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ABSTRACT 
 
This study analyses the institutional and organizational arrangements of irrigation water 
management and identifies the determinants of collective action and its effectiveness in 
managing communal irrigation schemes in the districts of Atsbi Wemberta (Tigray region) 
and Ada’a (Oromiya region), Ethiopia.  Results are based on data collected from a survey 
of 169 groups (communities) and 22 scheme level focus group interviews. All tabias which 
have irrigation projects that operated, in year 2006/07 are included. Analysis of descriptive 
and econometric methods are used. Analysis of qualitative information supplemented the 
econometric results. 
 
Our result reveals that in Atsbi, over 221.1 ha of land, there are 14 irrigation schemes 
which are used by 1855 beneficiary households. On the other hand, in Ada’a there are a 
total of 2059 irrigation water beneficiaries in 8 communal managed schemes, which 
irrigate 960.5 ha of land. Each irrigation scheme is a common property resource that is 
owned and managed by the community. In both study areas, each scheme has its own 
water users association which is administered by water users committee. The associations 
are local institutions which have a basic character of authority and by-laws. In addition, 
water users form groups at each outlet (block) level for administrative purposes, which are 
managed by group (block) leaders. They are 94 in Atsbi and 75 in Ada’a. In each 
irrigation schemes, rotational irrigation is practiced based on counting dates or 
complaints, but not based on the water need of plants. 
 
The econometric results show that collective action is more effective in irrigation water 
users of Atsbi than Ada’a. We also found evidence for an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between number of household beneficiaries and collective action. The findings also imply 
that community irrigation water management can contribute to a more sustainable 
irrigation water use and as a result in increasing agricultural production and productivity. 
Collective action for irrigation water management may be more beneficial and more 
effective in areas with  intermediate number of beneficiaries, in areas that are close to 
market access, in groups that have longer years of experience in irrigation water use, 
groups with larger family sizes, in communities with greater number of local 
organizations, and in schemes where there was participation of beneficiaries during 
construction of the scheme.  
  
Though women are found to be significantly involved in irrigation agriculture in male 
headed households, the revenue generated from agriculture is controlled by men. On the 
other hand, we found that the participation of female headed households at forum and 
leadership is very low. However, the estimation result shows that less number of conflicts 
and violation of rules are associated with high proportion of female household heads. This 
suggests policy intervention is needed to encourage the participation of women in farm, 
forum and at leadership level in water users association and in conflict resolution 
committee. In addition, effort should be made to change the wrong perception of the 
society towards gender inequality.   
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Our evidence also shows that instead of higher level of education status, it is greater 
number of provision of training which favors collective action. Thus, expansion of 
training for beneficiary farmers by governmental and non-governmental organizations 
will have a positive and a significant impact on increasing efficiency water use collectively. 
In communities that are more remote from markets or have larger number of 
beneficiaries, private–oriented approaches to resource management may be more effective. 
Access to formal credit and extension programs have a positive significant impact on 
collective action. Therefore, emphasis should be given on availability of such institutional 
support services. The  presence of external organizations reduce local efforts to enforce the 
restricted rules, suggesting that the roles of external organizations needs to be demand 
driven and complementary to local inputs . 
 
Generally, collective action in managing irrigation water functions well in both study 
woredas. It is found that farm households have started to grow crops which were not 
previously grown in the areas. It was also found that it has a positive impact on their 
income as well as on the living standard of their families. In addition, through time 
beneficiary farm households depend more on the production from their irrigated fields, 
which enabled them to harvest more than once a year.  Therefore, as beneficiary farmers 
shift to high value but perishable commodities, emphasis should be given to marketing 
extension, especially in facilitating markets and marker linkages to farmers. Furthermore, 
through time the demand for irrigation water increases among beneficiary farmers. 
Therefore, assigning of water rights and strengthening organization and operation of 
WUAs will be very essential for further efficient use of the common pool resource.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background of the Study  
Ethiopia is the second most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa, with an estimated 
population of over 77 million. In order to meet the food needs of its rapidly growing 
population, the country needs to double the production of its cereal production by 2025 
(IWMI, 2007). Agriculture is the largest sector of the economy contributing about 50 % 
of the country’s GDP and employing over 85% of the population. Agriculture in Ethiopia 
is mostly based on rain-fed small holder system (IWMI 2005). 
 
Although the Ethiopian agriculture is basically rainfall–based, the country is endowed 
with vast water resources including 12 major river basins and 22 natural and artificial 
lakes. Considering both the available on surface water resources and the annual run-off 
amount, it was estimated that there would be about 1707 m3 water /person/year available 
(Ibid). 
 
Rainfall in Ethiopia is characterized by high spatial and temporal variability. Moreover, 
land degradation, mostly soil erosion, deforestation and overgrazing is high and is one 
major cause of declining crop and livestock productivity in the country. The challenge the 
country is facing is how to meet the increasing food demand with the existing but 
dwindling natural resource base under worsening climatic conditions. It is important to 
apply the right agricultural practices and management systems in order to increase 
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agricultural productivity and production. This will require improved economic incentives, 
conducive organization policy and institutional environment for the agriculture sector. 
 
Irrigation is one means by which agricultural production can be increased to meet the 
growing food demands in Ethiopia. Irrigation can also stabilize agricultural production. 
Ethiopia indeed has significant irrigation potential. Realizing the potential irrigation 
development can contribute towards food security and improved welfare, the 
Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), has embarked on 
wide range of water development efforts throughout the country. A separate Ministry of 
Water Resource Development has been established.  
 
Irrigation development in Ethiopia has been focused on the agronomic, engineering and 
technical aspects of water projects, with little consideration to issues of management, 
beneficiary participation and availability of institutional support services. Moreover, in 
many developing countries the success of irrigation systems is highly affected by policy, 
institutional and social factors much more than technical issues (Gebemedhin and   
Peden, 2002). 
  
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
In rural Ethiopia, communities depend significantly on common property resources1 for 
irrigation water, fuel wood, grazing land and construction materials. However, most of 
these resources are exploited on a first come, first-served basis which results in the 
                                             
1 Common property resources are defined as those resources that are owned and managed by a given community. They 
are contrasted with open access resource, which have no defined owner (Gebremedhin et al, 2002) 
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inefficient utilization of the resources and inequalities in the distribution of benefits to 
users (Gebremedhin et al 2002). 
 
The solution to this problem in most developing countries depends not only on 
appropriate technologies and efficient market prices, but also on local level institutions of 
resource management and organizations that enforce them. This implies that just 
establishing the institutional set-up for the resource management is not a sufficient 
condition for sustainable use of the resources. Effectiveness in                               
internal governance is needed for the effective application of community rules. 
Therefore, the need to identify factors that facilitate or hinder the development and 
effectiveness of local formal and informal institutions and organizations becomes 
important (Ibid). 
 
Because water is liquid, it is characterized as flowing, seeping, evaporating and 
transpiring. These attributes cause problems in identifying the source and measuring the 
resource and also result in interdependencies among water users. Moreover, water 
supplies are often uncertain and variable. As a result of these attributes, the exclusive 
property rights which are the basis for an efficient exchange economy are difficult to 
establish and enforce. Relatively complex legal and administrative systems are needed in 
water allocation (Young, Daubert, Morel-Seytoux, 1986).  
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In Ethiopia, with food production already lagging behind, population growth, inefficient 
allocation of water for agriculture may worsen the problem of current food insecurity 
despite the availability a large volume of water in the country. 
 
Since 1991, the role of local communities in resource management has been increasing in 
Ethiopia. Locally there are different institutional arrangements for irrigation water 
management; examples include use of “water masters” and executives of water users’ 
associations. These institutional arrangements and the monitoring and enforcement of the 
laws and regulations have two implications; production (efficiency)2 and distributional 
(equity)3 dimensions. Water distribution to farmers can be explained based on timeliness 
and volume. Water available at the wrong time during the production process may be of 
little value, while water available in time but in lesser volume than needed may not have 
the desired effect on productivity. Hence, the design of the appropriate water 
management institutions becomes critical.  
  
However, little evidence exists regarding local level institutions and organizations for 
irrigated water management in Ethiopia. More generally, even if there is extensive 
literature on common property resource management (Ostrom, 1990; Bromley 1992), 
further empirical research is required to analyze institutional aspect of the common pool 
resource and to identify factors associated with collective action effectiveness and failure 
                                             
2 Efficiency refers to application of irrigation water to plots based on the requirement of the crop which 
takes into consideration soil type, crop type and stage of growth.   
3 Equity refers to equal distribution of irrigation water to all beneficiary farmers. It should be based on the 
required timeliness and volume. 
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in developing countries, since the effectiveness and failure of collective resource 
management strategies is likely to be context specific (Runge, 1992).  
 
1.3. Objectives of the Study 
The general objective of the study is to analyze the institutional and organizational 
aspects of irrigation water management in Ethiopia, and investigate the nature and 
determinants of collective action of irrigation management in Atsbi Wemberta and Ada’a 
Woredas in Ethiopia. 
 
Specific objectives of the study are: 
? To analyze the institutional and organizational arrangements of irrigation water 
management in the two woredas; 
? To assess the types of water management distribution mechanisms being used 
among site users and between upstream and downstream users; 
? To study the conflict resolution mechanisms used by irrigation water users; 
? To investigate the participation of women at different levels of irrigation water 
management and use; 
? To evaluate agricultural returns at each irrigation scheme; 
? To investigate the nature, levels and determinants of collection action for 
provision and appropriation of irrigation water. 
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1.4. Significance of the Study 
Ethiopia has developed a 15-year water development project for the period 2002-2016 in 
order to enhance the appropriate and comprehensive water use policies and related 
institutional arrangements. It  ensures  multiple  uses  of this  vital  resource  among  
various users. Among the water sectors agricultural water use has got the most attention 
through the strategy called Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI).  The  
intervention of  the  plan is to  address most  of the  supply-demand gap  within 15  years  
time  through  increasing  the number  of  large, medium and small  scale  irrigation 
schemes. In addition, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) recognizes, community 
managed small-scale irrigation water schemes as viable alternative to privatization and 
state ownership of the resource. 
  
Establishing appropriate water management institutions and strengthening capacity of 
water management organizations could help for efficient and equitable distribution of 
irrigation water for beneficiaries, thus contributing to increased productivity. Water 
management institutions are also important to avoid and manage conflicts and ensure the 
participation of women and the poor. In this regard, the findings of this study will 
contribute to narrowing the information gaps regarding the organizational and 
institutional context, management practices and collective action regarding irrigation 
water, and the major problems of irrigation development at the grass-root level. It will 
also shed some light on the problems of management and sustainability of agricultural 
water use in both areas. Therefore, the outcome of this study may serve as a source of 
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additional information for use by policy makers and planners during the design and 
implementation of irrigation development programs and prospects.  
 
1.5. Scope and Limitation of the Study 
This study is based on a cross-sectional data for the time period of 2006/07 aimed at 
analyzing institutions of irrigation water management in the two selected woredas, i.e., 
Atsbi Wemberta (one of the drought prone woredas in Tigray) and Ada’a (a relatively 
high agricultural potential area in the Oromiya region). 
  
The major limitations of the study relates to the unavailability of secondary data needed 
to supplement the primary data. Secondary data on investment costs, yield of previous 
production seasons and others were needed. In response to this limitation, we used 
triangulation data collection method, while we were collecting the data. Due to resource 
and time limitations, the study had to focus on only a few most important questions.  
 
1.6. Organization of the Report 
The study comprises eight chapters. Chapter two deals with review of literature. Chapter 
three presents methodology of the study and research hypotheses. Chapter four presents 
analysis of institutional arrangements of irrigation water management in Atsbi and Ada’a 
woredas. Chapter five presents results of the profitability analysis of irrigation agriculture in 
the study areas. Analysis of the participation of women in the irrigation sites are discussed in 
chapter six. Chapter seven deals with results of econometric analysis of the level and 
effectiveness of collective action for irrigation water management. Chapter eight concludes 
the thesis and presents implications. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
2.1. Nature and Roles of Institutions  
Institutions are the rules of the game in society. Formally, they are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction. As a result, they structure incentives in human 
exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way 
societies evolve through time and it is the key to understand historical changes (North, 
1990).  
 
From economics point of view, institutions define and limit the set of choices of 
individuals. They include any form of constraint that influences the action of individuals 
and shape human interaction. Institutions can be formal or informal: formal constraints 
are rules that human beings devise and informal constraints are conventions and codes of 
behavior. Institutional constraints include both what individuals are prohibited from 
doing and under what conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain 
activities. Therefore, they are the framework within which human interaction takes place. 
They are very similar to the rules of the game as in a competitive team sport. That is, they 
consist of formal written codes of conduct that underline and supplement informal rules. 
This means that if the formal rules or the informal codes are violated, punishment may be 
enforced (Ibid). 
 
The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable 
(but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction (North, 1990). Institutions 
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changes through time ranges from conventions, codes of conduct, and norms of behavior 
to state law, common law and contracts between individuals (Ostrom V., 1971). 
  
2.1.1. Why do Institutions Exist?  
If we combine a theory of human behavior and a theory of costs of transacting we can 
understand why institutions exist and what role they play in the functioning of societies. 
We can then analyze the role of institutions in the performance of economics. The 
costliness of information is the key to the costs of transacting, which consist of the costs 
of finding a transaction partner, measuring the valuable attributes of what is being 
exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements. 
These measurement and enforcement costs are the sources of social, political and 
economic institutions (Ostrom, 1990, North, 1992). 
 
For two hundred years the gains from trade were made possible through increasing 
specialization and division of labor and have been the cornerstone of economic theory. 
This implication of the costliness of economic exchange realizes the transaction costs 
approach from the traditional theory economists have taken from Adam smith. It was 
assumed that specialization can be realized by increasing the market and division of labor 
and end up with better economic performance and more specification. However, an 
exchange process which involves transaction costs suggests significant modifications in 
economic theory and very different implications for economic performance (ibid).  
 
According to Wallis and North (1986), transaction costs are growing overtime, since 
transaction increase as economy grow. The total costs of production consist of the 
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resource inputs of land, labor and capital involved both in transforming the physical 
attributes of a good’s size, weight, chemical composition etc, and in transacting, defining, 
protecting, and enforcing the property rights to goods (the right to use, the right to derive 
income from the use of, the right to exclude, and the right to exchanges). In addition, 
commodities, services, and the performance of agents have numerous attributes. Their 
levels also vary from one agent to another. Knowing the measurement of these levels is 
too costly to be fully accurate.  
 
Generally, institutions give the structure for exchange that (together with the technology 
employed) determines the cost of transacting and the cost of transformation. How well 
institutions solve the problems of coordination and production is determined by the 
motivation of the players (their utility function), the complexity of the environment, and 
the measurement and enforcement. Transaction cost of transfer constitute two parts: the 
market costs and the costs of time each party must devote to gather information. The 
greater the uncertainty of the buyer, the lower the value of the asset. The institutional 
structure also determines the risk to the seller that the contract would be violated. It is 
very important to note that the uncertainties with respect of security of rights are a critical 
distinction between the relatively efficient markets of high income countries today and 
economics in the past as well as those in the third world today (Ostrom,1986). 
 
2.1.2. Institutions in Economic Theory and Economic Performance 
We cannot see, feel, touch, or even measure institutions. They are constructs of the 
human mind but even the most convinced neoclassical economists admit their existence 
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and typically make them parameters (implicitly or explicitly) in their models. Institutions 
are the underlying determinant of the long-run performance of economies. If we are 
interested to construct a dynamic theory of change, it must be built on a model of 
institutional change (Hoff, 2003).   
 
Integrating institutional analysis into static neoclassical theory entails modifying the 
existing body of theory. But building a model of economic change needs the construction 
of an entire new theoretical framework, because no such model exists. Time path 
dependence is a key factor for a change in economic performance. Incorporating 
institutional factor into the economic model results in an approach that offers the promise 
of connecting micro level economic activity with the macro level incentives provided by 
the institutional framework (Williamson, 1986). 
 
According to Williamson (1986), the consequences of institutions for contemporary 
economic analysis can be summarized as follows:- 
? Economic and political models are specific to particular application of 
institutional constraints that differ radically both through time and cross 
sectionally in different economies. The models are very sensitive to institutions 
and end up with alternation of institutional constraints.  
 
? The assumptions of rational choice and efficient market hypothesis have curtained 
the implication of incomplete information and the complexity of environments 
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and human motivation. This enables us to understand not only why institutions 
exist but also how they influence outcomes.  
 
? Institutions play a major role influencing how much ideas and ideologies matter. 
They in turn shape the subjective mental constructs that individuals use to 
interpret the world around them and make choices. By structuring the interaction 
of human beings in certain ways, formal institutions determine the prices 
individuals pay for their actions. Moreover, they provide the freedom to 
individuals to incorporate their ideas and ideologies into the choices they make.  
 
? Political and economic decisions are interlinked in a way that they affect the 
performance of the economy. Therefore, a true political economy discipline must 
be developed. A set of institutional constraints define the exchange relationships 
between the two. A useful model of the macro and the micro aspects of an 
economy must build the institutional constraints into the model. 
 
2.1.3. The Economics of Institutions and the Source of Growth 
According to Matthews (1986), institutional changes have made a positive contribution to 
economics and growth. The idea of institutional change as a source of economic growth 
has taken two distinctly different forms: (1) institutions need continual adaptation in the 
face of a changing environment of technology and taste. Institutional change is a 
necessary part of economic change but not an independent source of it. (2) The 
movement towards Pareto-superior institutions cannot be achieved at once but as a very 
long run, possible permanent process. This process can come about by the continual 
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emergence and diffusion of institutional innovation, comparable to technological 
innovations. In other words, it can come about in a manner of a repeated game; in which 
people gradually learn or are selected against if they do not. For the state, it is easer to 
alter institutions than the private parties do, which implies that the state involvement with 
institutions is inherent. This is because the state is ultimate guarantor of property rights. It 
has to decide what kinds of rights and obligations it is prepared to recognize and enforce. 
 
2.2. Irrigation Water-A Common Pool Resource 
Two characteristics distinguish public goods from private goods 1) excludability that 
refers to the ability of supplies of a good or service to exclude or limit potential 
beneficiaries from consuming and 2) rivalry that refers to whether or not one person’s use 
or consumption of a good or services reduces its availability to another. As shown in the 
following table, private goods are characterized by both high excludability and high 
rivalry, while public goods are characterized by low excludability and low rivalry 
(http://www.econport.org) 
Table 2. 1. Taxonomy of Goods 
                                                                               Excludability 
         High                  Low 
Private Goods  
 
Common-Pool 
Resources 
 
Rivalry 
High 
 
Low Club Goods Public Goods 
(Toll Goods) 
Taxonomy of Goods 
Source: adapted from Ostrom, (1990) 
Water falls in the form of rain, and flows and evaporates with no regard to any boundary. 
Water is, however, subject to rivalry in consumption and, thus cannot be categorized as a 
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public good. Instead, it is a common pool resource, meaning that there is a finite amount 
that must be shared in common over a variety of uses and over geographic areas 
(Dalhuisen, 2000). 
 
Bromley (1992) has a slightly different view on that categorization. He stated that there is 
no such thing as a common property resource per se there are only resource controlled 
and managed as common property, state property, private property or resources over 
which no property rights have been recognized. For Bromley (1992) “Irrigation systems 
represent the essence of a common property regime. There is a well-defined group whose 
membership is restricted, there is an asset to be managed (the physical distribution 
system), there is an annual steam of benefits (the water which constitutes a valuable 
agricultural input), and there is a need for group management of both the capital stock 
and the annual flow (necessary maintenance of the system and process for allocating the 
water among members of the group of irrigators) to make sure that the system continues 
to yield benefits to the group.” 
 
In her seminal book “Governing the Commons”, Ostrom (1990) too complains about the 
misleading understanding when definitions are not clearly made. Failure to distinguish 
between subtractability of the ‘resource units’ (water spread on one farmer’s field cannot 
be spread onto the field of someone else) and the jointness of the resource system (all 
appropriators benefits from maintenance of an irrigation canal) leads to confusion about 
the relationship of common pool resources to public resources (or collective resources). 
Typical for a common pool resource is the subtractability of the resource unit, which 
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leads to the possibility of approaching the limits of the number of resources units 
produced (Osrtom, 1990). 
 
The well-known common pool dilemma is often the consequence. The expression 
“tragedy of the commons” is used to symbolize the degradation of the environment to be 
expected whenever many individuals use commonly a scarce resource. In Hardin’s 
famous article (1968), he explains the logic behind this model illustrating it by the well-
known example of a pasture with open access to all. The essence is that each herder is 
motivated to add more and more animals and bears only a share of the costs resulting 
from overgrazing. Since users are likely to ignore the effects of their actions on the pool 
when pursuing their self-interest, it must be concluded that most of the resources bear the 
risk of a tragedy of the commons. 
 
 In more recent literature, many authors like, McCay (2000), Olson (1965), Ostrom 
(1990) and Wade (1994) criticize the approaches to solve this social dilemma as 
insufficient. It is neither sufficient to create a system of private property rights, nor is it 
the only solution that the central government keeps control over common resources. 
Especially, Ostrom contributes to an empirically valid theory of self organization and self 
governance with the view to the problem of common pool resource (Ostrom, 1990). The 
implication is that collective action can be a means by which societies can overcome 
common property resources and use the resources in a sustainable way. Collective action 
is action taken by a group, either directly or on its behalf through an organization, in 
pursuit of members perceived shared interest (Marshall, 1998). 
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Water Users Association and collective Action –  
According to Von Benda -Beckmann and Von Bendci-Beckmam 2000 quoted in B. Van 
Koppen 2002 irrigation institutions are defined as the collective arrangements at scheme 
level for water control and use which include water distribution, construction of 
infrastructure, maintenance and rehabilitation. Water is derived from streams, dam, river 
diversion or groundwater, then allocated and distributed.   
 
Identification of factors that facilitate the establishment and effectiveness of collective 
action for irrigation development would help identify where collective action can easily 
be established and be effective, and where concerted effort is needed for the 
establishment and effectiveness of collective action. Key research issues regarding 
collective action for irrigation management include how people organize themselves with 
respect to irrigation water, what consistent and detectable influences of policies and other 
instruments can be deployed to modify stakeholder behavior, and how experience in 
participatory research and extension and common property management be used to 
facilitate local organizations for water management. The best starting point perhaps is to 
learn from the success of traditional irrigation systems, especially from the institutional 
and legal aspect of water administration and management. Understanding the evolution, 
development and functioning of traditional water uses associations4 should give 
important insights as to how to organize and develop modern irrigation associations 
(Gebremedhin and Peden, 2003). 
 
                                             
4 Water User Association can be arranged in informal or formal institutional aspect that collective action 
of irrigation water use is applied (Gebremedhin et al.2002).   
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International experience with farmer irrigation management suggests that, for a 
successful community management of irrigation schemes, the economic and financial 
costs of sustainable self –management must be a small proportion of improved income, 
the transaction cost of the organization must be low, and irrigation must be central to the 
improvement of livelihoods for a significant number of members. Developing local 
leadership skills for irrigation management also appears to be a key factor for successful 
collective irrigation management (ibid). 
 
2.3. Review of Empirical Literature-Evidence from outside Ethiopia 
The following empirical studies relate to this study either in the methodology applied or 
the issues discussed. The studies deal with on farmers’ and other stakeholders 
participation on local commons in developing economies; the impact of irrigation on 
different socio-economic groups; comparison between the performance of different 
institutional arrangements; relation between agricultural  productivity and irrigation and  
gender issues and women’s participation in irrigated agriculture.  
 
Vandersypen, et. al (2006), using descriptive and qualitative analysis, evaluated farmer 
organizations of water management at tertiary level5. The author focused on two principal 
activities of water management: water distribution and maintenance in Mali. For both 
activities, the rules in use and their ability to resolve possible collective action problem 
are assessed and the impact of the type of infrastructure on the rules was examined. The 
bulk of the data for this study was drawn from a questionnaire survey of 89 farmers on 59 
tertiary canals from five villages in Mali from June to October 2003.  
                                             
5 Tertiary level indicates sub-lateral canals. 
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Results showed that rules are devised only on 30% and 24% of the canals for water 
distribution and maintenance, respectively. Moreover, there is often no consensus on 
rules among farmers. Besides, monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms were absent. 
These results arose from individualistic behavior which caused problems on water 
distribution and maintenance for respectively 20% and 43% of the interviewed farmers. 
The study indicates that with water supply being abundant and the infrastructure recently 
rehabilitated, organization of water management at community level is not always 
required to avoid problems. 
 
Kurian and Dietz (2005) employed descriptive analysis to argue that participatory 
watershed management projects need not necessarily safeguard the interests of poorer 
rural households. The study was based on a survey and case study evidence from 28 
watershed management groups in Harayana, India.  They demonstrated that given a 
particular institutional contract, irrigation service provision by contractors proved to be 
more effective than provision by a community organization. It ensures that water 
allocation, collection of irrigation service fees and routine maintenance of irrigation 
infrastructure by contractors was more effective than the community. The analysis of 
benefit distribution reveals that wealthier landholding households benefited more from 
management of irrigation and forest resources as compared to relatively poorer 
households. With regard to the distribution of costs arising from watershed management, 
the researchers found that the workload for women was greater than that of men as a 
result of the doubling of agricultural yields under irrigation conditions. 
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Fujile, Hayami and Kikuchi (2005) examined factors affecting the success and failure of 
collective action for management of local commons in developing economies, using the 
case of irrigation in the Philippines. The study was based on cross-section survey of 46 
irrigators’ associations in 25 national irrigation systems under the command of the 
National Irrigation Administration over six provinces in the Philippines: Batangas, 
Cavity, Laguna, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro and Quezon.  
 
Results of Probit and OLS regressions were consistent with the hypothesis that collective 
action by water users for the operation and maintenance of irrigation system is difficult to 
organize (a) where the water shortage rarely occurs (b) where the difference in water 
supply is large between upstream and downstream farmers (c) where irrigator’s 
association is large in terms of service area and the number of farmer beneficiaries within 
its territory, (d) where the local community is sparsely populated, involving low social 
interactions (e) where farm households have the option of ready exit from farm to non-
farm economic activities and (f) where farmers had traditionally practiced rain-fed 
farming with no previous experience in managing communal irrigation systems.  
 
Panjab et. al (2004) in Pakistan studied the causes of low productivity of land and water, 
using panel data from irrigated settings in Chaj sub-basin of the Indus basin. Lalian and 
Khadir are the two tributaries which were used in this study. The result show that there is 
a significant difference in wheat yields across head, middle and tail reaches, within and 
across water courses along the two tributaries. Farmers who had land in head-reaches had 
higher yield than in tail-reaches. However, yield differences among head, middle and tail-
  
 
20 
Pa
ge
20
 
ends are found to be much higher than within water courses. The study also found that, in 
places where canal water was in extreme short supply there were no significant gains in 
aggregate yields and crop profitability.  
 
Using purely qualitative data, Theesfeld (2001), analyzed constraints for collective action 
in Bulgaria’s irrigation sector, in three different regions of Bulgaria’s irrigation sector. 
(Veliko Tamowo, Pavel Banja, Haskowo regions). Two kinds of case studies were 
conducted, in the three months field study. First 17 village case studies were made which 
gave an overview about the irrigation situation in the villages. The second kind of case 
studies is in depth studies of four villages which gave much more specific and very 
detailed information. 
 
The results showed that most of the people living in the selected areas were too old and 
were no more active in agricultural production. Most of them were subsistence producers 
having less than 20 decors6.  Only a few young families wanted to live on agriculture and 
they had to rely on irrigation for their production. Therefore, only a small actor group 
was concerned when discussing changes in operational irrigation rules towards collective 
action. The attitude towards collective action was very pessimistic and there seems to be 
no trust among the villagers. Moreover, individualistic behavior prevailed. Especially the 
actor’s characteristics and the information asymmetry pave the way for opportunistic 
behavior. The author attempted to show the effects of the following factors on collective 
action  
                                             
61 decor =0.1 hectare.   
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(1) resource system characteristics, (2) the resource characteristics, (3) the actor 
groups characteristics, (4) the evolving local rules in use, (5) the effective 
institutional settings and (6) the formal political settings.  
 
The researcher used qualitative method of analysis but it could be more appropriate to use 
instead econometric analysis to investigate each effect on the collective action. In 
addition the author concentrated on three regions of Bulgaria, but tried to generalize the 
results to all parts of the country.  
 
Makombe et.al (2001) compared and evaluated the performance of traditional irrigation 
system (bani) with governmental and community irrigation systems in Zimbabwe. They 
used a sample of 149 from government system, and 69 from community and 42 from 
bani (traditional) systems. In addition, plot level data were collected. They used frontier 
production function analysis in order to estimate technical inefficiency across farms.  
 
The results showed that the formal systems require by far greater amounts of inputs like 
land, fertilizer, and irrigation to produce a fairly same level of output with the bani 
system. Marginal and average productivities of inputs except labour are higher for the 
bani system compared to the other, which imply that the bani (traditional system) has a 
potential to achieve the objectives of irrigation.  
 
Meinzen-Dick et.al (2000) identified factors that affect organization of water users’ 
associations and collective action by farmers in major canal irrigation system in India. 
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The study was based on qualitative and econometric analysis of a stratified sample of 48 
irrigation outlets in four irrigation systems (two each in Rajasthan and Karnataka). The 
study first examined the conditions under which farmers are likely to form formal or 
informal associations at the outlet level (serving several watercourses and one or more 
villages). Results indicate that organizations are more likely to be formed in larger 
commands, closer to market towns and in sites with religious centers and potential 
leadership from college graduates and influential persons. Number of beneficiaries at 
head or tail-end location did not have a major effect. Lobbying activities are not more 
likely where there are organizations, but organizations do increase the likelihood of 
collective maintenance work. 
 
Pender and Sherre (1999), investigated the determinants of local organizational density 
and the impact of local and external organizations on collective action and private natural 
resource management decisions using econometric analysis. The study was based on a 
survey of 48 villages in the central hillsides regions of Honduras. 
 
With regard to the determinants of local organizational development in central Honduras, 
the main findings of the study were that population growth contributes to organizational 
development at low level of growth. However, it has a diminishing and possibly negative 
effect at high growth rate. Proximity to the urban center reduces local organizational 
presence. In addition, the presence of immigrants appears to favor local organizational 
development. Local organizational development related to natural resource management 
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is positively associated with population density (land scarcity) and positively associated 
with education level and expansion of coffee production. 
 
The result also indicates that local organizations contribute to collective investment in 
natural resource management and assist in regulating use of common property resources 
and dealing with externalities. Local organizations have mixed impact on farmers’ private 
decisions to adopt resource conservation measures, such as no burn practices and plowing 
in crop residues. External governmental organizations seem to displace collective 
investment in natural resource management, though they promote other kinds of 
collective investment such as construction and maintenance of water systems and roads. 
External organizations have a stronger impact on promoting adoption of labor-intensive 
conservation measures (such as no-burn, plowing in crop residues and terracing) on 
private cropland. 
 
Bastidas (1999), examines gender issues and women’s participation in irrigated 
agriculture in Carchi, Ecuador. Data for this study were collected during two summer 
field visits (June-August 1996 and May-August 1997). A combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods was used for analysis. The findings showed that women’s 
participation in irrigated agriculture was higher in female-headed households (10% of the 
households in the study area). In young couples who have small children, women’s 
participation was very limited by family obligations. In old couples lived by themselves, 
women were either too old or too sick to participate. In households where the couple had 
no small children, women preferred to engage in other activities where they could control 
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their income. It was also found that women with a rural background are more likely to 
participate in irrigated agricultural activities than those with an urban background. 
Although women’s participation in water user associations is low, and culture plays a 
strong role in terms of their decision-making power. In the contrary, women who had 
higher than average education occupied positions of leadership in the water user 
organizations. Also, women tried to solve their irrigation-related problems through 
informal ways where they had more decision making power. 
 
Makombe and Sampath (1998) evaluated the performance of smallholder irrigation 
systems in Zimbabwe. They took three smallholder irrigation systems; two from 
government managed system and one from the community or farmer managed irrigation 
system. In order to evaluate the production efficiency, they use production function 
analysis. The Theil information theoretic measure is used to evaluate inequality in the 
distribution of benefits from irrigation and the Theil forecast error method is used to 
evaluate management performance. The results shows that the farmer managed irrigation 
system performed better consistently than the government managed irrigation system in 
production, distribution and management performance.  
 
Zwarteveen (1997) explored the implications of individual allocation of irrigated plots in 
terms of intra-household labor allocation, agricultural productivity and intra-household 
gender relations in Burkina Faso. A detailed semi-structured individual and group 
interviews with male and female members of 20 households were conducted in the Dakiri 
irrigation system in Burkina Faso during the 1994 wet season. Each of these 10 
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households had a female and a male holder of an irrigated plot and the other 10 had only 
male plot-holders. The findings of the study show that the productivity of both irrigated 
land and labor is higher in households where both men and women have an irrigated plot 
each, in comparison with households in which only men have plots. Women are equally 
good as men or even better in irrigated farming. Their motivation to invest labor in 
irrigated production increase when they have their own irrigated plots. The proportion of 
labor contributed by women to men’s plots is virtually the same. The increase in income 
obtained by having irrigated plots reduces women’s economic dependence on men, and 
strengthens their bargaining position within the household. 
 
2.4. Irrigation Development in Ethiopia 
Traditional irrigation has a very old history in Ethiopia, especially in some parts of the 
country like Konso. The country’s irrigation potential ranges from 1.0 to 3.5 million 
hectares of irrigable land, of which between 160 –190 thousand hectares (5-10%) is 
estimated to be currently irrigated (Gebemedhin and Peden, 2002). About 65,000 hectares 
of land is operated by 359,000 farmers under traditional small scale irrigation in Ethiopia 
(MoWR, 1997). Per capita irrigated area is also estimated at about 35 m2, compared with 
the world average of 450 m2. About 352 thousand hectares of land is said to be irrigable 
using small–scale irrigation schemes (Gebemedhin and Peden, 2002).  
 
Although, traditional irrigation system had been practiced for centuries in highlands of 
the country, modern water development schemes are recent phenomenon in Ethiopia. The 
first initiative to develop irrigation was taken by the imperial government in 1950’s. Most 
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of the initiative concentrated in the Awash valley. At the beginning of 1970’s, about 100 
thousand hectares of land was estimated to be under modern irrigation. During the 
imperial regime, the main objective of irrigation was to provide industrial crops to the 
growing agro-industries in the country, many of which were controlled by foreign 
interests, and to increase export earnings (Gebemedhin and Pedon, 2002).  
 
After the fall of the imperial regime, the all large–scale irrigation schemes were 
nationalized by the military government and handed over to the Ministry of State Farms. 
Most of the landlord based small scale irrigation schemes also fell into the hands of 
producer-cooperatives. The military government also gave much emphasis to large-scale 
irrigation system schemes which were used by the nationalized agro-industrial and 
agricultural enterprises. In all these times the importance of small-scale irrigation was 
marginalized. It was after the devastating famine of 1984/85 that the government showed 
some interest on small-scale irrigation system. In response to these catastrophic droughts 
Irrigation Development Department (IDD) was established in the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA). However, only 35 small-scale projects were constructed until 1991(ibid).  
 
After 1991, when EPRDF took power, the focus on large-scale irrigation development 
and the neglect of small-scale schemes was reversed. The EPRDF government has given 
more attention to the development of small-scale irrigation schemes and improvement of 
farmer–managed traditional schemes at the forefront of its water development policy. The 
establishment of MoWR (Ministry of Water Resources) enables the unification of public 
agency for water resources development. Irrigation Development Department (IDD) was 
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dissolved in 1994 and was replaced by Regional Commissions for Sustainable 
Agriculture and Environment Rehabilitation (Co-SAERS) in a number of regions. The 
primary mandate of the Co-SAERs also remained rather technical–oriented, with 
inadequate attention accorded to policy, socio-economic and institutional issues. 
However, there have been significant improvements in beneficiary participation 
compared with during the military regime. 
 
2.5. Irrigation Management Experiences in Ethiopia  
According MoWR (2002) as cited in IWMI (2005), irrigation schemes in Ethiopia are 
classified into three on the basis of size of land area irrigated.  
1. Large and medium scale irrigation – Irrigation projects in Ethiopia are identified 
as large-scale irrigation if the command area is greater than 3,000 hectare, medium–scale 
if it falls in the range of 200 to 3,000 hectare. Even though these types of irrigation 
schemes are considered important; the number of such projects has remained stagnant in 
the last decade. They are associated with useful infrastructure development, create job 
opportunities, and contribute to agricultural growth and the macro economy. Parallel to 
the water sector development program, there are a remarkable effort to develop master 
plans for various river basins. Actually, comprehensive master plans for five basins have 
already been developed.  
 
2. Small scale irrigation schemes - it includes traditional small–scale schemes up to 
100 hectare and modern communal schemes up to 200 hectare. There might also be 
especial instances, such as the traditional spate irrigation in Tigray which would cover up 
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to 400 hectare. The construction of these kinds of schemes is initiated by farmers with 
limited assistance from the government. The farmers manage it through their own water 
users association or committees. The farm size varies from 0.25 hectare and 0.5 hectare. 
Water user associations have long existed to manage traditional schemes. They are well 
organized and operated effectively. There is strong social capital in such areas; therefore, 
there is not a problem of information asymmetry. Typically, members’ number can be up 
to 200 users who share a main canal or a branch canal. They may be grouped into several 
teams of 20 to 30 farmers each. The associations handle construction, water allocation; 
operation and maintenance functions. Small-scale modern schemes can be also 
constructed by the Federal or Regional government in order to overcome the catastrophic 
climatic change and drought since 1973. Such schemes involved dams and the diversion 
of streams and rivers. After construction, usually they are handed over to Water Users 
Associations for management, operation and maintenance with the support of personnel 
from Regional Bureaus (IWMI, 2005).  
 
Generally, small scale systems may have greater advantages than large scale systems. 
Small scale technology can be based on farmers’ existing knowledge, local technical, 
managerial and entrepreneur skills.  Migration and resettlement of the labor is not usually 
required, planning can be more flexible. In addition, social infrastructure requirements 
are lower. On the other hand, large projects can ensure the benefit of the surrounding 
population by providing employment opportunities. However, the successfulness of the 
irrigation system is not determined by its size but by its institutional, physical and 
technical factors (ibid). 
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3. Micro-irrigation – This system is not understood in the same way in the different 
places of the country. Sometimes the term is used for small-scale schemes of less than 
one hectare developed at household level, such as rainwater harvesting. Others consider 
micro irrigation in relation to the technology used. For example, drip irrigation needs 
treadle and small power pumps to lift water; and a variety of irrigation application 
technologies, such as small bucket and drip systems and small sprinkler systems. Micro- 
irrigation has the following advantages:- it can be used individually, low cost in terms of 
their capital and operating costs per farm. They are efficient in use of water with high 
productivity, with improving crop quality and reducing labor costs. Currently, the use of 
micro irrigation in Ethiopia is low with regard to area covered or volume of water used. 
Actually the use of micro irrigation by poor farmers has not properly begun in the 
country. Its introduction is a recent phenomenon and some attempts are done by the 
government, some NGOs and Universities (IWMI, 2005). 
 
2.6. Empirical Review of Literature on Common Property Resource Management in 
Ethiopia 
2.6.1 Irrigation Management 
Salilih (2007) employed both qualitative and quantitative approach, to assess the 
contribution of irrigation on household food security and irrigation management and 
problems associated with it in the case of Zingni and Fetam small-scale irrigation 
schemes in blue Nile basin of Amahara national regional state. The findings of the study 
revealed that irrigation contribution on minimizing household’s socio-economic poverty 
significantly vary from one irrigation scheme to another. Its contribution also vary across  
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irrigation systems depending on the physical structures of the scheme, amount of 
irrigation water, plot size, availability of agricultural inputs, management qualities and 
educational status of individual farmers to accept new ideas. For instance, 83.3 % and 
42% respondents in Wonjella (Fetam) and Deninatquashta Kebeles (Zingni) ,respectively 
confirmed that improved irrigation system benefited them to minimize households’ socio-
economic poverty. However, the degree of poverty is still high in Deninatquashta than in 
Wonejella Kebele and socio-economic and institutional problems are commonly much 
higher among female-headed households especially those households that have no close 
relatives and farmers who are disabled and aged. The two modern schemes are 
constrained by socio-cultural and technical problems. With the presence of these 
problems it is very different to generalize that irrigation system can reduce household 
socio-economic and institutional poverty.  
 
Finally, the author forwarded conclusion and recommendation based on the findings, 
farmers participation from inception to completion of irrigation projects should be a 
prerequisite for the sustainability of irrigation schemes, equitability and security in access 
and right to resource such as land, water and credit. In addition, training on irrigation 
water management contribute to break rural households’ socio-economic poverty and 
help mainstreaming of gender in each irrigation management activities. 
 
Checkol and Alamirew (2007) conducted a study on technical and institutional evaluation 
of Geray irrigation scheme in west Gojjam zone, Amhara region, Ethiopia. The technical 
evaluation was made by looking into the selected performance indicators such as 
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conveyance efficiency, application efficiency7, water delivery performance8 and 
maintenance indicators. The result of the study showed that the main and tertiary canals 
conveyance efficiencies were 92% and 82%, respectively. Many of the secondary9 and 
tertiary canals are poorly maintained and many of the structures are disfunctional. 
Moreover, application efficiency monitored on three farmers’ plot located at different 
ends of a given secondary canal ranged 44 % up to 57%. Water delivery performance was 
only 71% implying a very substantial reduction from design of the canal capacity. 
Besides, maintenance indicator evaluated in terms of water level charge10 (31.9%) and 
effectiveness of infrastructures11 (67%) shows that the scheme management was in a very 
poor shape. 
 
The result also depicts that the 47% of the land initially planned is currently under 
irrigation while there was no change in the water supply indicating that the sustainability 
of the scheme is in doubt. The scheme has been managed by Water Users Association for 
four years, despite the fact that it was constructed 27 years ago. Moreover, the study 
shows that the overall performance of the Water Users Association in terms of managing 
the schemes was very poor. Furthermore, support services rendered to the beneficiaries 
were minimal. There were very few indicators that production was market oriented.  
Ironically, farmers didn’t recognize market as their problem. Conflict resolution has been 
                                             
7 Application efficiency indicates watering crops using irrigation water without wastage but applying 
according to the crop requirement rate.  
8 Water delivery performance shows that whether beneficiary farmers get water at the appropriate time and 
volume 
9 Secondary and tertiary canals refer to lateral and sub-lateral canals 
10 Water level charge implies the amount of money farmers ought to pay for using irrigation water 
11 Effectiveness of infrastructure indicates how much the irrigation infrastructure functions 
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the duty of the Kebeles Council and Water Users Association has no legal authority to 
enforce its by-laws. 
 
A study by Shimelis (2006) evaluated the institutional and management practices of small 
scale irrigation systems in Ethiopia. He took the case of two small scale irrigation 
systems in eastern Oromiya: Gibe Lemu and Gambela Terra. A total of 65 sample 
households were selected from 216 households. Interview with key informants, Water 
Users Association committee members and different experts were made. Focus group 
discussion was also held.  
 
The result shows that the irrigation systems were poorly managed in terms of water 
allocation and distribution, conflict management and system maintenance, because of 
lack of well-established organizational and institutional conditions. The water user 
associations are not well organized and found to be weak to run the irrigation systems. 
Users have problematic social relation. Clearly defined and well-enforced land and water 
rights are non-existent at the operational level. Regarding technical resources such as 
improved seed that is adaptive to the situation of irrigation, labor and knowledge of 
irrigated agriculture (extension service and capacity building for irrigators) have not been 
met in the two irrigation systems.  
 
Zeleke (2006) employed qualitative approach, to examine water rights and the process of 
negotiations among irrigators along Indris modern scheme in Toke Kutaye district, West 
Shoa zone, Ethiopia. The findings of the research depicted that Indris scheme marked 
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three different significant phases in its historical development. In these phases, 
exploration pertaining to water rights and processes of negotiations were found to be at 
their immature ground. Multiple water right rules emanating both from the customary and 
formal water acts have co-existed to direct the actions of users. In this regards, the 
theoretical orientations of pluralism in water right paradigms proved to coincide with the 
programmatic context of water users from the scheme. Furthermore, the main reasons for 
conflict occurrence in connection to irrigation water use and rights are decline in the 
volume of water resource, institutional failures to address the causes adequately, week 
observance on governing water right rules and increasing demands of users. As a result, 
negotiation process aiming to settle disputes was repeatedly initiated either by users, 
committee members (elder) or courts.  
 
Gebremedhin and Pender (2002) analyzed the productivity of irrigation in the highlands 
of Tigray in 1998/99. The survey was based on 50 communities and 100 villages. The 
result showed that irrigation was found to increase the intensity of input use, especially 
labor, oxen, improved seeds and fertilizer. Controlling for other factors, use of manure or 
compost was about 50% more likely on irrigated plots than on rain-fed plots. By 
increasing such inputs, irrigation contributed to increase crop production. The predicted 
impact of irrigation was 18% increase in crop production relative to rain-fed field plots. 
On the contrary, the impact of irrigation on the productivity of land management 
practices was statistically insignificant.  
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In the same way, another survey was done in Amhara highlands of Ethiopia. Irrigation 
was associated with improved technologies such as fertilizer and manure, and other 
inputs like improved seeds and pesticides, labor and draft power. However, the impact of 
irrigation on the productivity of farming practices was insignificant (after controlling 
other factors) (Benin et al. 2002).  
 
Gebremedhin and Pender (2002) recommended that in both the highlands of Amhara and 
Tigray, the reason for failure of irrigation to improve productivity of farming practices 
needs further careful research on the technical, institutional, governance and managerial 
aspects of irrigation. In addition, they also suggested that such an investigation can give 
important guidance for policy and institution intervention to increase the impact of 
irrigation on productivity and income.  
 
2.6.2 Management of Other Common Pool Resources 
Gebremedhin et.al (2002) using both descriptive and econometric analyses investigated 
the nature and determinants of collective action and its effectiveness in managing 
woodlots in Tigray, northern Ethiopia. The study was based on a survey of 50 tabias12 in 
the highlands of Tigray, in 1998-99 cropping season. The empirical models adopted by 
the study were Tobit, Probit and OLS. Results of the study revealed that despite the 
community benefits were limited due to various restrictions on use of woodlots, 
collective action in managing woodlots generally functions well in Tigray, which 
supports the role of community resource management in redressing resource degradation. 
                                             
12 Tabias- The smallest administrative unit in Tigray, comprising usually four or five villages 
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Benefits were greater and reported problems of managing the woodlots were less on 
woodlots managed at the village level than on those managed at the higher tabia level. 
 
The econometric analysis showed that the factors that significantly affect collective 
action include population density (higher collective labor input and lower planting 
density at intermediate than at low or high density), market access (less labor input, 
planting intensity and tree survival where market access is better) and presence of 
external organizations promoting the woodlot (reduces local effort to protect the woodlot 
and tree survival). The finding of an inverse U-shaped relationship between population 
density and collective labor input is consistent with induced innovation theory, with the 
increased labor/land ratio promoting collective effort to invest in resources as population 
density grows to a moderate level, while incentive problem may undermine collective 
action at high level of population density. 
 
Gebremedhin and Pender (2002) examined the nature and determinants of collective 
action for grazing land management in the highlands of Tigray, northern Ethiopia. The 
results were based on data collected from a survey of 50 tabias which were selected using 
a stratified random sampling. Both descriptive and econometric analysis revealed that 
collective action for grazing land management is widespread in the highlands of Tigray 
and reportedly contribute to sustainable use of the resource. Most collective action is 
locally initiated and is organized at the village level. Communities which have smaller 
areas of restricted grazing land per household exhibited higher levels of various 
indicators of collective action (payment for the guard, establishment of penalty system 
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and reported less violations). There is also an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
population level and collective action. Market access detracts from collective action as 
does wealth heterogeneity of community. Experience in organizing and running local 
organizations encourages collective actions for grazing land management. 
 
Benin and Pender (2006), using data from 98 villages in the highlands of Amhara region, 
examined the determinants of collective action and its effectiveness in communal grazing 
lands management and the effect of restricting access and use in certain grazing areas on 
the condition of other communal grazing resources. 
 
The results of descriptive analysis reveal that more than one-half of the communities had 
at least one such restricted grazing area, with the total area in each of those communities 
averaging twenty-two hectares. About 70 percent of the restricted grazing lands were 
managed at the village level, while the remaining was managed at a higher Kebele level.  
 
Result of econometric analysis showed that collective action is more likely to be 
successful in communities that have large areas, are far from markets, and where wealth 
is more equally distributed. Where there is more alternative source of feed and in 
irrigated areas, collective action is not likely to succeed. In addition, increasing the 
proportion of restricted grazing land has a robust negative impact on the quality of other 
unrestricted grazing resources, although managing the restricted grazing land at the lower 
village level had a robust positive impact. Population growth has had negative effect on 
availability, quality and erosion level of grazing lands. Besides, severity of erosion of 
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grazing lands was lower in areas with higher rainfall areas and better access to credit and 
extensions programs offered by NGO’S. 
 
Thus, we can observe that from the aforementioned literature review the gap and linkage 
existed on the institutional and organizational context of communal managed resources in 
Ethiopia both from the objectives of the studies and the methodology used.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCE OF DATA 
3.1. Description of the Study Areas  
The data for the analysis is obtained from a community-level survey in Atsbi Wemberta 
woreda in Tigray Region and Ada’a woreda in Oromiya Region. 
 
3.1.1. Astbi Wemberta Woreda 
Astbi Wemberta woreda is located about 860 km north of Addis Ababa; 65 km northeast 
of the capital of Tigray Regional State, Mekelle. About half of the distance from Mekelle 
to the capital of the woreda, Endasselassie, is off the main road from Mekele to Adigrat 
to the east departing at the town of Agula’e. This woreda is one of those woredas in 
Tigray that borders the Afar Regional State. The woreda is geographically located 
13037’N latitude and 39030’E longitude. There are 16 peasant association (administrative 
localities, called tabia) and 2 town dwellers associations in the woreda. A combined total 
area of the woreda is estimated at 1223km2. The areas of the 16 PAs ranges from 26.5 
km2 (Hadinet) to 209 km2 (Kilesha Emene). According to the recent woreda population 
reports, the estimated total number household heads in the woreda was 21,398, with total 
population of 110,578 in 2003/04 (Atsbi Wemberta Woreda Pilot Learning Site 
Diagnosis, 2005).  
 
Agro ecologically, the woreda is classified as Dega. Altitude in the area ranges from 918 
to 3,069 m and 75% of the woreda is in upper highlands (2600masl or above) and only 
25% is found in midlands (between 1500 and 2600m asl) and lowlands (below 1500m 
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asl).  Lithic Leptosols are the soil types covering nearly 100% in the woreda, except in 
some parts where Vertic Cambisols are also observed (Ibid). 
   
Altitude and rainfall increases from south to north and east to west. Shortage of rainfall is 
a major constraint of agricultural production in the woreda. Rainfall is usually intense and 
short in duration. The average annual rainfall in (1995/96 to 2002/03) was 642 mm/yr. 
Under normal conditions, rain starts around the last days of June. As a result of all these, 
Atsbi Wemberta is one of the drought prone woredas in the Tigray region. The area 
receives bimodal rainfall: Belg (short rains) from Mach to April and Meher (long rainy 
season) from June to September. The short rainy season is not reliable enough for crop 
production except for growing grass for livestock. Nearly all the cereals and legumes are 
planted during the main rain (Ibid). 
 
The woreda is classified into two farming systems– i) Pulse /Livestock system-Nine of 
the 16 PAs grow barley, wheat, pulses and small ruminants farming system and are found 
starting from the central southern parts of the woreda to the tip north. Barley is the 
dominant crop followed by wheat and pulses. The altitude of these PAs in this farming 
system is around 2600 m asl or higher and as a result, frost is one of the major crop 
production problems in the area. 
 
ii) Apiculture/livestock farming system- Teff, wheat, barley, livestock and apiculture 
system is predominant in parts of the woreda where altitude is below 2600masl. This 
system is found starting from the middle of the woreda to the southern end. There are 7 
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PAs that belong to this farming system. A good part of the eastern escarpment is known 
for honey production. 
 
Despite the large population of livestock, livestock productivity is low as in many other 
parts of Tigray. The population of livestock in Atsbi is 48,870; 72,471; 10,427 and 
10,000 heads of cattle, sheep, goats and equines, respectively. The number of poultry is 
estimated at about 44,000. Out of the cattle population, there are an estimated 16,319 
drought oxen. On the other hand, there are 6,729 beehives of which 2,000 are modern 
ones. 
 
3.1.2. Ada’a Woreda 
Ada’a woreda is one of the woredas in east Shoa Oromiya region which is located about 
47 km southeast of the capital Addis Ababa. The woreda is geographically located 8030’ 
N latitude and 39017’ E longitude.  The woreda covers an area of 92,751.33 ha stretching 
east of the Bole International Air Port to the Northwest of Koka dam. The population in 
Addis Ababa, Adama and Bishoftu create a large market for most agricultural 
commodities.  
 
There are 27 peasant associations and 9 town dwellers associations with a total 
population of 138,147, of which, 18,450 and 1,912 are male and female headed 
households, respectively. 
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Agro-ecologically, the woreda is best suited for diverse agricultural production. There are 
a number of rivers and crator lakes that are being used for irrigated agriculture. There are 
two cropping seasons in the area. Belg (short rainy season) from March to April and 
Meher (main rainy season) from June to September. Belg rains are mainly used for initial 
breaking of the soil. Meher rain which accounts for about 74% of the annual precipitation 
is the most economically important rain for crop production. March, April and May are 
the hottest months and November and December are the coldest months. The long term 
(1953-2003) average rainfall recorded by ILRI Debre Zeit and EARO Debre Zeit 
research stations are found to be 839mm/yr. Mean minimum and maximum temperature 
recorded for 27 years ranged from 7.90c to 280c, respectively. Mean annual temperature 
for the same period was 18.50c (Ada’a Woreda Pilot Learning Site Diagnosis and 
Program Design, 2005). 
 
Black clay (locally called Koticha) and red light soils are the dominant type. Lithosol (red 
light soils) in Ada’a is highly degraded infertile soils, while Vertsol is generally fertile 
with good moisture holding capacity. They are hard and crack during dry and sticky 
when it is wet (ibid). 
 
Livestock production is an integral part of the production system. Production of cattle, 
sheep, goat and poultry is a common practice and there is an existing market–oriented 
production system (fattening and dairy production). The population of livestock in the 
woreda is 138,738; 19,305; 28,501; 1,094; 1,191; 34,900 and 922,002 heads of cattle, 
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sheep, goats, mules, horses, donkeys and poultry, respectively. Moreover, honey 
production is another source of livelihood of farmers in specific sites of the woreda. 
 
3.2. Data Source and Sampling 
This study relies on primary cross-sectional data collected in 2006/07 cropping season 
that is obtained from five types of semi-structured community level questionnaires. All 
tabias13 which have irrigation projects operated during the study period, 2006/07 
cropping season were included in the study. In other words, during the study period, 14 
and 8 irrigation projects were operating in Atsbi and Ada’a, respectively. All these 
irrigation schemes were included in the study. The questionnaires were administered at 
tabia (kebele), scheme and group levels.  
 
There are 94 and 75 groups of beneficiary farmers (Gujele(in Atsbi) and Gere(in Ada’a). 
Gujele and Gere refer to the smallest administrative unit of Water Users Association 
(irrigation scheme). The size of a group (the number of beneficiaries) differs from tabia 
to tabia. The size of the group is decided by the community and ranges from 4- 280 
number of beneficiaries in Atsbi and 8 up to 297 beneficiary farmers in Ada’a.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
13 Tabia, Peasant Association and Kebele have the same meaning. In this study, the three of them represent 
the lowest administrative units in Tigray and Oromiya regions, which comprise usually four to five villages. 
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Table 3.1. Tabias and PAs included in the study 
 
S. No. Name of Tabias in Atsbi included in the study 
No. of groups 
(Gojeles) 
Name of PAs in Ada’a 
included in the study 
No. of groups 
(Gere’s) 
1 Golgol Naele 37 Godino 31 
2 Feleg Woini 6 Kataba 17 
3 Ruba Feleg 4 Ganda Gorba 3 
4 Zarema 2 Koftu 9 
5 Adi Mesaenu 4 Hidi 15 
6 Haressaw 25   
7 Hadnet 9   
8 Hayelom 7   
Total  94  75 
 
One method for collecting valid and reliable case study data is triangulation. 
Triangulation means using multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1994; Bitsch, 2001). This 
opportunity is the major strength and advantage of a case study strategy. Data 
triangulation was also ensured in this study by collecting data from different data sources. 
The first type of questionnaire was a community level questionnaire on 169 groups (94 
Gujeles and 75 Geres). Each interview involved ten respondents chosen randomly to 
represent different age, gender, position in the irrigation scheme, level of education 
(literate and illiterate), income (low, middle and high). This questionnaire helped us to 
collect information on nature and determinants of collective action, its failure and 
effectiveness of the communal managed irrigation system in both woredas. 
  
Effort was also exerted to conduct in depth focus group discussions with beneficiaries at 
each scheme level that ranged from 10 to15 beneficiary farmers within the same scheme. 
As Ostrom (1994) stated, theorists interested in institutional questions have to dig deeper 
to understand how rules combine with a physical and cultural world to generate particular 
types of situations. This data collection method was undertaken in all irrigation schemes 
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of the two woredas. It gave much more specific and very detailed information about the 
institutional context of the communal managed irrigation schemes such as water 
distribution systems, conflict resolution mechanisms and legal framework. The number of 
female headed households in the schemes are very small (21.67% in Atsbi and 13.4% in 
Ada’a). As a result, there was under–representation of women. Therefore, in addition, 
discussion with female-headed irrigation water beneficiary households in eight tabias of 
Atsbi and five PAs of Ada’a was carried out, in order to enhance the availability and 
quality of information related to women farm decision makers in the irrigation sites. The 
participant ranged from 7-10 women household heads within the same irrigation scheme. 
Additional data were also gathered at each tabia level in order to capture the cost farmers 
incurred and benefits they accrued from using irrigation water in year 2006/07. It enabled 
us to measure the profitability of beneficiaries. Furthermore, interview with experts 
working on irrigation in different offices of governmental and non governmental 
organizations have been undertaken.  As a result, substantial quantitative and qualitative 
information were gathered and analyzed.  
 
3.3. The Field Procedure  
The first step of the fieldwork was brief field visits for 5 consecutive days in Atsbi (6-10, 
November 2006) and 7 days in Ada’a (November 28-December 04, 2006). It enabled me 
to get an understanding of the situation in the woredas and identifies issues, which should 
be included in study in addition to the checklist already developed. 
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The next stage was to prepare different types of questionnaire in order to gather 
substantial quantitative and qualitative information, followed by pre-testing the 
questionnaires in the study areas. Considering the changes made in the final questionnaire 
from the pre-test, all the final questionnaires were developed. 
 
Before going to the final survey the group (‘Gujele’ and ‘Gere’) interview questionnaire 
was translated into Tigrigna for Atsbi and Oromifa for Ada’a. Ten enumerators in Atsbi 
Wemberta and seven enumerators in Ada’a were involved. In addition, one supervisor in 
each area was employed based on their educational qualification and their previous work 
experience.  
 
The questionnaires for in depth focus group discussions (at scheme level and with female 
headed households) were done by the researcher herself with the help of language 
translators in both areas. Moreover, the tabia level data (for measuring profitability) were 
collected from each tabia and the woredas office of agriculture. 
 
A day and half long training were conducted for all enumerators and supervisors in both 
areas. The final fieldwork (survey) was implemented from February 19-March 15, 2007 
in Atsbi and from April 01-May 02, 2007 in Ada’a. The field survey was successfully 
completed in both woredas. 
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3.4. Analysis Approach 
Institutional analysis of communal managed irrigation systems is very complex. Usually 
these kinds of resources are frequently characterized by multiple users. In addition, there 
is a need for arrangement for negotiation and mechanisms for conflict resolution among 
different stakeholders. Rules for sharing the resources comprise property right, which are 
useful in resolving conflicts and creating incentives for investment for the development 
of the resource. At the same time, there is need to have institutions for collective action, 
either in the form of formal organizations or informal forms of cooperation, to abide by 
the property rights as well as act collectively for betterment of the community.  
 
These characteristics of irrigation institutions become a bit difficult to be analyzed 
quantitatively as (Mattews, 1996) stated;  
“Theory has made an indispensable contribution in recent times to advances of understanding in 
economics. But  it  seems  to me  that  in the  economics of institution theory  is  now  outstripping   
empirical  research to an  excessive  extent. No doubt the same could  be  said  about  other fields in 
economics,  but  there is  a particular  point  about  this one. Theoretical modeling may or may not be more 
difficult in this field than in others, but empirical work in it is confronted by a special difficulty. Because 
economic institutions are complex, they do not lend themselves easily to quantitative measurement. Even  in 
the  respects in  which they do,  the  data very  often   are  not  routinely  collected  by  national  statistical  
offices. As a  result, the   statistical   approach  which has  become  the  bread  and  butter  of  applied  
economics  is  not  straightforwardly  applicable.”   
 
However, qualitative  approaches  are increasingly used in  conjunction with quantitative 
approaches and such  combinations  can  enhance  the  validity and  reliability of  analysis 
and evaluation (Bamberger, 2000). 
 
A mixture of both quantitative and qualitative approaches was appropriate in this case 
because it provides the quantifiable results of factors which determine collective action 
and its effectiveness in communal managed irrigation schemes, in addition to, the cost–
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benefit analysis of beneficiary farmers in the sites. It also provides explanations on 
irrigation water distribution, conflict resolution mechanisms and gender related issues in 
irrigation.  
 
3.4.1. Descriptive Analysis Approach 
This part mainly focused on analyzing the descriptive statistics of the whole data. The 
data mainly contained information regarding nature of collective action. In addition, 
characteristics and actual uses of communal irrigation schemes were included.  Besides, 
the socioeconomic characteristics of irrigation water beneficiaries including family size, 
education status, access to market, agricultural extension programme and formal credit, 
soil quality, years of experience, training provision and experience with external and 
local organizations were also observed. 
 
Moreover, the data also contains beneficiary farmers’ decision with regard to the use of 
inputs: modern fertilizer, manure/compost, seed and labor (man power and oxen). This  
data was collected using secondary data from tabias administration, in addition to focus 
group discussion with beneficiary farmers at scheme levels. After calculating the total 
value of yield harvested in year 2006/07 using irrigation water, analysis of the net 
revenue of input costs like labor, fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, seed etc., at each tabia 
and crop type was made. Besides, based on the farming system crop pattern of farm 
household’s has been assessed.  
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3.4.2. Qualitative Analysis Approach 
This approach analyzed the whole picture of institutional and organizational 
arrangements in water distribution system and mechanisms used to distribute the 
irrigation water among site and between upstream and downstream users. Specifically, 
the data contained management system in communal irrigation schemes. This included 
the participation of different stakeholders in promotion, development of irrigation system 
and provision of technical support for beneficiary farmers. Besides issues like water 
distribution system, water rights and legal framework which constitutes the written by-
laws, and conflict resolution mechanisms were part of the data. Women participation at 
farm, forum and leadership level in the irrigation sites was also assessed using qualitative 
data. The qualitative information was gathered using an open-ended question that was 
included in the questionnaire in order to augment the results of the econometrics analysis.  
 
3.4.3. Econometric Approach 
Following Gebremedhin et. al (2002) the econometric model used to investigate the 
determinants of indicators of collective action, its failure and effectiveness for both 
provision and appropriation of communal irrigation water  management is stated below.  
 
Let M represent collective management of irrigation water. We assume there is 
decreasing marginal benefit and increasing marginal cost of collective management 
which includes the cost of monitoring and enforcing collective action. The benefit (B) 
and cost(C) functions can thus be specified as: 
                               )(MB 2bMaM −=                                   
           2)( dMcMMC +=  
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Where a, b, c, and d are positive constants. Collective management is affected by a vector 
of exogenous factors (X) which includes; Group Characteristics (XG), Farm 
Characteristics (XF), Village Characteristics (XV) and Scheme Characteristics (XS). These 
exogenous factors are assumed to shift the marginal benefit and cost curves but do not 
affect the slope of the curves. Incorporating the effect of the exogenous factors into the 
cost and benefit functions, we have. 
     
)2.....(..........)(),(
)1......(..........)(),(
2
2
dMMXXMC
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C
B
++=
−+=
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Where α  and  β  are coefficients to be estimated, and Bξ  and Cξ  are stochastic 
disturbance terms. Using the definitions of the exogenous factors, equations (1) and (2) 
can be rewritten as. 
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3.4.3.1 Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables are categorized into 4 vectors:- 
Region (XR)- whether the woreda is Atsbi or Ada’a 
 
Group Characteristics (XG) include:- 
Total number of households in the group (XHN), Total number of households in the 
group squared(XHN 2), Proportion of female households in the group (XHF), Proportion 
of literate headed households in the group(XHL), Average family size in the group 
(XHSIZE),  Proportion of households who used formal credit (XHC), Proportion of 
households who have access to extension programme (XHE), Proportion of households 
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whom irrigated agriculture is the main source of income in the group (XHIN), Total 
irrigated area in the group (XGAREA), Total agricultural land in the group (rain-fed) 
(XGAGRI), TLU of the group (XGTLU), Proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-
end(XGTAIL), For how many years beneficiaries have used the irrigation 
water(XGYEARS), Numbers of times beneficiaries have received training on issues 
related to irrigation water use (XGTRAIN). 
 
Farm Characteristic (XF) includes 
Proportion of soil coverage of the farm considered good by the group (XFSOIL). 
 
Village Characteristics (Xv) include 
Whether rainfall adequacy in the village was considered good by the group (XvRAIN) 
Access to Market and services (in hrs.) 
Walking time from that specific groups’ irrigated land to the nearest-town market 
(XvTOWN), village market (XGVILL), the tabia development post ( XvFTC). 
 
Scheme Characteristics (XS) include 
If the irrigation scheme was promoted by external organization (XSEXTER), Number of 
external organization(s) which is (are) operating in that irrigation site now (XSNOW), 
Number of local organization(s) which is (are) operating in that irrigation site currently 
(XSLOCA), Whether there is farmers’ participation during construction of the scheme 
(XSSTRUC), type of irrigation system (micro-dam, river diversion, spring water, shallow 
well and communal pond. Communal pond is identified in the base category. 
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Thus, equation (1) and (2) can be rewritten as:- 
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We assume that ;0,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 232219181716151413111098,76541 >αααααααααααααααααα  
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Higher total number of households in the group leads to greater scarcity of the resource, 
hence greater marginal benefit of collective management (α1>0).The effect of proportion 
of female headed households on collective action is unknown because it is highly 
influenced by the socio-cultural background of the community. Higher family size in the 
group increases marginal benefit of collective management, since irrigated agriculture 
needs higher labor force individually as well as collectively, ( α5>0). Higher literacy rate, 
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higher experience in irrigation water use(in number of years), provision of training may 
increase collective benefit in such a way that beneficiaries will have better understanding  
and awareness about the management of the resource more efficiently,(α4, α13, α14> 0). 
Higher proportion of households whom agriculture is the main source of livelihood may 
appreciate collective action which leads to increment of benefits, since all beneficiaries 
have the same interest (α8>0). Greater size of area of irrigated land increases the benefit 
of collective action (α9>0). Higher level of physical wealth (agricultural land and TLU) 
indicates the capacity of higher cost coverage for operation and maintenance of the 
irrigation scheme, (α10>0). High proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-end lead to greater 
scarcity of the resource for irrigation purposes, as a result there may be higher marginal 
benefit (α12> 0). However, on the other hand, if it becomes very scarce, competition may 
be so high and decrease the benefit (α12<0). Higher agricultural potential (soil and 
rainfall) and access to market and services(town market, village market, and development 
post, formal credit and access to extension programme) increase benefit to manage the 
limited resource (α6, α7, α15, α16, α17, α18, α19>0). External programmes may increase the 
benefit of collective management by increasing awareness of profitable opportunities or 
of new technologies (α19, α20>0), but they may undermine benefits if the programmes 
prevent communities from full participation (α20, α21<0). The involvement of local 
organization may increase benefits (α22>0), since local decision makers are likely to be 
more aware of local conditions affecting benefits. Farmers participation during the 
construction of the infrastructure (irrigation scheme) enhances sense of ownership among 
beneficiaries. Hence, it increases the benefit of collective action (α23>0). 
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Economies of scale are assumed to reduce costs of monitoring and enforcing collective 
action as the number of total households increases from a low level (β1<0), but at high 
number of households, diseconomies of organizing and enforcing agreements are 
assumed to dominate (β2>0). Formal credit enables farmers to use complementary inputs 
such as fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides and varieties of seeds that needs high amount of 
water, as a result transaction cost to enforce rules and regulations may decline(β6<0). 
Higher proportion of beneficiaries at tail-end leads to more scarcity of irrigation water at 
the tail. As a result, frequent conflict and violation of restricted rules will occur. It leads 
to higher costs for monitoring (β12>0). Higher proportion of households whom 
agriculture is the main source of income, larger rain-fed land size and TLU may decrease 
the cost of collective action. (β8, β10, β11<0). Costs of managing a resource are likely to 
increase with the size of the resource (β9>0).  Greater literacy rate, higher agricultural 
potential (soil and rainfall) or better access to market and services (town market and 
village market) may lead to higher labor opportunities and wages, hence higher costs of 
collective action (β4, β15, β16, β17, β18>0), unless labor markets are so well integrated that 
local wages are not affected by local opportunities (β15, β16, β17, β18 =0). On the other 
hand, access to extension programme and development post may decrease the cost of 
collective action (β7, β19<0).  Involvement of external programmes, long time experience 
in using irrigation water, provision of training  are likely to help reduce the cost of 
organizing and enforcing collective action because of better understanding of the 
concepts of rules and regulations (β20, β21, β4, β13, β14 <0). Collective management 
organized at a more local level is likely to be easier (less costly) to enforce (β22<0). 
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Higher participation of farmers during construction also decreases the cost of collective 
action (β23<0). 
Then, using equation (1) and (2), the necessary conditions for maximization are 
      )7.......(20 bMX
M
B −==∂
∂ α  
 
    ==∂
∂ 0
M
C )8.(..........2dMX +β  
 
Combining equations (7) and (8) and rearranging terms we have: 
                                                       
)9.....(....................
)(2
*
db
XXM +
−= βα  
 
And  
)10....(....................
)(2
*
dbX
M ii
i +
−=∂
∂ βα  
 
    Hence, we have the following comparative static results:  
)(2
)(2* 2211
db
N
NX
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G +
−+−=∂
∂ χβαβα > 0 at low N, since 011 >−βα  and will be larger than N)(2 22 βα −  
for low enough N;     
                                                               <0 at high N if 022 <−βα  (example, if 02≤α ); and  
                                                                >0 at all N if 022 >−βα .  
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)(2
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−=∂
∂
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M
H
βα , if there is no divergence of interest. 
 
0
)(2
* 55 >+
−=∂
∂
dbSIZEX
M
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βα ,if family members participate in the irrigation agriculture, if not 05=α  
 
0
)(2
* 66 >+
−=∂
∂
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M
G
βα ;                 0
)(2
* 77 >+
−=∂
∂
dbEX
M
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βα ;             0
)(2
* 88 >+
−=∂
∂
dbINX
M
G
βα  
 
0
)(2
* 99 >+
−=∂
∂
dbAREAX
M
G
βα , if economies of scale reduce cost of management relative of benefits   
)( 99 βα >  
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0
)(2
* 1010 >+
−=∂
∂
dbWEALTHX
M
G
βα ;                     0
)(2
* 1111 <+
−=∂
∂
dbTAILX
M
G
βα , if ( 1111 αβ > ) 
 
 
  0
)(2
* 1212 >+
−=∂
∂
dbYEARSX
M
G
βα ;                      0
)(2
* 1313 >+
−=∂
∂
dbTRAINX
M
G
βα  
 
 
0
)(2
* 1414 >+
−=∂
∂
dbSOILX
M
F
βα ; 0
)(2
* 1515 >+
−=∂
∂
dbRAINX
M
V
βα   
In both cases, if agricultural potential (soil quality and rainfall) does not increase the  
opportunity cost of labor or provide more ‘exit’ options, thus increasing the cost of 
enforcing collection action (i.e., 01514 =ββ ). 
 
0
)(2
* 1616 >+
−=∂
∂
dbTOWNX
M
V
βα ;                                0
)(2
* 1717 >+
−=∂
∂
dbVILLX
M
V
βα  
If town and village market access does not raise opportunity cost of labor or provide 
more ‘exit’ options )0( 1716 ==ββ . 
 
0
)(2
* 1818 >+
−=∂
∂
dbFTCX
M
V
βα  
0
)(2
* 1919 >+
−=∂
∂
dbEXTERX
M
S
βα ; if external organization(s) do not displace the local 
organization(s). 
 
0
)(2
* 2020 >+
−=∂
∂
dbNOWX
M
S
βα , if the community doesn’t entirely depend on the organization 
 
0
)(2
* 2121 >+
−=∂
∂
dbLOCAX
M
S
βα ;                                 0
)(2
* 2222 >+
−=∂
∂
dbSRTUX
M
S
βα  
 
3.4.3.2. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are divided in to three categories.  
i) Indicators of presence of collective action (see Table 3.2). 
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? Average value of a household contribution for the resource management per 
year14 , 
? Whether there is (are) guard(s) for protection of the irrigation site (1; 2),  
? Whether group members contribute for the guard’s payment (1; 2), 
? If there is (a) person(s) in charge of equitable water distribution and 
appropriate usage of  irrigation water (1; 2), 
? If group members contribute for the water distributor payment (1; 2). 
    ii)    Indicators of failure of collective action are 
? Number of times violation of restricted rules occurred by beneficiaries per group 
in 2006/07; 
? Number of times conflict occurred due to irrigation water distribution related 
issues in 2006/07 
iii)   And indicator of collective action effectiveness/enforcement includes 
? Number of times the penalty system applied per group in 2006/07; 
Therefore, the econometric models for indicators of collective action, its failure and 
effectiveness can be written as follows: 
)12...(....................).........,,,,(
),,,,(
),,,,(
),,,,(
),,,,(
),,,,(
),,,,(
),,,,(
SVFGR
SVFGR
SVFGR
SVFGR
SVFGR
SVFGR
SVFGR
SVFGR
XXXXXfNPENA
XXXXXfNCONF
XXXXXfNVIOL
XXXXXfCWATD
XXXXXfDWATD
XXXXXfCGUAR
XXXXXfDGUAR
XXXXXfACONT
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
 
                                             
14 All the data was collected for the year 2006/07 
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3.2.Description and Measurement of Indicators of Collective Action its Failure and Effectiveness-Dependent Variables included in the Model 
 
 
 
Variable Name Definition and Measurement 
 
 
No. of 
Observation 
Frequency 
(%age) 
Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Minimum Maximum Type of 
regression 
model used 
I) INDICATORS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION         
Value of a group member contribution for irrigation 
water management  (ACONT) 
Average annual value of a household contribution. in 
cash + kind + labor in the group (all converted to in 
Birr value) 
169  
200.17 
(152.4683) 
0 312 OLS 
If there is (are) guard(s) for protection of the 
irrigation site(DGUAR) 
Dummy variable for  
    1=yes 
    2= no 
 
169 
169 
 
103(61) 
66(39) 
   Probit-Selection 
model 
Whether group members contribute for the guard(s) 
in year 2006/07(CGUARD).    
Dummy variable for  
    1=yes 
    2= no 
 
103 
103 
 
60(58) 
43(42) 
   Probit-Selection 
model 
If there is (are) person(s)  in charge on equitable 
water distribution and appropriate usage of 
irrigation water in the irrigation site(DWATD) 
 
Dummy variable for  
    1=yes 
    2= no 
 
169 
169 
 
109(65) 
60(45) 
   Probit-Selection 
model 
Whether group members contribute for the person(s)  
in charge on equitable water distribution and 
appropriate usage of irrigation water in the irrigation 
site in year 2006/07(CWATD).    
Dummy variable for  
    1=yes 
    2= no 
 
109 
109 
 
65(60) 
44(40) 
   Probit-Selection 
model 
II) INDICATOR OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
FAILURE 
       
Number of times violation of restricted rules 
occurred(NVIOL) 
Total number of times violation of rules and 
regulations occurred in year 2006/07 in a group.  
169  
    20.33846 
(17.63036) 
 
2 
 
72 
 
OLS 
Number of times conflict occurred(NCONF) Total number of times conflict occurred among 
irrigation users in year 2006/07  in a group  
169  
15.33846 
(16.25963) 
 
0 
 
71 
 
Tobit /Tobit 
Decomposition 
III) INDICATOR OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
ENFORCEMENT/EFFEVTIVENESSS 
       
Number of times the penalty system had been 
applied(NPENA) 
 
Total number of times the penalty system had been 
applied in year 2006/07  in a group  
169  
4.684615 
(4.457921) 
 
0 
 
28 
Tobit /Tobit 
Decomposition 
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Table 3.3.Description and Measurement of Explanatory Variables included in the Model 
 
 
Variable Name Definition and Measurement 
 
 
No of 
observation 
Frequency 
(%age) 
Mean (Standard 
Deviation) 
Minimum Maximum Atsbi Ada’a 
Region(XR)         
Woreda Dummy variable for the woreda        
 1= Atsbi 
0= Ada’a 
 
169 
169 
94(55) 
65(44) 
 
  
    
Group Characteristics(XG)         
Total number of households in a group in 2006/07., no 169  25.50888         
(44.39167)          
4 297 20.531* 1 
(3.379684)*2 
31.74667* 1 
(6.380773) *2 
Proportion of female households in a group in 2006/07  169  .2059            
(.1537399 )          
0 .67 0.2374362 
(0.0162794) 
0.1663747 
(0.0161268) 
Proportion of literate headed households in a group in 
2006/07  
169  .3964337          
(.252199)           
0 1 0.3066809 
(0.0186778) 
0.508924 
(0.0326861) 
Average family size in a group, no 169  5.83432           
(1.280255)           
3 9 5.478723 
(0.1216909) 
6.28 
(0.1465028) 
Proportion of households who use formal credit in a group 
in 2006/07  
169  .3395976          
(.4124674)           
0 1 0.1524468 
(0.332288) 
0.57416 
(0.0455406) 
Proportion of households who have access to extension 
programme in a group in 2006/07 
169  .9636095          
(.0385834 )         
.87 1 0.963617 
(0.0039756) 
0.9636 
(0.0044908) 
 
 
Proportion of households for whom the primary source of 
livelihood is irrigate agriculture  in a group in 2006/07  
 
169 
  
.2610122           
(.3439764)           
 
10 
 
1 
 
0.1494794 
(0.0296739) 
 
0.4008 
(.041471) 
  
Total irrigated area in the group(ha) 
 
169 
  
7.192759          
(15.48685)          
 
.56 
 
192 
 
2.713577 
(0.3938537) 
 
12.80667 
(2.500013) 
 Total agricultural land in the group(rain-fed)(ha ) 169  12.86287          
(20.34169)         
.25 230 
 
4.385645 
(0.6471031) 
23.48767 
(3.020455) 
 Tropical Livestock Unit for the group 169  85.65166          
(70.90984 )          
9.18 39.346 48.63854 
(6.16249) 
132.0414 
(6.332693) 
 Proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-end in a group in 
2006/07 
169  .2964142          
(.1157906)           
0 .6 0.3129468 
(0.0092286) 
0.2756933 
(0.0161637) 
 Years  of experience of irrigation water use in a group, no 169  11.71598         
(10.78534)           
1 100 10.04255 
(0.7250644) 
 
13.81333 
(1.608165) 
 Number of training provision to farmers on issues related 
to irrigation water use 
169  1.349112         
(1.673324)           
0 10 1.138298 
(0.1576256) 
1.613333 
(0.2095842) 
Farm Characteristics(XF)         
 Proportion of soil coverage considered good by the group  169  .6019231           
.2902698          
.015 1 .5100532 
(0.0319113) 
0.7170667 
(0.024987) 
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Table 3.3.  continued 
Variable Name Definition and Measurement 
 
 
No of 
observation 
Frequency 
(%age) 
Mean (Standard 
Deviation) 
Minimum Maximum Atsbi Ada’a 
Village Characteristics(XV)         
 Dummy variable for whether rainfall adequacy in the 
village considered good by the group 
    1=good 
    2=not good 
 
 
169 
169 
 
 
78 (46.15)        
91 (53.85)        
     
 
4(4.26) 
90(95.74) 
 
 
 
74(98.67)  
1(1.33) 
 
Access to market Walking time from that specific group’s to the 
nearest,(in minutes) 
       
     -town market 169  251.7515          
(125.5681)          
40 485 200.3617* 1 
 (14.22391) *2 
316.16*1 
(7.603438) *2 
    -village market 169  39.50888          
(17.75331)          
10 90 62.59574 
(1.429285) 
80.2 
(6.180032) 
    -development post 169  40.68639          
(20.46198)          
10 100 34.71277 
(2.079776 ) 
48.17333 
(2.121055) 
Scheme Level Characteristics         
Dummy variable for if the irrigation scheme was 
promoted by external organization 
    1=yes 
    2=no 
 
 
169 
169 
 
 
69(40.83) 
100(59.17) 
    
 
42(44.68) )*3 
52(55.32) *4 
 
 
27(36) *3 
48(64) )*3 
Number of external organization(s) which (is) are 
operating currently in the irrigation site  
 
169  1.95858           
(1.381661)          
0 4 2.957447 
(0.106862) 
2.96 
(0.19949) 
Number of local organization(s) which (is) are 
operating currently in the irrigation site  
 
169  2.698225          
(1.47924)          
1 5 1.034043 
(0.093455) 
1.053333 
(0.228976) 
Dummy variable for whether there was farmers’ 
participation during construction of the whole structure 
    1=yes 
    2=no 
 
 
169 
169 
 
 
126(74.56) 
43(25.44) 
    
 
94(100) 
0(0) 
 
 
32(42.67) 
43(57.33) 
 
Dummy variable for whether the irrigation system is  
     1=micro-dam 
     2=river diversion 
     3=spring water use 
     4=shallow well 
     5=communal lake (identified as the base) 
    
 
169 
169 
169 
169 
169 
` 
 
122(72.19) 
39(23.08) 
5(2.96) 
1(0.59) 
2(1.18) 
 
                                    
62(65.96) 
24(25.53) 
5(5.32) 
1(1.06) 
2(2.15) 
 
60(80) 
10(13.33) 
0(0) 
0(0) 
5(6.67) 
*1- In variables with continuous data the values represent the mean of the observation of the variable under consideration 
 *2- In variables with continuous data the values in brackets represent the standard error of the mean  
*3- The numbers out of the bracket shows number of observations in each category for discrete data  
*4- In variables with discrete data the values in the bracket represent the percentage distribution of the variable from the total observation. 
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3.4.3.3. Model Specification and Estimation  
The type of regression model to use depends on the nature of the dependent variable:- 
Least squares regression was used for annual average value of household contribution for 
the resource management and number of violation restricted rules occurred in 2006/07, 
since these variables are continuous.  
 
Selection models (Probit) are used to examine the determinants of; whether  there is(are) 
guard(s) for protection, whether group members contribute for the payment of the guard, 
whether there is(are) person(s) in charge of equitable water distribution and appropriate 
usage of irrigation water in the site, whether group members contribute for the payment 
of the water distributor. Dependent variables - whether group members contribute for 
payment of guard is conditional on having guard. This implies that members contribute if 
only if in cases where there is guard (which only in 103 number of observations in our 
case). Similarly, whether group members contribute for payment of water distributor is 
conditional on presence of water distributor. This shows that members contribute if only 
if there is water distributor (which only in 109 number of observations in this study). As a 
result we use Selection model in order to test and control sample selection bias, which is 
created by selecting only cases that have guard/water distributor.  
 
We used two–step estimating procedure- 
In the first step the model - absence /presence of guard/ water distributor, attempts to 
capture the factors governing the probability of having guard/ water distributor. This 
equation is used to construct a selectivity term known as the ‘Mills ratio’ which is added 
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to the second stage ‘outcome’ equation. If the coefficient of selectivity term is significant 
then the hypothesis that the first equation is governed by an observed selection process is 
confirmed. Moreover, with the inclusion of extra term, the coefficient in the second stage 
‘selectivity corrected’ equation is unbiased (Zaman, 2001). We select the explanatory 
variable - proportion of beneficiary households who had access and used formal credit as 
the offset variable, because it is one of the most statistically significant variable for both 
the dependent variables (whether there is (are) guard (s) for protection of the site and 
whether there is (are) person (s) in charge of equitable water distribution and appropriate 
usage of irrigation water in the site, but it has less effect on whether to contribute or not. 
 
 Decomposing Tobit Coefficients- Tobit analysis was developed for analyzing censored 
dependent variable, variables whose actual values are not observed for a large proportion 
of cases (Tobin, 1958). It is also appropriate for analyzing dependent variables that 
cannot take below and above a particular limit. In this study, we also used Tobit model 
for  analyzing determinants of frequent occurrence of conflicts and application of penalty 
system in communal managed irrigation schemes for the year 2006/07, since the 
dependent variables for which a large proportion of cases have zero as the lowest possible 
value. Among 169 number of observation, 25 number of them had zero value of conflict 
occurrence, similarly 35 of 169 number of observations had zero as the lowest value of 
member penalty system exercised. Unfortunately, clear procedures for interpreting of 
Tobit coefficients are not available. Therefore, it is important to decompose the Tobit 
coefficients, which reveal important additional findings that could not be discerned from 
the ordinary Tobit coefficients (Roncek, 1992). 
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Among groups with no conflicts and no penalty system exercised, varying values of the 
independent variables imply different probabilities of occurrence of conflicts and 
experiencing penalty system application. For groups experiencing at least one conflict 
and application of penalty system, varying values on the independent variables imply 
variation in the conflict occurrence and penalty system exercised. Thus two types of 
effects should be discussed for each independent variable in many Tobit models: (1) the 
effect on the values of the dependent variable for cases with a non-limit (non-zero in our 
cases) values on the dependent variable, and (2) the effect on the limit value (zero in our 
case) of the dependent variable. These two effects parallel the structure of the Tobit 
model, which has two formulas for predicting values of the dependent variable-one for 
cases at the limit values and another for cases above the limit used in this study.  
 
Diagnostic Tests - We run 8 different models (2 OLS, (4) Sample selection- Probit  and 2 
Tobit and decomposing its coefficients) using STATA 0.9.  For each of the models we 
applied different diagnostics, as notes by Darnell and Evans (1990), before proceeding to 
test a hypothesis, one should apply several diagnostic tests to make sure that the chosen 
model is reasonably robust. The first one is to find whether there is potentially15 a 
problem of multicollinearity, but found potential problems only between total number of 
households in the group and total households in the group squared; total area irrigated 
land in the group and total number of households in the group; the regional dummies and 
rainfall. The correlation between these variables was leading to high variance inflation 
factors (34.1- 57.9 VIF) (Gujarati, 1995 and Chatterjee and Price, 1991). However, we 
                                             
15 As notes by Gujarati (1995), if the pair –wise or zero-order correlation coefficient between two 
regressors is high, say, in excess of 0.8, then multicollinearity is a serious problem. 
 
  63 
Pa
ge
63
 
included all the variables in the models since they are statistically significant coefficients. 
Moreover, omitting one of the variables would result in omitted variables bias. The other 
variables had a variance inflation factor less than 7.10, indicating that multicollinearity 
was not a major concern for these variables 16(Gujarati, 1995 and Chatterjee and Price, 
1991). Robust regression is undertaken to avoid the hetroskedasticity problem.  We also 
tested if there is a problem of incorrect functional form. The result indicated that there 
was no evidence of functional form misspecification. We also tested normality and 
singled out the outliers. 
 
3.4.3.4. Why Did We Use Community Level Survey for Econometric Analysis in this 
Study? 
Analysis of common property resource management can be done at any one of several 
levels, including those of individual farm household and community level. In this survey 
the data which is used in econometric analysis was administered at community (Gujele 
and Gere level). There are at least two reasons why a community (group) level survey is 
appropriate, as compared with household level. The first reason is Gujele and Gere17 is 
the smallest social unit that has the capacity to govern the administration and utilization 
of the common pool resource- irrigation water. Programmes will need to be managed by 
a larger collection of individuals. The second reason is since communal managed 
irrigation water has the attribute of a common pool resource in that the exclusion of 
farmers within the command area is difficult, but if use exceeds supply capacity it will 
                                             
16 As a rule of thumb , if the VIF of a variable exceeds 10 (this will happen if Rj2exceeds 0.90), that variable 
is said to be highly collinear, Gujarati (1995) Chatterjee and Price(1991) 
 
17 Gujeles and Geres are the smallest administrative units in a scheme(WUA) 
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become exhausted. Thus, in arranging collective action, it faces two types of common 
pool resource management problems: provision and appropriation problems (Ostrom, 
1994). The problem of provision arises in arranging the construction and maintenance of 
canals and appropriation problem arises in water distribution arrangement. As a result, 
the whole structure of institutional water management may most closely reflect the 
combined practices of farmers in the group rather than that of any single household 
irrigated farm.   
 
3.4.3.5. Research Hypothesis 
The vectors used to explain variations in indicators of collective action, its failure and 
effectiveness include: Region (XR), Group Characteristics (XG), Farm Characteristics 
(XF), Village Characteristics (XV) and Scheme Characteristics (XS). The hypothesis about 
how these factors may influence collective action draw from the literature on collective 
action (North, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Pender and Scherr, 1999; Gebremedhin, 
Pender and Tsefaye, 2002)  
 
Group Characteristics (XG)  
When the total number of households in the irrigated area is small, collective action may be 
low due to high fixed cost. While when the number of households is very high, collective 
action may also be low due to increasing variable transaction costs of attaining and 
enforcing collective action or higher competition for the resource. (Pender and Scherr 
1999; Gebremedhin et al, 2002). Hence, we hypothesize an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between number of households in a group and collective action for 
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communal irrigation water management. Intermediate number of beneficiary farmers 
favors collective action, while low and very high household number hinders collective 
action.  
 
The effect of proportion of female headed households on collective action is unknown because 
it is highly influenced by the socio-cultural background of the community. Higher family 
size in the group expected to increase the benefit of collective management, since irrigated 
agriculture demands higher labor use individually as well as collectively. Higher literacy 
rate have two possible excepted effects; the first one is, it may increase collective action 
since that beneficiaries may have better understanding and awareness about the 
management of the resource. The other effect, it may undermine collective action, since it 
allows high ‘exit’ options.  
 
Higher proportion of households who use formal credit  favor collective action, since most 
of the time farmers get credit to buy inputs such as fertilizer, improved seed, pesticides, 
herbicides etc., which are complementary inputs with irrigation water use. However, we 
should note the difference in obtaining, need and access to credit since those who need 
and have access to credit may not obtain credit. Those who need may not have access and 
from those who have access some may not be interested to obtain credit due to different 
reasons. Similarly, access to extension programme appreciates collective action as does 
higher proportion of households whom agriculture is the main source of income. Community 
physical capital endowment; groups that have better physical assets (higher TLU and larger size of 
rain-fed agriculture plots) are the ones who are more likely to cover operation and 
  66 
Pa
ge
66
 
maintenance costs and have better irrigation structure than groups that have few physical 
assets. Hence, physical capital is expected to have positive relationship with collective 
action. Economies of scale are important in favoring collective action. We expect that 
collective action should be greater and more effective in groups which have larger 
irrigated lands.  
 
Higher proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-end lead to greater scarcity of the resource for 
irrigation purposes, as a result collective action may increase. However, at high levels of 
scarcity and ecological stress institutional arrangements often break down as people 
scramble for survival and discount rates increase, which leads to lower collective action. 
Longer years of experience of irrigation water use and provision of training may increase awareness 
towards how to use the water efficiently and how to co-ordinate themselves, hence, leads 
to more collective action.  
 
Farm Characteristics (XF)  
The effect of soil quality on collective action may have two different effects. While better 
soil quality may increase the value of the return from managing the irrigated water 
effectively, thus favoring collective action. The other one is soil quality may also 
decrease the incentive of members to abide by the rules, increasing the opportunity cost 
of labour or by providing more ‘exit options’, making enforcement of rules more 
difficult.  
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Village Characteristics (XV) 
The effect of group members’ access to markets on collective action is mixed. Better access 
to markets may increase the value of the return from managing the irrigated water 
effectively, thus increase collective action. Better markets may also undermine 
individual’s incentives to co-operate by increasing the opportunity cost of labour or by 
providing more ‘exit options’, making it more difficult to punish those who fail to co-
operate. Rainfall adequacy in the village may also have mixed impacts on collection action 
for similar reasons. Access to development post appreciates collective action, since farmers will 
have close contact with DAs and experts.  
 
Scheme Level Characteristics (XS) 
External organizations can have two different effects. On the one hand, they can favour 
collective action by providing interventions that are complementary to local collective 
action and if they are demand-driven. On the other hand, external organizations may 
retard collective action if their role substitutes local collective action such as by replacing 
local effect or dictating management decisions or otherwise undermining collective 
action (such as by increasing ‘exit options’ of local community members). 
 
It is expected that the effect of experience with local organizations on collective action will 
have a positive relationship due to possible learning effects and the effect of social capital 
on the costs or ability to enforce collection action. Farmers’ participation during construction 
increases collective action, since it increases the sense of ownership and belongingness.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT OF IRRIGATION WATER 
MANAGEMENT 
 
This chapter focuses on the big picture of institutional and organizational arrangement of 
water distribution mechanisms in the two study woredas. It also discusses about the 
characteristics of beneficiary farmers, the existing legal framework, conflict resolution 
mechanisms and nature of collective action in the communal irrigation schemes.  
 
Soon after the failure of the military socialist government, both the Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia (TGE), formed in 1991 and the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (FDRE), established in 1995 took a decision to construct new irrigation scheme. 
This also involved the clean up and rehabilitation of the old canal system in Atsbi and 
Ada’a woredas, in both modern and traditional irrigation sites. A massive effort was 
exerted in constructing dams, diversions, shallow wells and ponds. In all these activities, 
the community was actively involved both in labor and kind contribution. The irrigation 
schemes are aimed at improving productivity, achieving food self sufficiency and 
sustainable development based on a strategy called Agricultural Development–Led 
Industrialization (ADLI).  
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4.1. Potential and Actual Uses of Irrigation Water  
4.1.1.  Atsbi Wemberta 
Currently, in the woreda, there are 5 micro-dams- Teghane, Haresssaw, Kelish Emni , 
Ruba Felg, Era; 6 modern river diversions - Endaminu, Barka Adi Sebha, Hadnet, Habes, 
Adi Mesaenu, Kuret; 5 traditional river diversions- Gera Rebue, Afenjow, Kimber, 
Mebrahtom, Era Erere; 3 spring water use sites- Tsquaf, Samera, Tsigaba; 1 communal 
shallow well and 2 communal ponds in Adi Mesaenu. The overall potential of irrigable 
land of the woreda is unknown. However, according to the woreda agricultural office the 
potential for some of the irrigation sites is stated in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.  
 
In Atsbi woreda, all the above irrigation schemes cover over 221.1 ha of land.  In this 
command area 1855 beneficiary farmers were involved, of which 402 (21.67%) are 
female-headed households and 1453(78.3%) are male–headed households. According to 
the woreda office of agriculture, the potential irrigable land using micro-dams is over 
155.5ha (excluding Era micro-dam) serving 1,184 beneficiary farmers. But actually the 
size of land under irrigation is only 71% of the potential estimated, indicating under–
utilization of the resource.  
 
From the total number of irrigation water users in the woreda, nearly, 38% of beneficiary 
farmers use micro-dams as a source of irrigation water, of which 27% of them are female 
headed households and 73% are male headed households. Of the above 5 micro dams 
only Tegahane (at Golgol Naele) and Haressaw micro-dam are operational currently (see 
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Table 4.1).  Debre Selam, located in Ruba Felig tabia, is the largest micro-dam in the 
woreda where conflict has occurred repeatedly since 199718. 
 
All of the modern schemes have been established since the fall of the former Derg 
government in 1991. The establishment of these schemes have been promoted by external 
organizations. For instance, Golgol Naele micro-dam was constructed by Co-SAERT 
(Commission for Sustainable Agricultural and Environmental Rehabilitation for Tigray) 
in 1997. Similarly, Haressaw and Ruba- Felg were constructed by World Vision (NGO) 
in 1992. Because of severe shortage of water in the area, farmers around Kelisha Emni 
and Era micro-dams prefer to use the water for drinking purpose for their livestock.  
 
Like the micro dams, the woreda office of agriculture estimated potential of 85 ha of 
irrigable land for the river diversions, with 1,012 beneficiaries. However, about 104.3ha 
of land is actually irrigated.  This indicates that unlike the micro-dams, over-utilization of 
the resource is observed. All of the modern diversions were promoted by Tigray Regional 
Water Resource Bureau. The largest diversion in the woreda is Endaminu which is found 
in Hayelom tabia. It irrigates 64.4ha of land, which constitutes 61.7% of the total land 
irrigated using modern river diversions in the woreda.  Fourty years ago farmers around 
the river Chuhet had begun to use the diversion traditionally but later on in 2003 with the 
fund support of IFAD, Tigray Regional Water Resource Bureau constructed the main 
modern diversion called Hayelom. Following this, beneficiary farmers formed union of 
cooperatives in 2005, which helps them to access more easily inputs like fertilizer, 
                                             
18 The whole conflict issue will be discussed in detail at the end of this chapter. 
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improved seeds etc. It also creates market linkages to their produced crops using 
irrigation water. 
  
Since the construction of the modern diversion, Gera Rebue traditional river diversion 
operates partially because of the decline in the volume of water from the source (since 
both the traditional and modern schemes have the same source). Under the modern 
diversion, there are a total of 507 beneficiaries, of which 19% are female headed 
households.  Farmers at this irrigation site have on average 28 years of experience in 
irrigation water use.  There are a total of 7 Gugles in Hayelom river diversion which 
range from 33 to 280 beneficiary farmers in a group. 
 
Following Endaminu, Hadnet river diversion is the second largest diversion in the 
woreda. It irrigates 25.14 ha of land with a total of 68 beneficiaries, of which 8.8% of 
them are female headed households (see Table 4.1). Kuret and Adi Mesaenu also cover a 
command area of 8.535 ha and 6.25ha of land, respectively. In Adi Mesanu, all the 
beneficiaries are male household heads, while in Kuret 18.2% are female household 
heads. According to the woreda irrigation expert, Habes and Barka Adi Sebha cut-off 
drain river diversions are mainly used for restricted grazing land management (see Table 
4.2).  
 
Table 4.3 shows the characteristics of the traditional river diversions. Like the micro-
dam, the traditional river diversion at Era was unfunctional in 2006/2007. Gera Rebue 
river diversion in Haylom tabia covers the widest command area compared to other 
  72 
Pa
ge
72
 
traditional river diversions in the woreda, i.e., 9.875 ha of land. In its command area, 62 
beneficiaries are included with 19.4% of female farm decision makers. As mentioned 
before, the total command area covered has decreased after the construction of the new 
main diversion. A total 6.5 ha of irrigated land is utilized under Tsquaf and Samera 
irrigation sites which are found in Ruba Felg tabia. It embraces 13 women and 65 male 
headed households. Mebrahtom and Kimber are recently developed traditional river 
diversions with a total area of 2.4782 ha and 1.25 ha of land and 32 and 13 beneficiaries, 
respectively. 
 
According to discussion with key informants, there were many spring water sources in 
the woreda. However, eventually most of them had become drier and finally disappeared 
at all. In the woreda, there are 2 spring irrigation water use sites 1 in Ruba Felg and 1 in 
Zarema. Under these spring sites 7.5 ha of land was cultivated for 66 household heads of 
which 4.5% are female. 
 
In additional to all these, farmers at Adi Meseanu made an effort to use two communal 
ponds and one communal shallow well for irrigation. They took a collective credit in 
2005 from World Vision for buying motor pumps. Twenty five beneficiaries were 
included in this package, of which only one of them is woman farm decision maker. 
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Communal Irrigation Schemes in Atsbi Wemberta Woreda 
Table 4.1- Micro- Dams 
Potential Actual 
No. of beneficiaries 
S.No Tabia Kushet Year of construction 
No. of 
Gugles 
Actual 
years of 
experience 
of using the 
irrigation 
(Mean) 
Total  
irrigable  
land (ha) 
Total no. of 
Beneficiaries 
Total land 
irrigated 
(ha) Total Female Male 
Distance 
from the 
woreda 
town(Enda 
Selassie) in 
Km. 
1 Golgol Naele Tegahane 1997 37 8.36 41.50 457 
41.6728 
 
542 
 
1381 
(25.5%)2 
404 
(74.5) 2 
2 Harressaw Feliga 1994 25 12 39 271 
42.3008 
 
305 
 
96 
(31.5%) 
209 
(68.5%) 20 
3 Kelisha Emni Adi Shehu 1997 0 0 54 284 0 0 0 0 44 
4 Ruba Felig Debre Selam 1993 0 2.5 21 172 0 0 0 0 11.5 
5 Era Era 1996 0 0 NI NI 0 0 0 0 28 
Total 
   
62    
83.9736 
((38%))3 
847 
((45.7%))3 
234 
(27.6%) 
((58.2%)) 
613 
(72.4%) 
((42.2%)) 
 
Source-Own survey and computation except figures used in potential irrigable land and potential total no. of beneficiaries. (applicable for all tables and figures) 
 
1 Numbers out of the bracket shows number of observation in that category,   
                  -actual years of experience of using the irrigation (mean), 
                  - irrigated land size  
2 Numbers within the bracket shows percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in that specific scheme 
3Numbers within the double bracket shows percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in whole existing schemes in the woreda 
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Table 4.2. Modern River Diversions 
 
 
 
1 Numbers out of the bracket shows number of observation in that category,   
                  -actual years of experience of using the irrigation (mean),  
                  - irrigated land size  
2 Numbers within the bracket shows percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in that specific scheme.  
3Numbers within the double bracket shows percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in whole existing schemes in the woreda. 
Potential Actual 
No. of Beneficiaries 
S.No Name of river diversion 
Type of 
Technology 
Year of 
construction 
No. of 
Gugeles 
Actual years 
of 
experience 
of using 
irrigation 
water 
(Mean) 
Total  
land 
irrigable 
in ha 
Total  no. of 
Beneficiaries 
Total 
land 
irrigated 
(ha) Total Female Male 
Distance 
from  the 
woreda 
town(Enda 
Selassie) in 
Km. 
1 
Enda minu 
(in Haylom 
Tabia) 
Main-
diversion 1996 6 28.28571 48 490 64.375 
 
507 
971 
(19.1%)2 
410 
(80.9%) 26.5 
2 Barka Adi Sebha Cut-off drain 1996 0 0 7 112 0 0 0 0 7 
3 Hadnet Cut-off drain 1997 9 5.4 10 175 
 
25.14 68 
6 
(8.8%) 
62 
(91.2%) 36 
4 Habes Cut-off drain 1997 0 0 7 95 0 0 0 0 12 
5 Adi Mesanu Cut-off drain 1996 1 1 6 20 6.25 9 0 
9 
(100%) 6.5 
6 Kuret Cut- off drain 1997 3 8 7 120 8.535 
 
159 
29 
(18.2%) 
130 
(81.8%) 5 
Total 
   
19  85 1,012 
104.3 
((47.2%))3 
 
743 
((40%))3 
132 
(17.8%) 
((32.8%)) 
611 
(82.2%) 
((42%))  
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Table 4. 3. Traditional River Diversions 
Actual 
S. 
No. 
Name of the 
river diversion Tabia 
No. of 
Gugeles 
Actual years 
of irrigation 
wate 
use(Mean) 
Total land 
irrigated(ha) 
Total no. of 
beneficiaries 
Female Male 
Distance from  
the woreda 
town(Enda 
Selassie) in Km. 
1 Gera Rebue Hayelom 1 40 9.875 62 121(19.4%)2 50 (80.6%) 25 
2 Tsiquaf Ruba Felg 1 24 1.5 20 5(25%) 15(75%) 10 
3 Samera Ruba Felg 2 25 5 58 8(13.8%) 50(86.6%) 10 
4 Kimber(Tsigaba) Zarema 1 3 1.25 13  0 13 (100%) 16 
5 Mebrahtom Felg Woini 
3 
2 2.4782 32  7 ( 21.9%) 25  (78.1%) 4.5 
6 Era Erere Era 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 
Total 
   
 
20.1032 
((9 %)) 
185 
((9.97%))3 
32 (17.3%) 
((7.96%)) 
153 ( 82.7%) 
((10.5%))  
 
 
 
1 Numbers out of the bracket shows number of observation in that category, 
                  - actual years of experience of using the irrigation (mean), 
                  - irrigated land size  
2 Numbers within the bracket shows percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in that specific scheme.  
3Numbers within the double bracket shows percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in whole existing schemes in the woreda.
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Table 4.4.Spring water use  
Actual 
S. 
No. 
Name of the 
river diversion Tabia 
No. of 
Gugeles 
Actual years 
of irrigation 
water use Total land irrigated(ha) 
Total no. of 
beneficiaries Female Male 
Distance from  
the woreda 
town(Enda 
Selassie) in Km. 
1 Afenjow Ruba Felg 2 23 4.5 42 21 ( 4%)2 40(96%) 11 
2 Tsigaba Zarema 1 6 3  24 1 (4.2%) 23  (95.8%) 17 
Total 
   
 
7.5 
((3.39%))3 
66 
(( 3.56%))3 
3 (4.5%) 
((.7%)) 
63 (95.5%) 
((4.3%))  
 
 
 
Table 4.5. Shallow Wells and Artificial Lakes 
 
 
Actual    
S. 
No. 
Name of the 
river diversion Tabia 
Type of 
Irrigation 
Water 
No. of 
Gugeles 
Actual years 
of irrigation 
wate use Total land irrigated(ha) 
Total no. of 
beneficiaries Female Male 
Distance from  
the woreda 
town(Enda 
Selassie) in Km. 
1 Gereb Gesa 
Adi 
Mesanu 
Shallow 
wells 
1 2 2 51 (100%) 0 5 7 
2 
Gereb Gesa Adi 
Mesanu 
Communal 
pond 2 2 3.25 8(89.9%) 1(11.1%)
2 9 7 
Total 
     5.25 
((2.37%)) 
13  
((.75%))3 
1  (7.1%) 
((.2%)) 
14  (92.9%) 
((.89%)) 
 
1 Numbers out of the bracket shows number of observation in that category, 
                  - actual years of experience of using the irrigation (mean) 
                  - irrigated land size  
2 Numbers within the bracket shows percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in that specific scheme.  
3Numbers within the double bracket shows percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in whole existing schemes in the woreda. 
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4.1.2. Ada’a Woreda 
Currently, in the woreda there are 4 modern and 2 traditional irrigation schemes from 
Wedecha-Belbela dam (see Figure 4.6). There are also one river diversion under 
operation from Mojo river and one natural lake, named Hora Kilole (see Table 4.7). The 
overall potential of the woreda is unknown especially after the separation from Liben. 
The woreda irrigation office has in its record a land area of 2,017 ha under irrigated land, 
with 5,043 total beneficiary households. It also shows that an average land holding size of 
about 0.5 ha irrigated area per household. 
 
The Wedecha- Belbela Dam Storages System  
The Wedecha dam was first constructed for state farm purpose in 1978 by the former 
socialist government of Ethiopia in collaboration with the Cuban government. Currently 
the dam supplies Keteba Gimbi, Gohaworko, Godino and Harawa irrigation schemes in 
the woreda.  The dam itself is located in the border of Sendafa and Gimbichu woredas.  
The farmers in these woredas have not been beneficiaries of the irrigation water except 
for some emerging interest to irrigate some of their land.  Because of this reason, farmers 
who live around the dam complain and conflict arises frequently (farmers in Sandfa and 
Gimbichu tried to destroy the main regulator for a number of times).  Later on the new 
canals were constructed by Oromiya Rehabilitation fund which lead to Keteba Gimbi and 
Harawa schemes. 
 
The Wedecha dam stores a water volume of 15.160 X 106 m3 mainly from flood water.  
This stored water is utilized in the right and left channels and feeding the various 
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schemes along its way until it ends up in Belbela dam.  The current usage of water for 
irrigation before the entry to Belbela dam is 577.625 ha and a new expansion with a size 
of additional 120 ha is underway upstream of the Keteba Gimbi scheme. 
 
The Belbela Dam has a capacity of 12 X 106 m3. Similar to Wedecha dam it is a flood 
harvesting dam. After the Wedecha water flows via Keteba Gimbi and Harawa, the water 
stores in Belbela Dam, it supplies water to Belebela and Fultino schemes.  
 
Dinsho owned large irrigable land which is not currently under use.  However, the new 
expansion of commercial flower farming is expanding to the command area of the 
Belbela dam, and they use the water from the dam for irrigation at this stage. The overall 
combined use of Belbela Dam is less than 100 ha with a potential to expand by 100 ha. 
 
The irrigation water at Wedecah –Belbela dam has unfunctional main and lateral gates; 
therefore, there is an overnight storage provision. The aim is to reduce the misused 
amount of water during night time when farmers don’t use the irrigation water, in stead it 
flows to this overnight storage called Seroba. 
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Figure  4.1.  Wedecha  and  Belbela  Dam  Schematic  Representation  and  the 
Associated Irrigation Schemes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goha Work 
scheme, 108ha 
Wedecha 
Dam 
Keteba 
Ginbi 
scheme, 
178.375  
Wedecha Dam 
- Reservoir area, A=2.7 km2 
- Capacity = 15.16x106m3 
- Live storage 142,300,000m3 
- Embankment volume = 130,000m 
- Embankment length=478m 
- Maximum height =18m 
- Mean flow of outlet -2.7m3 
- Max. regulated flood flow =111m3/s 
- Specific coefficient =97/1 
- Dead volume =938   
Godino scheme, 
241.25ha 
Harawa scheme, 
50ha  
Belbela 
Dam 
Belbela-Fultino 
scheme, 76ha 
Enema scheme, 
20.625ha  
To Dinsho, 
commercial 
flower farm, etc
Belbela Dam 
- Reservoir area, A=2.1 km2 
- Capacity = 12x106m3 
- Live storage 1.5x106m3 
- Embankment length = 710m 
- Maximum height =26.75m 
- Mean flow of outlet =2.4m3 
- Max. regulated flood flow =387m3/s 
- Specific coefficient =373/1 
- Dead volume =674679m3 
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4.6. Functional Irrigation Schemes from Wedecha-Belbela Dam, River Diversion and Natural Lake Use 
 
 
1 Numbers out of the bracket shows number of observation in that category, 
                  - actual years of experience of using the irrigation (mean) 
                  - irrigated land size  
2 Numbers within the bracket shows percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in that specific scheme.  
3Numbers within the double bracket shows percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in whole existing schemes in the woreda. 
 
 
 
 
Functional Small Scale Irrigation Schemes from Wedecha-Belbela Dam 
Actual 
No. of beneficiaries S. No. 
Name of the 
irrigation scheme 
PA 
Actual years of 
irrigation water 
use 
Total irrigated 
land Total Female Male 
Distance from the 
woreda town 
(Debre Zeit) 
1 Godino Godino 13.95 241.25 4951 90 (18.2%)2 405(81.8%) 12 
2 Gohaworko Godino 39.625 108 267 65 (24.3%) 202(75.7%) 13 
3 Harawa Godino 19.6667 50 68  24( 35.3%) 44  (64.7%) 18 
4 Belbela-Fultino  Koftu 10 76 247 28 (11.3%) 219(88.7%) 7.5 
5 Dhanama Ganda Gorba 7 20.625  54 8  (14.8%) 46 ( 85.2%) 10 
6 Kataba-Gimbi Kataba 9.058824 178.375 427 71 (16.6%) 356(83.4%) 21.75 
 
   
674.25 
 ((70.2%))3 
1558
((65.4%)) 
286(18.2%) 
((90%)) 
1272(81.6%) 
((61.8%))  
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Table 4.7.  River Diversion and Lake Irrigation Use in Ada’a 
  
 
1 Numbers out of the bracket shows number of observation in that category, 
                  - actual years of experience of using the irrigation (mean) 
                  - irrigated land size  
2 Numbers within the bracket shows percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in that specific scheme.  
3Numbers within the double bracket shows percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in whole existing schemes in the woreda. 
Actual 
No. of beneficiaries S. 
No. 
Name of the 
irrigation scheme 
Type of 
irrigation 
system 
Name of 
PA 
Actual years of 
irrigation water 
use 
Total irrigated 
land Total Female Male 
Distance 
from the 
woreda town 
(Debre Zeit) 
1 Mojo  river River diversion Hidi 10.11 263.5 1 698 25  (3.6%) 673 (96.4%) 13 
2 Hora Kilole lake Lake use Hidi 3 22.75 125 7 (5.6%)2 118 (94.4%) 14.5 
 
 
  
286.25 
((29.8%))3 
823 
((34.6%)) 
32 (3.8%) 
((10.1%)) 
791 (96.1%) 
((38.4%))  
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The above two tables show that in Ada’a woreda, there are a total of 2,059 irrigation 
water beneficiaries on 960.5 ha of land. Among the irrigation sites, Godino irrigation 
scheme is the largest in both size of command area and number of beneficiaries. It has the 
command area of 241.2 ha of land that is 35.8% of the whole Wedecha–Belbela dam 
command area. A total of 495 household beneficiaries are served, of which 81.8% are 
male headed households. Kataba-Gimbi traditional irrigation scheme is the second vast 
command area in the woreda. In this scheme 178.375 ha of land is irrigated by 427 
household heads, out of which 16.6% of them are female. The other two irrigation sites 
that are found in Godino PA are Gohaworko and Harawa. Those schemes have a long 
history of using Wedecha and Belbela spring water for irrigation purposes. The 
Wedecha–Belbela dam was named after these old aged spring water sites- Wedecha and 
Belbela. The two schemes (Gohaworko and Harawa) cover a total of 108 ha and 50 ha of 
land with total beneficiaries of 267 and 68, of which 24.3% and 35.3% are female headed 
households, respectively. 
 
Belbela dam is the source of two schemes namely Fultino (found in Koftu PA) and 
Dhanama (located Ganda Gorba PA). The command area under these two schemes has 
76ha and 20.625ha of land with 247 and 54 beneficiary farmers, out of which 88.7% and 
85.2% are male household heads.   
 
Regarding river diversion, there is only one river which crosses the woreda through Hidi 
PA. There are 698 farmers who use the irrigation water on 263.5ha of land. Hora Kilole 
natural lake is another source of irrigation water for farmers living around Hidi PA. It 
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covers 22.75 ha of land with 125 household beneficiaries, out of which 5.6% are female 
and 94.4% are male beneficiary farmers. Similar to farmers at Adi Mesanu in Atsbi, 
farmers who live around this natural lake took credit collectively from Ratson (NGO) for 
buying motor pumps for irrigation purpose.     
 
4. 2. Management Systems in Communal Irrigation Schemes  
Irrigation Water Administration 
Irrigation water administration covers the organizational, managerial and institutional 
structures including the regulatory apparatus and conflict resolution mechanisms, which 
are directly connected to the water sector. 
 
Organizational Framework 
The general organizational framework of irrigation water sector in Ethiopia can be briefly 
described by highlighting the key actors playing different roles at the centre, in the 
regions and at grassroot level. 
 
Regional Water Resource Bureaux (Tigray for Atsbi and Oromiya for Ada’a) provide 
oversights of the irrigation sites. As discussed previously almost all the diversions in 
Atsbi were constructed by the Tigray regional water resource bureau. It also gives 
financial support for maintenance at the outlet and system level, with the assistance of the 
community and other stakeholders. Similarly, the woreda agricultural office and the 
woreda water resource office have a larger role in the provision of technical assistance for 
beneficiary farmers. In both study areas, under the woreda agriculture office, the 
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irrigation team sub-division provides trainings and irrigation use awareness programs. 
The sub-division has coordinated training progrmmes a number of times in collaboration 
with NGOs and external organizations such as World Vision, IPMS-ILRI and Genesis. It 
creates a bridge between beneficiary farmers and other stakeholder.  
 
Moreover, there are a number of governmental and non-governmental organizations 
which play a huge role in enhancing the productivity of farmers in the schemes. World 
Vision, Irish AID, REST, Safty Net, World Bank and BoARD  in Atsbi, and Ratson, Kale 
Hiwot, Voca and  Genesis  in Ada’a; IPMS-ILRI  in both study woredas are the major 
external and non governmental organizations, which give technical support for 
beneficiary farmers. There are also local organizations which attempt to assist the farmers 
through provision of input such as Hayelom and Alph Goha Co-operatives in Atsbi and 
Ada’a, respectively. Furthermore, research organizations like Debre Zeit and Melkhasa 
Agricultural Research Institute in Ada’a are also participating actively in introducing new 
technologies to beneficiary farmers. 
 
Each irrigation scheme is a common property resource that is owned and managed by the 
community. Each site has formed Water Users Association (WUA) which is administered 
by Water Users Committee (WUC). Under normal circumstances, everybody who is the 
beneficiary of irrigation water is a member of WUA in a particular scheme. WUA is a 
local institution and has a basic character of authority and by-laws. It has rules, methods 
and sanctions for selecting executive committee, raising finances, setting disputes among 
irrigation water beneficiaries and supervising provision of the irrigation water service. 
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Each irrigation site has an elected committee with 3-7 members and a chair, which varies 
from scheme to scheme; with one-chair person, one-vice chairperson, one secretary, one-
treasurer (cashier), controller (s) and other members. It also embraces a water distributor, 
(in Atsbi locally called Abo-Mai19), who is responsible for everyday operation of the 
scheme. Under these water users associations and the executive committee, the new 
structure was created by water users with water course representatives at the outlet (block 
or group20) level (Gujele and Gere level).There are 94 Gujele and 75 Gere leaders in 
Atsbi and Ada’a, respectively. In this study Gujele and Gere leaders means group (block) 
leaders. These leaders are in charge of any issue concerned with monitoring and 
controlling of water distribution in their group. The water distributor controls these block 
(group) leaders at the scheme level. Usually, the water distributor is one person per 
scheme.  
 
The executive committee is an official link between irrigation water users and the 
government officials in tabias and woredas. They represent irrigation landowners and not 
the government. While they are appointed by the water users, they don’t have any formal 
office, payment or compensation for their services. Ownership of land within the same 
catchment’s area, active participation within the community, age and good family 
background are important considerations for appointment as a committee.  
 
 
                                             
19 Abo Mai means water distributor  at scheme level in Tigrigna (Atsbi). 
20 In this study Gujele, Gere, group and block are refer to the same meaning 
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According to discussions with water user farmers, the principal duties of the executive 
committees and water distributor include:- 
(1) enforcing the rules and regulations of the association; 
(2) collecting of annual cash contribution from each water user farmer; 
(3) mobilizing the resources for operation and maintenance of the scheme; 
(4)  assisting all offices of the government in executive of their public duties and 
supply the required information and generally act for and on behalf of the 
landowners and lease-in farmers in the catchment area; 
(5) resolving any conflict that relates to water distribution; 
(6) monitoring and controlling the water volume from the main regulator, lateral and 
sub-lateral; 
(7) planning, organizing and enforcing clearance and maintenance of the main canal, 
laterals  and sub-lateral canals; 
(8) After negotiation with all water users, they decide the water schedule (when each 
group and user get the water) and the mechanism how to distribute it and 
(9) listening any complaints and give resolutions. 
In both places, local associations are influential and powerful to the local communities. 
Most people feel a stronger sense of identity and belongingness than in the formal set- 
ups. 
 
4.3. Characteristics of Community Managed Irrigation Schemes 
The descriptive statistics for characteristics of communal managed irrigation schemes in 
the two woredas is indicated in Table 3.3. There are a total of 94 Gujeles and 75 Geres in 
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Atsbi and Ada’a woredas, respectively. Besides, the average number of beneficiaries in a 
group is 20.5 in Atsbi, with the minimum number 4 in Adi Mesanu communal pond 
irrigation use and a maximum of 280 irrigation water users in one of Endaminu’s modern 
river diversion groups. Similarly, in Ada’a the average number of beneficiaries in a group 
is 32. The largest Gere embraces 297 beneficiaries in a group and the smallest group 
includes 8 farmers. 
 
With regard to group characteristics, average family size for a combined irrigation 
schemes (Atsbi and Ada’a) is nearly 6, with slight variation among groups in the two 
woredas. In terms of education wise distribution, a large percentage of the household 
heads in the groups are illiterate. In both cases, only 30% and 50% are literate 
beneficiaries in Atsbi and Ada’a, respectively. 
 
As Table 3.3 shows, large proportion of households in the group have access to 
agricultural extension programme. In both cases, 96% of households have access to 
extension programme, indicating a possible positive association between access to 
extension and irrigation water use. Regarding financial capital endowment of irrigation 
water users in a group in cropping season of 2006/07, only 33% of beneficiaries obtained 
credit from formal organizations for the combined population. The mean variation in this 
respect is very large, 15% in Atsbi and 57% in Ada’a. The major reasons for lower mean 
percentage of beneficiaries that obtained credit  are due to the inability to repay back the 
previous credit, insufficient supply of credit, credit aversion, shortage of prepayment cash 
and different other reasons.  
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The population density in irrigated areas of Atsbi is very high. The average number of 
beneficiaries per hectare is 8 in Atsbi and 3 in Ada’a. With respect to soil fertility, the 
beneficiaries were asked what percentage of their groups’ irrigated farm land soil 
coverage is considered ‘good’, based on their perception. Only 51% and 72% of the soil 
of irrigated land is classified as ‘good’ in Atsbi and Ada’a, respectively. The mean 
proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-end is comparable among irrigation beneficiaries in 
Atsbi and Ada’a at 0.31 and 0.27, respectively. 
 
Furthermore, average years of irrigation water use experience shows that most of the 
schemes were constructed or began to operate after the fall of the military government. It 
has been on average 10 years, since the irrigation schemes started to operate in Atsbi, 
while it has been 13 years in Ada’a. The average number of times training was given in 
2006/07 cropping season for beneficiaries is higher at Ada’a than in Atsbi, i.e., twice in 
Ada’a and once in Atsbi. This shows that less involvement of stakeholders in training 
provision in both woredas. There is much variation in total ownership of agricultural land 
(non-irrigated land) and TLU across irrigation water beneficiary communities in the two 
woredas. 
 
The combined mean for walking time to the town market for a round trip takes 251.75 
minutes (4:20 hrs). The mean walking time to Enda Selassie (the woreda town of Atsbi) 
takes 200.36 minutes (3:33hrs) with the maximum of 455 minutes(7.58hrs) from Hadnet 
to Enda Selassie and the minimum of  60 minutes (1hr) from Tegahne (Golgol Naele 
tabia) to Enda Selassie. On the other hand, the average walking time to Debre Zeit (the 
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woreda town of Ada’a) takes 316 minutes (5.26 hrs), with the minimum of 180 min(3hrs) 
from Koftu PA (Belbela-Fultino scheme) to Debre Zeit and the maximum of 415 
min.(6:59 hrs) from Kataba PA to Debre Zeit. However, village markets are nearer to 
irrigated villages of the woredas as compared with the town markets. The combined mean 
for walking time to the nearest village market for a round trip is 70 minutes (1:10hrs), 
with some variation between the two woredas (20 min.). In both cases, the town markets 
are very remote from the irrigated tabias which might reduce incentive to sell the product 
in town market that the beneficiary farmers start to produce using irrigation water.  
 
The result shows that, 82% of the current irrigation sites in Atsbi were promoted by 
external organizations like Co-SAERT, Tigray Regional Office of Water Resource and 
World Vision, with the full participation of the community in food-for-work programme. 
However, Wedecha- Belbela dam was constructed by the then socialist government in 
collaboration with Cuban government. The results of focus group discussion reveals that 
during the construction of Wedecha- Belbela dam, only some farmers participated as a 
daily laborer. While the diversion from Mojo river and Hora Kilole lake was initiated and 
promoted by farmers around the water source. The average number of external and local 
organizations which operate currently is comparable among irrigation water beneficiary 
groups in both woredas (3 external organizations and 1 local organization per scheme in 
both woredas). Moreover, in both woredas, micro-dam is the main source of irrigation 
water, 65% in Atsbi and 80% in Ada’a.   
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4.4. Nature of Collective Action in the Irrigation Sites- as a common pool resource 
4.4.1. Participation of Members in WUA 
Like in any other common pool resource, collective action arrangement in irrigation 
water use faces two types of resource management problems: provision and 
appropriation. The problem of provision arises in arranging the construction and 
maintenance of canals, while appropriation arises in water distribution arrangement. To 
overcome these problems, as we discussed previously, irrigation beneficiaries has formed 
WUA and WUC at each scheme, and block (Gujele and Gere) leaders at each outlet 
level.  
 
Before the start of the irrigation season, water users in general assemble to negotiate 
when to clean the canals (the main canal, lateral and sub-lateral canals) and then decide 
the water distribution programme, i.e., where to start (upstream or downstream), 
rotational irrigation intervals, for how much time to irrigate per person etc. Especially, 
water distributors have a big role in organizing the water distribution programme and the 
mechanism to achieve the goals.  
 
The irrigation group leaders are in charge of control at turnout gates of lateral and sub-
laterals. They also inspect at farm–level water distributions that are to be carried out by 
each block.  
 
Participation of Members in Meetings- Many of the problems related to irrigation are 
solved directly by farmers themselves. According to the current status of the rule and the 
regulations of the WUA in both woredas, members should meet once a month and WUC 
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once at fortnight to discuss problems, make decisions and once a year to elect new 
executive committee and water distributor. However, in practice, it is hardly the case. It 
seems that the only occasion that brings farmers and WUC to meetings is when they 
negotiate on the issues like when to clean the canals, when the irrigation system ceases to 
function or when an urgent action is needed. 
 
All farmers are allowed to participate equally in all meetings, which are led by WUC. 
Representation by other family members is quite common. Double representation is 
considered (by men and women) inefficient and unnecessary. In addition, all members of 
WUA (women and men) have equal right to vote and to be elected to serve as an 
executive committee, water distributor or block leader.     
 
4.4.2. Water Distribution System 
In both selected areas, rotational irrigation is practiced. Rotational irrigation is the 
application of irrigation water in a given amount at the given time and in proper order, so 
that all farmers may get enough water to irrigate their fields. The irrigation distribution is 
designed according to the existing system layout and actual topographic conditions, so 
that irrigation water can be simultaneously delivered into each rotation block or group. 
This is why each irrigation site is divided into different Gugeles and Geres (blocks). 
Actually, water distribution shifts are established based on counting dates or complaints, 
instead of water needs by plants.  
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Under normal circumstances, a group gets water for a day whereby the interval differs 
from season to season, which depends on the amount of water stored in the reservoir. In 
both woredas, efficient and effective use of rainfall is an important source of irrigation 
water. Presently, all the existing micro-dams conserve rainfall as the irrigation water. 
Raising the fields to capture more rain water is the method used. Other sources of 
irrigation water are also directly related to the amount of rain-fall during wet season.  
 
Farmers also claim to follow crop-water requirement rates in irrigating their plots. 
However the application is without consideration of the soil type, crop type and stage of 
growth. According to focus group discussions with beneficiary farmers, they know and 
use crop–water requirement rates. Nevertheless, interview with the woreda and tabia 
irrigation experts revealed that beneficiary farmers always try to over-irrigate their fields 
thinking that more water results more yields.  
 
4.5. Indicators of collective Action to Manage the Irrigation Schemes 
Table 4.9 depicts indicators of collective action in communal irrigation schemes in the 
two woredas. The combined average area of irrigated land per households is 0.31 
ha/household, with high variation among the two woredas, which is 0.15 ha/household in 
Atsbi and 0.43 ha/household in Ada’a. This may be due to the presence of high 
population density in the highlands of Ethiopia, especially in such places where there is 
high potential of agriculture. 
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There are three kinds of contributions among irrigation water beneficiaries: in cash, kind 
and in labor form. Farmers in the two woredas have comparable annual total average 
value of contribution per household for the resource management that is nearly 190 Birr 
in Atsbi and 206 Birr in Ada’a. The most common members’ contribution is in form of 
labor, that members clean and maintain canals collectively in a number of times in a year. 
This form of contribution accounts for 95% in Atsbi and 86% in Ada’a as compared with 
the total amount of contribution.  
 
All of the beneficiaries of the irrigation water have an obligation to participate in 
cleaning, maintenance and minor construction of canals, water gates and spill ways.  
Months like September and February are the most favorable times to clean the canals.  
The farmers form a group and a team leader and agreed on how much meter of canal to 
clean.  If a group can’t finish in the agreed time, it will be punished by a cash fine set by 
the WUA. 
  
In Ethiopia and in many other developing countries around the world, the ability of 
government to ensure irrigation cost recovery is the most important problem. In these two 
woredas, the canal water charge is zero. They have only collected money to cover some 
operation and maintenance costs and payment for guards and water distributor. In Atsbi, 
the mean annual cash contribution is 2.81 Birr per household. Whereas, in Ada’a average 
annual household cash contribution is 19.82 Birr for the resource management. 
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Table 4.8–Indicators of Collective Action to Manage the Irrigation Schemes in the Woredas 
Indicators Atsbi Ada’a All irrigation schemes 
Area of irrigated land per household (ha) 
.1534593*1 
(.0190819)*2   
.4256 
(.0222955)   
.3104635 
(.0192127) 
If there is formal written rules (Yes, No)                           150(89) 163*3(97)*4 159(94) 
Average value of a group member contribution            
for the resource management(in cash+kind+labor) 
189.9 
(10.03769)   
206.2511 
    (18.63855)   
200.17 
(11.55121)   
Value contribution in cash form ( in Birr) 2.81 (1.50)   19.82 (2.789)   12.6 (1.876063) 
         Value contribution in kind form (converted to in   
Birr) 5.6 (2.448)   10.1(2.662)   8.2 (1.855946) 
Value contribution in labor form (converted to in 
Birr) 181.5 (11.37)   177.8 (16.98)   179.3 (10.88) 
Number of times violation of rules and regulations  
occurred  in 2006/07 (no.) 
12.72727 
(1.510782)   
   25.92 
(1.748)   
20.33846 
(1.320701)   
Number of conflicts occurred related to irrigation water 
use in 2006/07 (no.)                           
9.927273 
       (1.48774)   
19.30667 
(1.630)   
15.33846 
 (1.199113) 
Number of penalty exercised  in 2006//07(no.)                     
3.109091 
(.4017409)   
5.84 
(.615)   
4.684615 
(.4096386)   
If there is(are) guard(s) for protection of the irrigation 
site(Yes, No) 
                     32 (19) 
            
162 (96) 
 
105(62) 
 
Number of guards in the irrigation site (no.) 
.3090909 
(.141832)   
2.506667 
(.0917759)   
1.576923 
(.1244501) 
Number of months guards protect the irrigation site (no.) 
9.818182 
(.433831)   
8.36 
(.4570331)   
9.238462 
(.4532798)   
Whether group members contribute for the guard(s)  
(Yes, No) 
 
                    28.73(17) 
  
145(86) 
  
98(58) 
  
Value of contribution per guard per month ( in Birr)  
52.36364 
    25.44415   
206.7387 
(11.55267)   
141.4262 
(14.280) 
If there is water distributor in the irrigation scheme (Yes, 
No.) 
 
94 (100) 
  
69(41) 
   
110(66) 
 
Number of water distributor in the irrigation site (no.) 
1 
(.)   
.6666667 
(.0547997)  
.8076923 
 (.0346998)   
Number of months the water distributor operates in a 8 5.373333 6.484615 
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year time in the irrigation site  (no)  (.2201928)   (.5229071)   (.3348626) 
Whether group members  contribute for water 
distributor(Yes,  No)  
63 (37) 
  
144(85) 
   
101(61) 
 
Value of contribution per water distributor per month  (in 
Birr)      
52.36364 
(25.44415) 
108.6267 
(12.38735) 
84.82308 
(13.09309) 
 
*1- In variables with continuous data the values represent the mean of the observation of the variable under consideration 
 *2- In variables with continuous data the values in brackets represent the standard error of the mean  
*3- The numbers out of the bracket shows number of observations in each category for discrete data  
*4- In variables with discrete data the values in the bracket represent the percentage distribution of the variable from the total 
observation. 
 
 
 
The third type of contribution is in kind.  In some cases of irrigation schemes of Atsbi, 
guards who protect the irrigation farm and the infrastructure are paid in kind (cereals like 
wheat and sorghum). During minor construction, beneficiaries also contribute in kind, for 
instance raw materials such as stone and soil.  The average annual contribution in kind is 
5.6 Birr per household and 10.1 Birr per household in Atsbi and in Ada’a, respectively.  
 
Minor construction and maintenance that needs community level participation is 
organized by the water committee. Water committee mobilizes resources and fixes time 
of maintenance. Resources for these kinds of maintenance are from three sources: income 
from punishment, community labor, community contribution in cash form (additional to 
the one annually paid) and contribution in kind. 
 
In both areas, interview with the woreda expert reveals that there is no problem with 
labor contribution and mobilization for maintenance and clearance of canals. Every water 
user is equally committed to the purpose. However, informal discussion with beneficiary 
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farmers shows  that  tail-enders21  usually have to contribute  more  labor  than  the  head-
enders.  
 
Farmers clean the canals two-four times a year in order to prepare the structure for 
irrigation during the dry season. The agreement is that beginning from the uppermost part 
of the scheme, every user has to contribute labor until the lower–most canal that serves 
for a common use. Therefore, beneficiaries in every group should come out and clean up 
the canal. But when we come to the actual case, the head–enders usually flee 
maintenance work once the head- end part has been done. The rest of the work is up to 
the tail-enders.    
 
4.6. Water Rights 
The issue of water rights and water quotas as a mechanism for allocation and 
accountability assume the importance of decreasing scarcity and conflict among 
communities and individual users. Unfortunately, Ethiopia does not have any explicit 
legal framework for irrigation use water rights. Individual rights to irrigation water is 
recognized only indirectly through land rights. Hence, a farmer who has land near the 
irrigation water can have a right to use the irrigation water. 
 
4.7. Legal Framework 
Formal and informal institutions are closely linked and greatly depend on each other. In 
both study areas, for many years, there have been a variety of locally managed water 
related institutions in traditional river diversions and spring water use. These institutions 
                                             
21 The tail and head-enders are identified by beneficiary farmers. 
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are in the form of informal customs and conventions for water sharing as well as 
community–based organizations for water management. These institutions had remained 
largely independent of formal water institutions and had operated only at the periphery of 
the formal water sector. However, the present government of Ethiopia gives special 
attention and makes an effort to create a link between the informal and formal institution 
arrangements, with the understanding that informal customs and conventions can still 
provide very valuable insights for designing institutional mechanisms that are needed for 
filling the organizational vacuum existing at grassroot level of water management. 
 
Before the construction of modern schemes in both woredas, the community has long 
experience of using rivers and spring water for irrigation purposes. For example in Atsbi 
river Chuhet (in Hayleom tabia), Kimber spring water (in Zarema tabia) and  Samera 
river (in Ruba Felg) are some of rives and spring water uses which have been there for 
many years. In Ada’a also Hidi river, Wedecha and Belebla spring water have been used 
for long without much knowledge of how to use the water effectively and how much 
benefit they would accrue using irrigation water. It is a recent phenomenon that farmers 
in both woredas have begun to cultivate cash crops such as onion, cabbage and tomato.  
 
For irrigation water management the beneficiaries collectively prepare and agree on a set 
of rules of restricted access to water and make arrangements of water for their plots. It is 
the executive committee, water distributor and group leaders who are in charge of 
enforcing the use of restricted rules and regulations.  
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Concerning the existence of formal written rules, 89% of Gujeles in Atsbi have formal 
written rules. The figure is even higher in Ada’a, i.e., 97% of Geres have written rules. 
These rules and regulations for operation and water management were formulated by the 
irrigation water beneficiaries in collaboration with the woreda agricultural offices.  These 
arrangements were written, but documented only at the woreda agricultural offices. 
Neither water users nor WUC have the written document of the rules. They run the 
operation simply as a commonly understood convention and recall punishment rates as 
they want. 
 
4.7.1.The Written By-Laws in Atsbi  
In Atsbi, in all the irrigation schemes the components of the by-laws are the same, except 
the penalty system part. It varies scheme to scheme, depending on discussions in the 
general assembly of beneficiary farmers at the beginning of each year. 
 The formulated written by-law constitutes three parts.   
(i) Rules and Regulations- in this section the whole obligations of beneficiary farmers are 
stated (see annex 1).  
(ii) The second section explains the rights beneficiary farmers have as a member of WUA 
and; 
 (iii) The third part and the more detailed section is the penalty system for not abiding by 
the rules and regulations (see annex 1). 
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A very interesting observation in Atsbi is that the rules and regulations have been revised 
many times, since the beginning of the establishment of the association. This has 
implication on management and utilization of the resource  
 
4.7.2. The Written By-Laws in Ada’a  
In Ada’a the presentation of the written rules and regulations is a bit different from Atsbi. 
It was also observed that in all schemes the by-laws are the same. The by-laws are 
divided into seven articles:-  
Article 1- states the name of the Water Users Association (WUA), 
Article  2- identifies the address of the association, 
 Article 3–states when it was established and the aims, objectives and vision of the 
association, 
 Article 4- duties, responsibilities and obligations of member beneficiaries  
Article 5 &6- explains about the rights and obligations members have as a beneficiary of 
irrigation water user.  It also includes duties and responsibilities of the executive 
committee. Finally, article 7 states how often members and WUC should meet. 
 
However, the realty is far from this, according to discussions with the executive 
committee in Ada’a, attendance to the WUA meetings is far less than expected. In 
addition, the level of obedience to the WUAs by-laws is low. It was noticed that in Ada’a 
the WUA was established in each scheme in 2000. Since then, the document is put in the 
agriculture office of the woreda and there was not even a single revised article of 
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regulation. In addition, less observance of laws and regulation was noticed among 
irrigation water users. 
 
The most frequent violation of use restrictions of irrigation water is stealing of water 
(using water without turn), inappropriate usage of water (over irrigating own plot and the 
nearby irrigated fields), infrastructure damage caused by livestock, not attending and 
being late in meetings. The mean variation in number of times for violation of rules and 
regulations among beneficiaries in these two woredas is very high. It occurred nearly an 
average of 13 number of times per group in Atsbi and 26 number of times per group in 
Ada’a in year 2006/07. Similarly, the mean number of times conflict occurred in 2006/07 
cropping season due to irrigation water related issues was 19 times in Ada’a per group 
and 10 times per group in Atsbi. 
 
Irrigation schemes in Ada’a are protected in almost all cases by an average of 3 guards, 
96% of which are paid their salary in cash. The WUC collect money annually and pay an 
average of 207 Birr for a guard per month. These guards in average give services for 8 
months. However, guards at Wedecha and Belebla dam protect the dams all year round. 
Fourty one percent of the schemes in Ada’a have water distributor in which only 5 
months22 of a year he monitors the water distribution system in a scheme. 
 
However, in Atsbi, there is guard to protect the scheme in only 19% of the cases. It is the 
beneficiaries themselves who protect the irrigation sites turn by turn. In cases where 
                                             
22 The water distributor monitors the water distribution during the irrigation scheme is under operation 
(only 5 months a year). 
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guards are in charge of protecting schemes, average monthly payment is 52 Birr per 
guard. On the contrary, in all the cases, there are Abo Mais in Atsbi with a mean of 416 
Birr payment from the beneficiaries for giving 8 months of service in a year.  
 
4.8. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms  
Formal and informal institutions interact appreciably in conflict resolution at the local 
level in both study areas. Most disputes on the water use are resolved informally at the 
lower levels before they erupt into serious conflicts. There are 4 identified ways of 
considering both informal–formal conflict resolution mechanisms as mentioned below: 
o One to one level between the victims: both parties speak out and agree on 
resolving the conflict; 
o At block or group level: this is a semi-formal, since block or group leaders are 
elected among water users. Normally the group leader is well respected person for 
both parties and can give more trustful and appreciable judgment; 
o Scheme level : water distributor and the executive committee will involve in the 
conflict resolution mechanism when the above solutions have failed and;  
o Tabia administration and the community court: the water users committee refers 
conflict management cases beyond its capacity to the tabia administration and the 
community court. The community court which is responsible for managing almost 
every type of conflict in the community is said to be supporting the water 
committee with resolution of high level conflicts over water use. However, 
according to scheme level focus group discussion results, irrigation water 
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beneficiaries and the executive committee complain that the community court is 
so busy and slow in deliberating and delivering solutions immediately. 
 
Generally, water users prefer informal routes over formal ones (tabia level court system). 
This is because of the existence of a greater sense of identity and hope for justice than 
they would experience in the courts of formal law where decisions are based on ‘I loose-
you-win’ or ‘I win-you-loose’ principles. Such parallel forums provide an effective 
conflict resolution institution for managing water conflicts at a lesser cost. 
 
Due to scarcity of water and other relevant reasons, conflict may arise among irrigation 
water users which may be the cause of sever injury. According to results from focus 
group discussions, in these two woredas the number of conflict occurrence increases from 
year to year because of two possible reasons. The first one is eventually, the volume of 
irrigation water decreases due to decreasing trend of rainfall in the areas. The second one 
is, through time farmers have begun to realize the benefits of using irrigation water. 
Therefore, every year the command area becomes wider. 
 
4.9. Unresolved Conflicts 
Pre-feasibility and feasibility study is needed when investment is made on a long-term 
common property resource. Otherwise, the results will be disappointing, which leads to  
frequent occurrence of conflicts among different interest groups. Debre Selam micro-dam 
which is located in Ruba Felg tabia  and Wedecha- dam which is found at the boarder of 
Sendafa and Gimbichu woredas, are the two best examples, which causes the 
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displacement of many households to other places and end up with frequent conflict 
occurrences. 
 
4.9.1 The Land of Controversies -Ruba Felg 
Ruba Felg means the land of rivers and spring water in the local language Tigrigna. It 
was World Vision which took the lead to construct the dam in Debre Selam in 1993-94. 
The goal was to reduce poverty through increasing the production and productivity of 
farmers through irrigation water use. The farmers express their appreciation through 
participating in labor during the construction of the dam. As one of the farmers explained, 
“We were all happy. Even other farmers who lived in other tabias also came to 
participate during the construction. We hoped the better for tomorrow but the result is 
very disappointing as you can see it, for a number of years the dam has been 
unfunctional, we cannot use the water. Every time we try to use it, conflict arises. We 
loss a big benefit every year.”  It is right. It has been nine years since farmers have not 
used the irrigation water in Debre Selam.  
 
After the construction of the dam had been finished, World Vision handed the micro-dam 
to the community. After using it for only two years the canals began to crack and there 
was high amount of seepage. Therefore, Co-SAERT (Commission for Sustainable 
Agriculture and Environmental Rehabilitation for Tigray) came to maintain the canals in 
1997. After 1998, conflict has occurred between displaced grazing land owners and the 
current irrigation water users.  
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Here is the whole story of the conflict. Totally, there are four Kushets23 in Ruba-Felg 
tabia, namely Hineto, Afenjow, Agew and Debre Selam. The dam is found in Hineto 
Kushet on 3ha of land but the beneficiaries are from Agew and Debre- Selam Kushets. 
On the 3ha of land, there were people who used to have resident houses (10 in number), 
plots of land and grazing lands (37 in number). People who had resident houses and plot 
of land got compensation for their losses. However, individuals who had grazing land 
were left with nothing.  It is this problem which caused almost a decade of conflict. 
 
The dam has an irrigation potential of 70ha of land in the two Kushets; namely Agew 
(consists of 138 households) and Debre-Selam  (116 households). The rationale solution 
for this problem is, as the benefit goes to these two Kushets, the cost also should go to 
both of them. Unfortunately, people who live in Agew (in Samera Goth24) already gave 
their land for construction of health and development post. Thus, they do not volunteer to 
give additional piece of land for another public purpose, since the development and 
health post give services for the whole dwellers of that tabia. However, the farmers at 
Debere Selam are very willing to give up some piece of land to those former grazing land 
owners, but the land is not fertile for grazing purposes.  
 
There is also additional situation which aggravates the problem. The present Kushets in 
Ruba Felg tabia were previously part of two different tabias, namely Agewo and Debre 
Selam. Agewo consisted of three Kushets: Samera, Agewo and Aserti. On the other hand, 
Debre Selam included: Hineto, Debre Selam, Afenjow and Tsquaf Kushets. But, now 
                                             
23 Kushets  means villages in the local language of Tigrigna 
24 Goth is a sub-division of village 
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Ruba Felg constitutes some Kushets from Agewo and some Kushets from Debre Selam. 
However, during the construction period the agreement was the compensation would be 
on the lands of Debre Selam tabia. But just after the construction of the dam, the tabias 
were restructured. The basic question was raised, ‘who will bear all the costs?’ 
 
Conflict Resolution Mechanism:-  As many parts of  Ethiopia, for centuries  as the 
mechanism  for resolving conflicts at the micro–level, there are  traditional and informal 
village level institutions in Atsbi . 
 
From both Kushets, the people elected 3 elders from Debre Selam and 3 from Agewo 
(Samera Goth). These elders are influential, widely respected and are expected to serve 
the community genuinely and are opinion leaders. It is expected that these respected 
elders will come up with optimal solution for all the concerned parties. 
 
However, for the time being, there are four guards who protect the dam and its whole 
structure from any external attack. These guards are paid 90 quintals of wheat from food-
for-work programme. The former grazing land owners attempted to break the main 
regulator and spill way three times. It was World Vision which covered the maintenance 
expenses with 22,000 Birr each time. 
 
4.9.2. The case in Ada’a -   There is also similar case in Ada’a. The place where the 
Wedecha dam was constructed is between the woredas of Sendafa and Gembichu. 
However, the beneficiaries are farmers from Ada’a woreda. Farmers who live in these 
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woredas had asked to use the water for irrigation many times, but they didn’t receive any 
answer from a concerned authority. Just like the case in Ruba Felg, people from those 
woredas attempted to break the main regulator and the spill way for a number of times. 
This is the reason why there are three guards who protect the micro-dam in every season 
of the year, 24 hours a day without exceptions. Two of the guards are from Gimbichu 
woreda and one of them is from Sendafa. The farmers around the dam are allowed to 
water their cattle from the dam. 
 
4.10. KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
In Atsbi, under 221.1 ha of land, there are 14 irrigation schemes used by 1855 beneficiary 
households, of which 402 (21.67%) are female and 1453 (78.3%) are male headed 
households. Currently,  there are 5 micro-dams, 6 river diversions, 5 traditional river 
diversions, 3 spring water use, 1 communal shallow well and 2 communal ponds. On the 
other hand, in Ada’a, there are 4 modern and 2 traditional irrigation schemes from 
Wedecha- Belbela dam, with addition of one river diversion (Mojo river) and one natural 
lake use (Hora Kilole). The irrigation system has 960.6ha of land in its command area 
Out of 2,381 beneficiary farmers, 318 (13.4%) are female and 2059 (86.6%) are male-
headed households. 
 
The afore-mentioned irrigation schemes are common property resources with their own 
water users associations and water users committee (appointed by water users). Every 
beneficiary of irrigation water is a member of WUA in a particular scheme. WUA is local 
institution and has a basic character of authority and by-laws. In addition, there are a 
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water distributor in each scheme and block leaders (Gujele and Gere leaders), which are 
94 in Atsbi and 75 in Ada’a. Regional Water Resource Bureaux (Tigray for Atsbi and 
Oromiya for Ada’a) and the woreda agricultural office and the woreda water resource 
office have immense role in provision of technical support for beneficiary farmers.   
Other stakeholders like: World Vision, IPMS-ILRI, REST, Irish AID  and World Bank                              
in Atsbi; Ratson, IPMS-ILRI, Oromiya Rehabilitation Fund and Debre Zeit Agricultural 
Research Institute in Ada’a are the major non-governmental and governmental 
organizations which participate actively in introducing new technologies and in training 
provision of  beneficiary farmers. 
 
With regard to characteristics of community managed schemes, within 94 gujeles which 
are found in Atsbi, the smallest group has 4 household beneficiaries and the largest 280, 
with average number of households of 20.5. On the other hand, in Ada’a the maximum 
number of beneficiaries in a group is 297 and minimum 8. The average family size in the 
irrigation is nearly 6, with slightest variation among the woredas. About 30% and 50% of 
beneficiary farmers are literate in the irrigation sites of Atsbi and Ada’a, respectively. 
Besides, large proportion of households in the group have access to agriculture extension 
program in both study areas. Moreover, nearly 15% farm decision makers in Atsbi and 
57% in Ada’a obtained credit from formal organization.  The mean area irrigated land in 
a group is 2.71ha in Atsbi and 12.8 ha in Ada’a. The mean proportion of beneficiaries at 
the tail–end in a group is comparable among Atsbi and Ada’a, 0.31 and 0.27, 
respectively. When we look at the average years of experience of irrigation water use, it  
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is 10 years for Atsbi and 13 years in Ada’a. In addition, the average number of times for 
provision of trainings in 2006/07 is twice in Ada’a and once in Atsbi.  
 
Before the start of the irrigation season (dry season), water users in general assemble and 
negotiate on: when to clean the canals and decide the schedule of water distribution; in 
order to overcome provision and appropriation resource management problems. Water 
distributor is a person in charge of organizing the operation and distribution of irrigation 
water. Group leaders also control the irrigation water at turnout gates of lateral and sub-
lateral canals. In both selected areas, rotational irrigation system is practiced. Farmers 
also claim to use crop-water requirement rates in plot level, even if the application is 
without consideration of soil type, crop type and stage of growth. 
 
The other interesting information we found is, irrigated land in Atsbi is more densely 
populated than in Ada’a, which is 0.15 ha/household and 0.43ha /household, respectively. 
Moreover, there are three kinds of contributions for the resource management, that are in 
cash, kind and in labor form. The average value of contribution per household is 
comparable in both woredas, nearly 190 Birr in Atsbi and 206 Birr in Ada’a per year. 
Labor constitutes the dominant share, for maintaining and clearance of canals and minor 
construction.  
 
In addition to this, beneficiaries collectively prepare and agree on a set of use rules for 
the irrigation water management, in their respective WUA, in order to have access to 
water and make arrangements of water for their plots. It is the executive committee, water 
  109 
Pa
ge
10
9 
distributor and the group leaders who are in charge of enforcement of these rules and 
regulations. Eighty nine percent of Gujeles in Atsbi have formal written rule. This figure 
is even higher in Ada’a, i.e., 97% of the Geres have their own written rules and 
regulations. Furthermore, violation of restricted rules and conflict among beneficiary 
farmers on water distribution issues are common phenomenon in the irrigation sites. The 
mean violation occurrence per group in 2006/07 is 13 and 26 number of times in Atsbi 
and Ada’a, respectively. Similarly, the average number of times conflict occurred in 
2006/07 is 19 numbers of times per group in Ada’a and 10 times per group in Atsbi.  
Generally, as can be observed, even if there are water users associations and executive 
committees who are responsible for the restricted rules enforcement, there is a wide gap 
between the by-laws stated on papers and the actual realty of actions of beneficiaries. 
Thus, awareness raising programmes on the concepts of restricted rules and regulations 
and the importance of imposing and enforcing them should be provided extensively for 
further sustainable use of the resource. Besides, governmental intervention is needed to 
strengthen the water users associations in a number of dimensions.  
 
In Ada’a the schemes are protected by guards in about 96% of the times. The payment is 
fully covered by beneficiary farmers’ contribution for an average of 8 months of a year. 
However, in Atsbi, in 81% of the cases, the irrigation sites are protected by the 
community turn by turn. This suggests that the effect of social capital to manage the 
communal managed resources at less cost. In addition, all the schemes have water 
distributor (Abo Mai) in Atsbi who are paid a mean average monthly salary of 52 Birr. 
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The focus group discussion with beneficiary farmers showed that through time the 
frequency of conflict occurrence increases in the irrigation sites. There are two main 
reasons; the first one is over time the volume of the irrigation water decreases due to 
erratic nature of rainfall in the woredas. The second one is farmers have began to realize 
the benefit accrued from irrigation water use, therefore, every year the command area 
becomes wider. Thus, in the face of growing demands of irrigation water with declining 
water resource, relevant institutions need to exert further endeavor on the formulation of 
water policies that clearly stipulate specific water entitlements to irrigation water users.  
 
Even if there are two kinds of conflict resolution mechanisms in both woredas (formal 
and informal systems), water users prefer the informal one. This is because of the 
existence of a greater sense of identity and hope for justices. Such parallel forms of 
conflict resolution methods provide effective conflict resolution institutions for managing 
water conflict at a lesser cost. Therefore, intervention should be made to strengthen the 
capacity of the informal system. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF IRRIGATION AGRICULTURE IN ATSBI 
AND ADA’A WOREDAS 
 
5.1. Irrigated Agriculture 
The introduction of irrigation has offered households the possibility of increasing the 
annual agricultural output. However, it has not replaced traditional rain-fed agriculture; 
rather, farm households use the irrigated production to supplement the rain-fed 
production. Having access to irrigated plots helps households to meet families’ 
consumption requirements. The average plot sizes of irrigated fields (0.15ha/household in 
Atsbi and 0.45ha /household in Ada’a) are relatively small compared to rain-fed holdings, 
which are 0.5 ha/household and 1.75ha/household in size in Atsbi and in Ada’a, 
respectively. 
 
The produce from the rain-fed are used mainly to meet the household’s cereal needs. 
Most holders of irrigated plots use their income from the sale of high–value crops such as 
onion, tomatoes, potato, to purchase their other household requirements.  
 
According to the result of focus group discussion with irrigation water beneficiary 
farmers, over the last years, productivity of rain-fed agriculture has considerably 
decreased due to sever soil degradation. As a result, the production of the rain-fed fields 
is seldom sufficient for meeting family consumption needs. Through time households 
depend more on the production from their irrigated fields, which enabled them to harvest 
twice in a year. 
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5.2. Cropping Pattern 
As part of the institutional analysis of irrigation water management the study has 
employed a descriptive analysis to compare costs farmers incurred and benefits they 
accrued in communal managed irrigation schemes in year 2006/07. In order to increase 
the reliability of the data, all tabias with irrigation projects were included. Here, the crop 
types are classified into five categories; vegetables, fruits, pulses, spices and cereals. 
 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 present the descriptive statistics for the size of land coverage of 
each crop in each tabia of the two woredas. In Atsbi a total of 220.675 ha of land was 
covered with different crops using irrigation water. The major types of crops were 
vegetables which covered 104.122 ha of land and accounted for 47%; pulses with 80.45 
ha of land (36.46%). From vegetable crops category that had larger share were tomato, 
onion (cross-bred), cabbage, potato and swiss chard, accounting for 23.75ha (10.8%), 
23.257ha (10.5%), 16.1ha (7.3%), 13.43ha (6.1%) and 9.45ha (4.3% ), respectively. With 
respect to pulses, peas and faba beans covered the largest area of land, 41.9ha (19%) and 
27.3ha (12.4%) of land, respectively. Moreover, almost 25ha  (11%)  of the irrigated land 
was covered with spices where fenugreek, green pepper, lin seed, ‘azmud’ and ‘camoon’  
represented 17.3ha (7.8%), 4.8ha(2.2%), 3ha(1.36%), 0.125 ha (0.057%) and 0.05ha 
(0.02%) of land, respectively. Cereals took the smallest area as compared to other 
categories in the irrigated land of Atsbi which covered 10.25ha and accounted for 4.64%. 
This crop category type was only grown in Ruba Felg, Adi Mesanu, Hayelom and Hadnet 
tabias. Maize covered the widest cereal area which was 5.75ha of land (2.6%). Apple and 
banana were also grown using irrigation water although they covered a small piece of 
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land only in Zarema tabia, on about 0.56ha (0.25%). Surprisingly, even though 
Endaminu irrigation scheme covered the largest area, 74.37ha, the most diversified25 crop 
types were observed in Hadnet scheme on a total of 43.25ha of irrigated land.  
 
On the other hand, in Ada’a woreda, the irrigation system had over 961.87ha of land. 
Vegetables, pulses, spices and others represented 629.55ha (65.45%), 299.27ha (31.1%), 
28.55ha (2.968%) and 4.5ha (0.468%), respectively. Besides, in the vegetables category 
the two types of onion (cross-bred and local) had the lion share which took 193.15ha 
(20%) and 130.7ha (13.6%), followed by, tomato 75.75ha (7.9%), spinach 62.45ha 
(6.49%) and potato 60.15ha (6.25%). The second major crop category is pulse, in which 
chick pea, lentil and ‘guaya’ took 171.22ha (17.8%), 102.55ha (10.7%) and 14.75ha 
(1.53%), respectively. Spices also covered 28.55ha of the irrigated land in the woreda, the 
main type being fenugreek 13.75ha (1.43%), green pepper 11ha (1.14%) and ‘beso bela’ 
3.8ha (0.395%) of land. Whereas, ‘gesho’ accounted for 0.46% (4.5 ha) of the irrigated 
land. 
 
Unexpectedly, fruits were not observed in the irrigation sites of Ada’a at all. Although, 
Godino PA had the widest irrigation scheme in the woreda, it was Hidi PA that has 
diversified crop types.   
 
 
 
 
                                             
25 Crop diversification was measured in the number of types of crops grown using irrigation water in that 
specific tabia during the study period. 
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5.1. Area Coverage of Each Type of Crop in hectare– Atsbi 
Crop type Golgol Nael Felg Woini Ruba Felg 
Adi 
Mesanu Zarema Haylom Haressaw Hadnet Total 
Onion    
(cross-bred) 0.5*1(1.9%)*2 1.3(12.1%) 0.625(5.8%) 0.32(2.8%) 0.25(5.88%) 17.25(23%) 2.75(6.4%) 0.262(1%) 23.257((10.5%))*3 
Onion 
(local) 0 1.06(9.8%) 0 0.5(4.4%) 0 0 1.2(2.8%) 0.225(.9%) 2.985((35%) 
Garlic 0.25(.6%) 0.4(4%) 0 0.5(4.4%) 0 1.03(1.4%) 0.55(1.3%) 0.1625(.68%) 2.8925((1.3%)) 
Tomato 0.25(.6%) 0.3(2.89% 0.5(4.65%) 2.25(19.6%) 0.25(5.88%) 19.45(26.2%) 0 0.75(3.1%) 23.75(10.8%)) 
Potato 0.5(1.22%) 0.9(8.67%) 0.5(6.65%) 1.5(13%) 1(23.5%) 8.85(11.9%) 0 0.1625(.68%) 13.43((6.1%)) 
Carrot 0.5(1.236%) 0 0.625(5.8%) 0.05(.4%) 0.0625(1.5%) 1.1625(1.6%) 0.25(.58%) 0.75(3.1%) 3.3998 ((1.5%)) 
Beet root 0 0 0 0.125(1.1%) 0 1.03(1.4%) 0 1(4.2%) 2.155( (.98%)) 
Cabbage 3(7.15%) 0.2(2.02%) 0.5(4.65%) 1.75(15.3%) 0.5(11.8%) 5.15(6.9%) 4(9.2%) 1(4.2%) 16.1((7.3%)) 
Swiss chard 0 0.2(2.02%) 0 0.25(2.2%) 0 6.5(8.7%) 0.75(1.7%) 1.75(7.3%) 9.45((4.3%)) 
Lettuce 0.25(.6%) 0.25(2.3%) 0 0.05(.4%) 0.125(2.9%) 1.025(1.4%) 5(11.56%) 0 6.7((3%)) 
         104.122(47%) 
Apple  0 0 0 0 0.28(6.6%) 0 0 0 0.28((.13%)) 
Banana 0 0 0 0 0.28(6.6%) 0 0 0 0.28((.13%)) 
         .56(.25%) 
Field peas 10.25(24.4%) 2.9(27.2%) 3.5(32.6%) 0.25(2.2%) 0 0 18(41.6%) 7(29.2%) 41.9((19%)) 
Faba beans 8(19.07%) 2.8(26%) 2.5(23.3% 1.25(10.9%) 1.25(29.4%) 0 8.75(20.2%) 2.75(11.5%) 27.3((12.4%)) 
Lentil 6(14.3%) 0 0 0.75(6.5%) 0 0 1.25(2.9%) 1.625(6.8%) 9.625((4.4%)) 
Chick pea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.625(6.8%) 1.625((.74%)) 
         80.45(36.46%) 
Green 
pepper 0 0 0 0 0 4.8(6.5%) 0 0 4.8((2.2%)) 
Fengreek 10.45(24.9%) 0.3(2.89%) 0.75(7%) 1.5(13.1%) 0.125(3%) 2.5(3.36%) 0.75(1.7%) 0.925(3.9%) 17.3((7.8%)) 
 Lin seed 2(4.77%) 0 0.25(2.3%) 0 0 0 0 0.75(3.1%) 3((1.36%)) 
 'Camoon' 0 0 0 0.05(.4%) 0 0 0 0 0.05((.02%)) 
 'Azmud' 0 0 0 0 0.125(3%) 0 0 0 0.125((.057%)) 
         25.275(11.45%) 
Barley 0 0 0.5(4.65%) 0 0 0 0 1.25(5.2%) 1.75((.79%)) 
Wheat 0 0 0.5(4.65%) 0.125(1.1%) 0 0.125(.17%) 0 1(4.2%) 1.75((.79%)) 
Maize 0 0 0 0.25(2.2%) 0 5.5(7.4%) 0 0 5.75((2.6%)) 
Millet 0 0 0 0  0 0 1(4.2%) 1((.453%)) 
         10.25(4,64%) 
Total 41.95(100%) 10.812(100%) 10.75(100%) 
11.47 
(100%) 4.24(100%) 74.37(100%) 43.25 (100%) 43.25(100%) 220.657(100%) 
*1- The numbers out of the bracket show total land covered by that specific crop type (in ha) of crop. 
(.)*2- The percentage land size coverage of the crop as compared to other crops coverage which were grown using irrigation water 
in that specific tabia.,    
((.))*3- The percentage land size coverage of the crop as compared to the total crop coverage irrigated land. 
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Table 5.2. Area Coverage of Each Type of Crop in hectare– Ada’a 
Crop type Hidi 
Ganda 
Gorba Fultinao Godino Kataba Total 
Onion    
(cross-bred) 45*1(15.7%)*2 1.25(6.33%) 4.5(5.8%) 100.15(25.07%) 42.25(23.6%) 193.15 ((20%))*3 
Onion (local) 29.25(1.2%) 1.5(7.59%) 0.75(.968%) 84.2(21.08%) 15 (8.38%) 130.7 ((13.6%)) 
Onion(Barro) 5.75(2%) 0 1.5(1.935%) 7(1.75%) 0 14.25 ((1.48%)) 
Garlic 15.75(5.5%) 0 0.75(.968%) 2(.5%) 9.5(5.3%) 28((2.9%)) 
Tomato 44.75(15.6%) 2.5(12.66%) 22(28.39%) 4(1%) 2.5(1.397%) 75.7 ((7.875%)) 
Potato 10(3.49%) 0 1.25(1.61%) 43.4(10.86%) 5.5(3.07%) 60.15((6.25%)) 
Carrot 1.75(.611%) 1.625(8.2%) 0 1.5(.376%) 4.5(2.515%) 9.375((0.97%)) 
Beet root 4.75(1.66%) 1.625(8.2%) 0 3.2(.8%) 3.5(1.956%) 13.075((1.36%)) 
Sweet potato 0 0 3(3.87%) 3(.75%) 0 6((0.624%)) 
Cabbage 2(.699%) 0 4.5(5.8%) 4.8(1.2%) 3.5(1.956%) 14.8((1.54%)) 
Spinach 18.5(6.46%) 0 0.75(.968%) 43.2(10.8%) 0 62.45((6.49%)) 
Swiss chard 3.25(1.1%) 0 2(2.58%) 4(1%) 2(1.118%) 11.25((1.17%)) 
Lettuce 4.25(1.48%) 0 1.5(1.9%) 2.6(.65%) 1.25(.699%) 9.6(0(.998%)) 
Kiyar' 0 0 1(1.29%) 0 0 1((0.10%)) 
      629.55(65.45%) 
Lentil 27.75(9.7%) 1.5(7.59%) 5.5(7.097%) 33.8(8.46%) 34(19%) 102.55((10.7%)) 
Chick pea 50(17.47%) 4(20.25%) 24(30.97%) 61.6(15.42%) 31.62(17.7%) 171.22((17.8%)) 
Sunflower 0 0 0 0 7.5(4.19%) 7.5((0.78%)) 
Guaya' 5.25(1.8%) 2.5(12.658%) 2.75(3.55%) 0 4.25(2.375%) 14.75((1.53%)) 
Haricot beans 0 0 0 0 3.25(1.82%) 3.25((0.34%)) 
      299.27(31.1%) 
Green pepper 7(2.4%) 1.25(6.3%) 0.5(.645%) 0 2.25(1.26%) 11((1.14%)) 
Fengreek 6.25(2.18%) 1.25(6.3%) 0 0 6.25(3.493%) 13.75((1.43%)) 
 'Beso bela' 1(.349%) 0.25(1.266%) 1.25(1.61%) 1(.25%) 0.3(.168%) 3.8((.395%)) 
      28.55(2.968%) 
Gesho' 4(1.4%) 0.5(2.53%) 0 0 0 4.5((.468%)) 
       
Total 286.25(100%) 19.75(100%) 77.5(100%) 399.45(100%) 178.92(100%) 961.87(100%) 
*1- The numbers out of the bracket show total land covered by that specific crop type (in ha) of crop 
(.)*2- The percentage land size coverage of the crop as compared to other crops coverage which were grown using irrigation water 
in that specific Kebele  
((.))*3- The percentage land size coverage of the crop as compared to the total crop coverage irrigated land.  
 
An interesting result that was obtained from focus group discussions with beneficiary 
farmers in the two study areas is that farmers have started to grow crops which were not 
previously grown in the areas. Besides, the result of discussions indicated initially, most 
farm households had concentrated on specific crops; however, eventually the types of 
crops also have increased in number and in the area coverage. 
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5.3. Input Use Decision of Beneficiary Farmers for Each Crop Type 
Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 present the descriptive statistics of beneficiary farmers input use 
decision for each crop type, i.e., fertilizer, compost/manure, herbicides, pesticides and 
seeds use, labor (man power) and oxen power usage in each tabia. In both study woredas, 
for all kinds of crops grown, fertilizers were used in all irrigation schemes except for 
‘guaya’ and chick pea (in Ada’a). However, fertilizer was used more evenly in Ada’a 
than Atsbi. In Ada’a the mean amount of fertilizer use (kg/ha) was equal in almost all 
cases of crop types. Hence, in Atsbi, in some tabias farmers did not use fertilizer at all.  
 
In relation to the use of commercial fertilizer, over a total cost of 167,431 Birr and 
527,549 Birr was paid out for UREA and DAP in Atsbi and Ada’a, respectively. The 
average amount of fertilizer use per hectare was 217.18kg/ha in Atsbi and 242.9kg/ha 
Ada’a, but differed according to the types of crops grown. The highest amount was for 
tomato, 400kg/ha in both woredas.  
 
Another important information that can be depicted from Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 is 
beneficiaries in Atsbi used higher amount of compost/manure indicating effort farmers 
made to supplement the modern fertilizer to manure/ compost. Furthermore, we find that, 
there was no usage of herbicides and pesticides at all in the irrigation sites of Atsbi during 
2006/07 cropping season. However, in Ada’a, especially for onion (cross-bred), onion 
(local), carrot, beet root and lentil, herbicide was applied. Moreover, pesticides like 
Ridomingold, Karate, Selekrom and Tighnks were used. The highest amount of pesticides 
was used for lentil, 8 liters/ha of Tighnks and Karate, followed by chick pea (6 liter/ha), 
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swiss chard and lettuce (4 liter/ha) and cabbage (3 liter/ha). In terms of the value of 
herbicides and pesticides, the total estimated cost was around 165,414 Birr and 485,622 
Birr, respectively. 
 
The other most important input was seed. Average amount of seed used per hectare 
varied by crop type grown. There was variation among the two study areas as well. For 
instance, the mean amount of seed used per hectare for onion (local) is 2600kg/ ha in 
Ada’a, however, it was 1200kg/ha in Atsbi. Besides, for lentil, it was 211.2kg/ha in 
Ada’a but 327.5 kg/ha in Atsbi. The same was true for green pepper, the average amount 
of seed used per hectare was 0.5kg/ha in Ada’a, in the contrary, in Atsbi, it was 3.5 kg/ha. 
In addition, the approximated value of seed used in the irrigation schemes in Atsbi and 
Ada’a was 222,351 Birr and 1,758,957 Birr, respectively. 
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Table 5.3.Use of fertilizer, compost/manure, herbicides, pesticides and seeds in Atsbi Wemberta woreda in year 2006/07 
  Fertilizer use Compost use Herbicide use Pesticide use Seed 
Crop type 
Mean amount 
(kg/ha) 
Value 
Birr/kg 
Total 
value 
used@ 
Mean amount 
(kg/ha) 
Value 
Birr/kg 
Total 
value 
used@ 
Mean 
amount 
(liter/ha) 
Value 
Birr/lit 
Total 
value 
used@ 
Mean 
amount 
(liter/ha) 
Value 
Birr/lit 
Total 
value 
used@ 
Mean 
amount 
(kg/ha) 
Value 
Birr/kg 
Total 
value 
used@ 
  
Total 
cost
2 
Onion    
(cross-bred) 391 3.5 31,389 229 0.4 2130 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.1 254.4 18110 51,629 
Onion 
(local) 380 3.5 3305 180 0.4 215 0 0 0 0   0 1200 3.2 12128 15,648 
Garlic 350 3.5 2934 293  0.4 161.98 0 0 0 0 0 0 400 7 8204 11300 
Tomato 400 3.5 30,100 110 0.4 1045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.51 484 3060 35,155 
Potato 210 3.5 8769 179 0.4 590 0 0 0 0 0 0 1500 4 62543 74,422 
Carrot 150 3.5 1754 200 0.4 320 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 160.9 2216.2 4,290 
Beet root 250 3.5 1776 333 0.4 287 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.67 160 875 2938 
Cabbage 218.57 3.5 10,978 302 0.4 1944 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 200 1280 14,202 
Swiss chard 133.3 3.5 4292 172 0.4 650 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 399 21010 25,952 
Lettuce 150 3.5 3491 200 0.4 536 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.44 230 2759.7 6,789 
                            
Field peas 255 3.5 36,593 110 0.4 1843 0 0 0 0 0 0 185 4 33230 71,667 
Faba Beans 160 3.5 14,560 102.5 0.4 1119 0 0 0 0 0 0 198.3 3.83 20256 35,935 
Lentil 175 3.5 5512 250 0.4 962 0 0 0 0 0 0 327.5 10.75 31406 37,880 
Chick pea 200 3.5 1137 200 0.4 130 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 3.2 528 1,795 
                            
Green 
pepper 150 3.5 2520 400 0.4 768 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.5 2.1 33 3321 
Fenugreek 43 3.5 4515 393 0.4 2768 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 10 87 7370 
Lin seed 300 3.5 131.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.67 16 62 193 
                            
Barley 200 3.5 1225 110 0.4 77 0 0 0 0 0 0 50.5 18.9 1339.6 2642 
Wheat 175 3.5 918.75 100 0.4 70 0 0 0 0 0 0 150 8.25 959 1948 
Maize 225 3.5 1181.2 132.5 0.4 304 0 0 0 0 0 0 150 2 2025 3510 
Millet 100 3.5 350 50 0.4 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 120 2 240 610 
                             
Total     167,431     20,340     0     0     222351   
                 410,123
@ - Total value used is equal to mean amount (kg/ha) used * value (Birr/kg)* total area covered by that specific crop type (ha) in year 2006/07. 
- Total cost 
2refers to total cost used to Fertilizer+ Compost+ Herbicide+ Pesticide+ Seed in year 2006/07 
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Table 5.4.Use of fertilizer, compost/manure, herbicides, pesticides and seeds in Ada’a woreda during 2006 cropping season  
  Fertilizer use Compost use Herbicide use Pesticide use Seed   
Crop type 
Mean 
amount 
(kg/ha) 
Value 
Birr/kg 
Total 
value 
used@ 
Mean 
amount 
(kg/ha) 
Value 
Birr/ha 
Total 
value 
used@ 
Mean 
amount 
(kg/ha) 
Value 
Birr/ha 
Total 
value 
used@ 
Mean 
amount 
(kg/ha) 
Value 
Birr/ha 
Total 
value 
used@ 
Mean 
amount 
(kg/ha) 
Value 
Birr/ha 
Total value 
used@ Total cost 
2
 
Onion    
(cross-bred) 390 3.51 18001 0 0 0 4 80 4208 1.5 130 2564 3.8 253.6 42250 67023 
Onion (local) 380 3.51 174321 0 0 0 4 80 41824 1.25 115 18788 2600 1.55 121681.2 356614 
Onion(Barro) 367 3.51 18356 0 0 0 4 80 4560 0.5 156 1112 2 160 4480 28508 
Garlic 200 3.51 19656 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 130 5460 400 10 1120000 1145116 
Tomato 400 3.51 106353 0 0 0 4 80 24240 1.4 76 8060 5 80 7497.5 146150 
Potato 250 3.51 52781 0 0 0 4 44 10586 2 52 6256 1500 3.75 237900 307523 
Carrot 200 3.51 6581 0 0 0 5 80 3750 0.5 70 328 4 160 6440 17099 
Beet root 200 3.51 9178 0 0 0 5 80 5230 1.5 130 2550 3.75 160 7608 24566 
Sweet potato 350 3.51 7371 0 0 0 4 80 1920 2 70 840 1500 4 36000 46131 
Cabbage 200 3.51 10389 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 70 3108 0.4 180 2781 16278 
Spinach 200 3.51 43840 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 70 13114 1.67 15 688 57642 
Swiss chard 200 3.51 7897 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 70 3150 9 399 40399 51446 
Lettuce 200 3.51 6739 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 70 2688 0.28 230 618 10046 
                            
Lentil 100 3.51 35995 0 0 0 4 60 28004 6 120 311448 211.2 4.4 60722 436169 
Chick pea 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 60 41092 8 77.5 106156 105.6 4.24 68130 215378 
Guaya' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 3 1425 1425 
                            
Green pepper 200 3.51 7722 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 12 132 7854 
Fenugreek 50 3.51 2369 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 10 63 2432 
                            
                            
Total     527,549     0     165,414     485,622     1,758,814   
                                2,937,400 
@ - Total value used is equal to mean amount (kg/ha) used * value (Birr/kg)* total area covered by that specific crop type (ha) in year 2006/07. 
- Total cost 
2refers to total cost used to Fertilizer+ Compost+ Herbicide+ Pesticide+ Seed in year 2006/07 
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5.4. Labor Use in the Irrigation Sites  
The total labor usage for the two study woredas is shown in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6. In 
this case, family, hired, sharecropping and exchange with relatives and neighbors were 
included in the labor usage in irrigation schemes. Labor was used for in five different 
activities: land preparation and planting, weeding and cultivation, watering, harvesting 
and threshing.  In year 2006/07, the average labor person-days used by the households in 
the irrigation sites in Atsbi was around 98 person-days/ha and around 86 person-days/ha in 
Ada’a. This figure is much higher than the case of rain–fed agriculture with average 55 
person-days/ha and 53 person-days/ha, in Atsbi and Ada’a, respectively. This result is 
consistent with the argument that irrigation agriculture demands higher labor, implying 
higher cost of production for the beneficiary farmers. 
 
The highest labor person-day was needed for vegetable crop category in both woredas. In 
Atsbi, the highest of all was for tomato which needed around 136 labor person-days/ha, 
followed by onion (cross-bred and local) and carrot-around (120 person-days/ha), swiss 
chard and lettuce- (around 118 person-days/ha) and faba beans- (around 108 person-
days/ha). Similarly, in Ada’a tomato was the major crop which demanded the highest 
labor person-days, (around 124 persons-days/ha), followed by onion (cross-bred and 
local), onion (barro) and garlic – (around 118 person-days/ ha). 
 
Furthermore, the average labor person-days for land preparation and planting of crops 
was estimated 20 labor person-days/ha in Ada’a, whereas, in Atsbi, it was lower, around 
18 person-days/ha. On the contrary, the mean manpower input for weeding and 
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cultivation was lower in Ada’a (32 person-days/ha) compared to Atsbi which was 36 
person-days/ha. Perhaps, this is due to complete absence of herbicides usage in the 
irrigation tabias of Atsbi in year 2006/07. 
 
Another important result that can be observed from Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 is the labor 
usage for watering of crops. There is higher variation of person-days/ha for watering 
among irrigation water beneficiary farmers among the two woredas, 28 person-days/ha in 
Ada’a, whereas, it was 35 person-days/ha in Atsbi. Similarly, farmers in Atsbi had 
slightly higher labor usage in harvesting which was 7.3 person-days/ha as compared to 
6.7 person-days/ha in Ada’a.  
 
Most of the crops which are grown using irrigation water do not involve threshing. 
However, pulses and cereals such as field peas, faba beans, lentil, fenugreek, lin seed, 
maize and wheat demand man power as an input for threshing. The average labor person-
day for threshing in both the woredas was 4 person-days/ha.  
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Table 5.5.Labor inputs used in the production-Atsbi Wemberta 
ATSBI  Type of labor power used in farming using irrigation water 
  Labor (family+hired+share cropping+exchange) Animal power      
  
Land preparation and 
planting 
Weeding and 
cultivation Watering Harvesting Threshing Oxen power used 
Crop type No.
1
 Value 
2
 Total
3
 No. Value  Total No. Value  Total No. Value  Total No. Value Total No. Value Total 
Mean 
person-
days/ha 
Total 
person-
days/ha 
4
Total 
value(Man 
power) 
Onion    
(cross-bred) 24 14 7812.3 48 14 15625 44 14 14326 2 18 837.04 0 0 0 16 120 44653 33.6667 118 38600.34 
Onion 
(local) 24 14 1003 48 16 2292.5 44 14 1838.8 2 15.1 90.296 0 0 0 16 120 5731 33.6667 118 5224.596 
Garlic 24 14.8 1029.5 36 14.2 1475.5 48 14 1943 2 16.5 95.453 0 0 0 16 120 5553 24.6667 110 4543.453 
Tomato 22 15.5 8098.8 50 15.3 18169 52 14 17290 12 16.7 4759.5 0 0 0 16 120 45600 43.1667 136 48317.3 
Potato 22 14.1 4177.8 42 15.3 8624.5 24 14 4512 8 16.7 1794.2 0 0 0 16 120 25785 33.8333 96 19108.5 
Carrot 24 14 1142.3 40 15 2039.9 50 14 2798 8 16 435.17 0 0 0 16 120 7676 33.3333 122 6415.37 
Beet root 24 12.3 636.16 30 14 905.1 27 14 814.59 8 14 241.36 0 0 0 16 120 4137 23.3333 89 2597.21 
Cabbage 24 14 5409.6 35 14 7889 30 14 6762 4 17 1094.8 0 0 0 16 120 30912 29.6667 93 21155.4 
Swiss chard 24 13.2 2993.8 42 14 5556.6 40 14 5292 12 15.2 1723.7 0 0 0 16 120 18144 27.6667 118 15566.1 
Lettuce 24 15.3 2460.2 42 23 6472.2 40 14 3752 12 21.4 1720.6 0 0 0 16 120 12864 28.6667 118 14405 
Field peas 12 14 7039.2 32 14 18771 12 14 7039 8 15.7 5252.6 8 15.7 5252.6 24 120 120672 20.6667 84 43354.4 
Faba Beans 12 13.5 4422.6 32 14.3 12492 12 14 5241 8 16 3494.4 8 16 3494.4 24 120 78624 25.3333 108 29144.4 
Lentil 12 13.5 1559.3 32 15.7 4826.4 16 14 2156 8 15.5 1193.5 8 14 1078 24 120 27720 28 96 10813.2 
Chick pea 12 15 292.5 32 15 780 24 14 546 8 11 143 8 11 143 24 120 4680 27.3333 84 1904.5 
Green 
pepper 12 15 864 32 15 2304 32 14 2150 4 15 288 0 15 0 12 120 6912 24 80 5606 
Fenugreek 12 13 2698.8 28 14 6781.6 16 14 3875 8 17 2352.8 4 17 1176.4 16 120 33216 24.1667 68 16884.6 
 Lin seed 12 14 504 32 14 1344 12 14 504 8 15.7 376.08 4 15.7 188.04 2 120 720 33 88 2916.12 
Barley 12 10 210 30 12.5 656.25 12 14 294 8 12.5 175 4 11 77 24 120 5040 31.5 86 1412.25 
Wheat 12 12.3 258.93 28 12.3 604.17 12 14 294 8 12.3 172.62 4 12.3 86.1 24 120 5040 34.5 84 1415.82 
Maize 12 13 897 32 14 2576 12 14 966 8 14 644 4 14 322 24 120 16560 37 88 5405 
Millet 12 12 144 28 15 420 12 14 168 8 15 120 4 15 60 24 120 2880 31.3333 80 912 
Total   53654   120605   82561   27004   11878   503,119     295,702 
Mean 18 13.6   36 14.8   35 14.4   7.3 15.5   4 14.2   18 213   28.5682 98.286   
Percent     16.32%     36.68%     35.18%     8.21%     3.61%           100% 
1
No. stands for number of labor person-days per hectare,    
2
Value refers to the value of one labor-person per day in Birr 
3
Total is equal to number of labor person-days* the value of one labor-person per day* total area covered by that specific crop type 
4
Total value of man power refers to value of man power for land preparation and planning + weeding +watering + harvesting +threshing  
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Table 5.6 .Labor inputs used in the production-Ada’a 
ADA'A Type of labor power used in farming using irrigation water 
 Labor (family+hired+share cropping+exchange) Animal power       
Crop type 
Land preparation and 
planting 
Weeding and 
cultivation Watering Harvesting Threshing Oxen power used 
  No.
1
 Value
2
 Total
3
 No. Value  Total No. Value Total No. Value Total No. Value  Total No. Value Total 
Mean 
person-
days/ha 
Total 
person-
days/ha 
4
Total 
value(man 
power 
Onion    
(cross-bred) 28 18 97348 40 18 139068 48 17 157610 2 18 6953.4 0 0 0 16 60 185424 39.333 118 400,979.4 
Onion (local) 28 18 65873 40 17 88876 48 16 100378 2 18.75 4901.3 0 0 0 16 60 125472 39.333 118 260,027.7 
Onion(Barro) 28 20 7980 40 20 11400 48 18.3 12517 2 20 570 0 0 0 16 60 13680 38 118 32,467.2 
Garlic 28 20 15680 40 20 22400 48 17.5 23520 2 20 1120 0 0 0 16 60 26880 38 118 62,720 
Tomato 24 20 36360 40 19 57570 48 19 69084 12 15 13635 0 0 0 16 60 72720 38.667 124 176,649 
Potato 20 20 24060 36 20 43308 20 20 24060 8 15 7218 0 0 0 16 60 57744 24.667 84 98,646 
Carrot 20 19 3562.5 36 18.6 6277.5 24 19 4275 8 15 1125 0 0 0 16 60 9000 22 88 15,240 
Beet root 16 18.75 3922.5 36 18.75 8825.6 20 19 4968.5 8 18.75 1961.3 0 0   16 60 12552 21.333 80 19,677.88 
Sweet potato 20 20 2400 36 20 4320 24 20 2880 8 15 720 0 0 0  60 0 25.333 88 10,320 
Cabbage 20 20 5920 20 20 5920 28 20 8288 4 15 888 0 0 0 16 60 14208 19.333 72 21,016 
Spinach 12 18.75 14051 16 20 19984 28 20 34972 12 15 11241 0 0 0 16 60 59952 21.333 68 80,248.25 
Swiss chard 20 20 4500 16 20 3600 28 20 6300 12 15 2025 0 0 0 16 60 10800 22.667 76 16,425 
Lettuce 20 20 3840 16 20 3072 28 20 5376 12 15 1728 0 0 0 16 60 9216 22.667 76 14,016 
Lentil 12 17 20920 32 17 55787 12 17 20920 8 17 34867 4 17 12859 32 60 246120 20.667 68 145,353.4 
Chick pea 8 17 23286 48 17 139716 12 17 34929 8 17 116430 4 17 30804 32 60 410928 26.667 80 345,163.9 
Guaya' 4 17 1003  0 0 8 17 2006 4 17 4012 4 17 1615 16 60 14160 8 20 8,636 
Green pepper 24 20 5280 28 20 6160 24 17.5 4620 4 20 3520   0 24 60 26400 22 80 19,580 
Fenugreek 20 15 4125 28 15 5775 15 15 3093.8 4 15 3300 4 17 1870 24 60 33000 21.167 71 18,163.75 
Total    340,111   622,059   519,798   216,215   47148   1,328,256 471.17     
Mean 20 16.93   32 16.02   28 16.47   6.7 15.08   4 17   19 60     85.944 1,745,329 
                      
Percent     19.49%     35.64%     29.78%     12.39%     2.70%             
1
No. stands for number of labor person-days per hectare,         
2
Value refers to the value of one labor-person per day in Birr 
3
Total is equal to number of labor person-days* the value of one labor-person per day* total area covered by that specific crop type  
4
Total value of man power refers to value of man power for land preparation and planning + weeding +watering + harvesting +threshing  
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Moreover, in terms of value of labor, total value of labor person-days for the total 
households in the irrigation sites in Atsbi and Ada’a was 295,702 Birr and 1,745,329 
Birr, respectively. Hence, of the total value of labor-days about 295,702 Birr in Atsbi, 
constituted labor usage for land preparation and planting, weeding and cultivation, 
watering, harvesting and threshing, accounted for 16.2% (53,654 Birr), 36.5% (120,605 
Birr), 35% (82,561 Birr), 8.2% (27,004 Birr) and 4.2% (11877.5 Birr), respectively. The 
total value of labor person-days in irrigation agriculture in Ada’a, was used for 340,111 
Birr (19.5%), 622,059 Birr (35.6%), 519,798 Birr (29.8%), 216,215 Birr (12.4%) and 
47,147.8 Birr (2.7%) for land preparation and planting, weeding and cultivating, 
watering, harvesting and threshing, respectively. As expected, the largest components are 
costs for watering and weeding in both areas. This suggests that more effort is needed in 
the provision of herbicides. Moreover, research and development interventions need to 
take account of the labor and cost demand of the irrigation technology.  
 
5.5. The Demand for Oxen Power for Irrigation Agriculture  
In relation to animal power used, the mean oxen power-days used per hectare in the two 
woredas was comparable, which was around 18 oxen-days/ha and 19 oxen-days/ha in 
Atsbi Wembreta and Ada’a, respectively. Furthermore, value of oxen-days for the total 
households in the irrigation schemes in Atbi and Ada’a was 503,119 Birr and 1,328,256 
Birr, respectively. The highest average oxen-days/ha was recorded for lentil and chick 
pea at 32 oxen-days/ha and field peas, faba beans, lentils, chick pea, wheat, maize and 
millet at 24 oxen-days/ha in Ada’a and Atsbi, respectively.  
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5.6. Value of Yield Harvested in Atsbi and Ada’a 
After discussing all the costs incurred by beneficiary farmers in both study woredas, the 
next section will be analyzing the revenue they accrued by using irrigation water. Table 
5.7 presents the mean yield harvested (kg/ha)-productivity of irrigated land, average price 
of each crop (birr/kg), the total value of each crop harvested per hectare and the total 
revenue. The average estimated value of crop yield in Atsbi was 4,413,538 Birr and 
13,469,056 Birr for Ada’a. High variation among mean yield harvested per hectare 
(productivity irrigated land) was observed among crops grown in the woredas, which 
ranged up to 3,732 kg/ha of irrigate land. For instance, in the case of onion (cross-bred), 
the mean yield harvested per hectare was 3467.5 kg/ha in Atsbi, whereas, 7200 kg/ha in 
Ada’a. Perhaps, it is due to less input use such as fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides in 
Atsbi. There was also higher variation in the average price of crops per kg among the two 
woredas, that ranged up to 7.94 Birr. For example, in the case of green pepper, the 
average price per kg was 10 Birr in Atsbi but 2.06 Birr in Ada’a. Even though field peas 
covered the largest area in the irrigation schemes of Atsbi, faba beans took the highest 
productivity per hectare i.e., 14,350kg/ha. Although, onion (cross-bred) took a leading 
position area coverage in Ada’a, it is onion (local) which had the highest yield, which 
was 7775 kg/ha.   
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Table 5.7.Mean yield harvested (kg/ha), average price, productivity rate, total revenue of irrigation water beneficiary farmers in Atsbi and Ada’a  
  Atsbi Wemberta Ada'a 
Crop type 
Area 
irrigated(ha) 
Mean 
yield 
harvested 
(kg/ha) 
Average 
price in 
Birr(kg) 
Total value 
of crop yield 
harvested 
per hectare 
(in Birr)*1 
Total value of yield 
harvested (Total 
revenue) in Birr 
Area 
irrigated(ha) 
Mean yield 
harvested 
(kg/ha) 
Average 
price in 
Birr(kg) 
Total value of 
crop yield 
harvested per 
hectare (in 
Birr)*1 
Total value of yield harvested 
(Total revenue) in Birr 
Onion    
(cross-bred) 23.257 3467.5 3.59 12448.325 289,511 *2 (6.6%) *3 193.15 7200 2.18 15696 3,031,682 *2 (22.5%) *3 
Onion (local) 2.985 6425 2.625 16865.625 50,344 (1.1%) 130.7 7775 4.2 32655 4,268,008  (31.7%) 
Onion(Barro) 0 0 0 0 0 14.25 4800 2 9600 136,800 (1%) 
Garlic 2.8925 6425 8 51400 148,675  (3.4%) 28 4500 4.3 19350 541,800 (4%) 
Tomato 23.75 4600 2.79 12834 30,480 (6.9%) 75.75 4950 2.49 12325.5 933,656  (7%) 
Potato 13.4325 4500 2.21 9945 133,586 (3%) 60.15 3750 2 7500 451,125  (3.3%) 
Carrot 3.4 2338 2.225 5202.05 17,686 (0.4%) 9.375 1775 1.5 2662.5 24,960 (0.19%) 
Beet root 2.155 2026.67 2.3 4661.341 10,045( 0.2%) 13.075 1900 2.25 4275 55,895  (0.4%) 
Sweet potato 0 0 0 0 0 6 4000 1.2 4800 28,800 (0.2%) 
Cabbage 16.1 3126 1.7875 5587.725 89,962 (2%) 14.8 4020 3.2 12864 190,387 (1.4%) 
Spinach 0 0 0 0 0 62.45 22667.67 0.33 7480.3311 467,146 (3.47%) 
Switchard 9.45 3280 2.4 7872 74,390 (1.7%) 11.25 1675 2 3350 37,687 (0.3%) 
Lettuce 6.7 2466.67 2.3 5673.341 38,011 (0.86%) 9.6 1750 2.5 4375 42,000 (0.3%) 
Field peas 41.9 7812.5 3.65 28515.625 1,194,804 (27%) 0 0 0 0 0 
 Faba Beans 27.3 14350 3.33 47785.5 1,304,544 (29.6%) 0 0 0 0 0 
Lentil 9.625 1093.75 4 4375 42,109 (0.95%) 102.55 1820 4.75 8645 886,544 (6.58%) 
Chick pea 1.625 2600 2.85 7410 1,204 (0.27) 171.22 4560 2.76 12585.6 2,154,906 (16%) 
Guaya' 0 0 0 0 0 14.75 2400 1.6 3840 56,640 (0.4%) 
Green pepper 4.8 3500 10 35000 168,000 (3.8%) 11 4375 2.06 9012.5 99,137.5 (0.7%) 
Fengreek 17.3 2970 9.25 27472.5 475,274 (10.8%) 13.75 450 10 4500 61,875 (0.46%) 
Lin seed 3 466.67 2.67 1246.0089 3,738 (0.08%) 0 0 0 0 0 
Barley 1.75 1600 2 3200 5,600 (0.1%) 0 0 0 0 0 
Wheat 1.75 2333 2.73 6369.09 11,146 (0.25%) 0 0 0 0 0 
Maize 5.75 2566.67 2.27 5826.3409 33,501 (0.759%) 0 0 0 0 0 
Millet 1 3200 1.8 5760 5,760 (0.13%) 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 219.922       
4,413,538.222 
(100%) 941.82       
13,469,056 
(100%) 
*1- Total value of crop yield harvested per hectare  is equal to mean yield harvested (kg/ha)*average price (kg) 
*2 - Total value of yield harvested (Total revenue) is equal to area irrigated (ha) of that specific crop* mean yield harvested (kg/ha) of that specific crop *average price (kg) of that specific 
crop, (.%),    *3The percentage distribution of the total value of that specific crop from the total value of yield harvested. 
Note that all values are given in Birr value. 
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In relation to total revenue obtained, in Atsbi, faba beans constituted the lion share of the 
total revenue, which took1, 1,304,544 Birr (29.6%), followed by field peas which 
accounted for 1,194,804 Birr (27%) and fenugreek 475,274 Birr (10.8%)  On the other 
hand, in Ada’a, the main component of the total revenue generated was from onion 
(local), which represented 4,268,008 Birr (31.7%), followed by onion (cross-bred)  and  
chick pea, which contributed 3,031,682 Birr (22.5%) and 2,154,906 Birr (16%),  
respectively. 
 
5.7. Net-Revenue Gained in the Irrigation Sites of Atsbi and Ada’a 
Table 5.8 indicates the net revenue of each crop produced using irrigation water in year 
2006/07. As can be seen from the table below, producing crops using irrigation water 
generally functions well in both woredas, when we see in aggregate level. The total net 
revenue was estimated as 3,274,889 Birr for Atsbi, with total revenue of around 
4,413,540 Birr and the total cost26 of around 1,138,651 Birr. When we disaggregated it, 
faba beans, field peas and fenugreek were the major source of net revenue, which 
accounted for 1,160,841 Birr (35.4%), 959,113 Birr (29.3%) and 417,435 Birr (12.7%), 
respectively.  
 
Furthermore, the net revenue was 7,458,069 Birr for Ada’a, with the total cost of around 
6,010,985 Birr and total revenue of around 13,469,056 Birr. Onion (local and cross-
bred), chick pea and tomato took the leading position in the composition of the net total 
                                             
26 Total cost = value of ( modern fertilizer use + manure/compost + herbicides + pesticides + seeds +labor 
(man power)+ oxen power)  
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revenue which represented 3,525,895 Birr (47.2%), 2,378,256 Birr (31.8%),1,183,437 
Birr (15.86%) and 538,138 Birr (7.21%), respectively. 
 
In the irrigation sites, it was not only net-revenue observed, but also net-loss was 
recorded. In Atsbi, carrot (695 Birr), lin seed (91 Birr) and barley (3494 Birr) were the 
major crops which demanded higher value of cost of inputs compared to the total revenue 
in year 2006/07. Likewise, loss of (692,916 Birr) for garlic, (12,788 Birr) for potato, 
(16,378 Birr) for carrot and (900 Birr) for beet root were incurred in the irrigation 
schemes of Ada’a. 
 
According to the result of focus group discussion with beneficiary farmers through time 
there is a shift in farm households’ crop choice decision towards highly priced and 
marketable agricultural products. The farmers themselves witnessed, it has a positive 
impact on their income as well as on the living standard of their families. However, one 
thing to note in this case is, the level of magnitude of benefit accrued to the beneficiary 
farmers significantly depends on market and infrastructure accessibility, since most of the 
crops grown in the irrigation sites of the two woredas are perishable (see Table 5.1 and 
Table 5.2). Hence, unless these products are able to reach to consumers immediately after 
harvested, either their market value will decrease with time or it might be a complete loss 
to the farmers.  
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Table 5.8.  Net revenue gained in the irrigation sites of Atsbi and Ada’a in 2006 cropping season 
Atsbi  Adaʹa 
Crop Type Total Revenue (in Birr) 
Total Cost 
(in Birr) 
Net Revenue 
(in Birr) 
Net Revenue 
in percent 
Total Revenue(in 
Birr) 
Total Cost 
(in Birr) 
Net Revenue 
(in Birr) 
Net Revenue 
in percent 
Onion    (cross-
bred) 289510.6945 134,882 154,629 4.72% 3031682.4 653,426 2,378,256 31.8% 
Onion (local) 50343.89063 26604 23,740 0.72% 4268008.5 742,114 3,525,895 47.2% 
Onion(Barro) 0 0 0 0 136800 74,655 62,145 0.83% 
Garlic 148674.5 2136 146,539 4.47% 541800 1,234,716 -692,916 -9.29% 
Tomato 304807.5 128122 176,686 5.4% 933656.625 395,519 538,138 7.21% 
Potato 133586.2125 116796 16,790 0.51% 451125 463,913 -12,788 -0.17% 
Carrot 17686.97 18382 -695 -0.021% 24960.9375 41,339 -16,378 -0.21% 
Beet root 10045.18986 5672 4,373 0.13% 55895.625 56,796 -900 -0.01% 
Sweet potato 0 0 0 0 56,451 28800 27,651 0.37% 
Cabbage 89962.3725 66269 23,693 0.72% 190387.2 51,502 138,885 1.862% 
Spinach 0 0 0 0 467146.6772 197,842 269,304 3.610% 
Swiss chard 74390.4 59662 14,728 0.4% 78,671 37687.5 40,984 0.54% 
Lettuce 38011.3847 34056 3,955 0.12% 42000 33,278 8,722 0.116% 
Field peas 1194804.688 235,692 959,113 29.3% 0 0  0 
Faba beans 1304544.15 143703 1,160,841 35.4% 0 0  0 
Lentil 42109.375 36413 5,696 0.17% 886544.75 827,642 58,902 0.78% 
Chick pea 12041.25 5380 6,661 0.2% 2154906.432 971,470 1,183,437 15.86% 
Guaya' 0 0 0 0 56640 24,221 32,419 0.43% 
Green pepper 168000 15839 152,161 4.6% 99137.5 53,834 45,304 0.60% 
Fenugreek 475274.25 57839 417,435 12.7% 61875 53,596 8,279 0.11% 
Lin seed 3738.0267 3829 -91 -0.003% 0 0 0 0 
Barley 5600 9094 -3,494 -0.1% 0 0 0 0 
Wheat 11145.9075 8404 2,742 0.08% 0 0 0 0 
Maize 33501.46018 25475 8,026 0.2% 0 0 0 0 
Millet 5760 4402 1,358 0.04% 0 0 0 0 
Total 4,413,540 1,138,651 3,274,889 100% 13,469,056 6,010,985 7,458,069 100%
Total revenue is equal to area irrigated (ha)* mean yield harvested (kg/ha)*average price(kg) 
Total cost = value of ( modern fertilizer use + manure/compost + herbicides + pesticides + seeds +labor (man power)+ oxen power)  
Net revenue refers to Total revenue minus Total cost 
Net revenue in percent is the percentage distribution of the net revenue of that specific crop from the total net revenue accrued 
Note that all values are given in Birr . 
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Means of Transport for the Commodities Farmers Produced in Atsbi and Ada’a:- 
The common means of transportation for commodities farmers produced in Atsbi is 
donkey. Beneficiaries at Hayelom tabia also use motor trucks to transport tomato and 
onion to the nearby town called Hayek Meshal and the woreda town market-Enda 
Selassie. The value is 15 Birr/quintal. Donkeys also have different values in different 
tabias (see Table 5.9 below) which depends on the distance they transport the product, 
whether it was to village market or town market.  
 
Moreover, farmers in Ada’a also used donkeys and lorries as a main means of transport 
for their products. Mean value of transport using a donkey per day was 6.5 Birr/quintal 
and for lorries, it was 14.4/2 quintals Birr per one way trip. In addition, they also used 
motor trucks to transport their products such as onion, tomato, potato and sweet potato to 
the woreda town-Deber Zeit, the average value was 5.8 Birr/quintal. 
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Table 5.9. Means of transportation for commodities in Atsbi and Ada’a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean value of donkey 
rent per day(Birr) 
 
Tabia name 
to the 
village 
market  
to the 
woreda 
market 
Value of 
lorry for 
one way 
trip 
(Birr) 
Modern 
transport 
(Birr/quintal) 
Atsbi 
Wemberta      
 Golgol Nael - 5  - 
 Felg Woini 4 5  - 
 Ruba Felg 7 7  - 
 Adi Mesanu 5 7  - 
 Zarema 7 8  - 
 Hayelom 5 10  15 
 Harresaw 5 33  - 
 Hadnet 6 -  - 
  5.571429 10.71429  15 
Ada'a 
     
 Hidi 7  14 6 
 Ganda Gorba 7  14 6 
 Fultina 6  16 6 
 Godino 6  14 5 
 Kataba 7  14 6 
  6.6  14.4 5.8 
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5.8. KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
In Atsbi, out of 220.67 ha of land, 104.22 ha of land (47%) was covered by vegetables. 
Tomato, onion (cross-bred), cabbage, potato and swiss chard took the leading position in 
area coverage from vegetable category. The second largest share in land coverage were 
pulses, which accounted for 80.45ha of land (36.46%), with the majority of field peas and 
faba beans. Likewise, in Ada’a vegetables covered the largest irrigated area in the 
woreda, that was 629.55ha of land (65.45%), followed by pulses 299.27 ha (31.1%). 
Experience of growing fruits in both woredas was limited, especially in Ada’a where 
fruits were not observed at all in all of the PAs of the study areas.   
 
Over a total cost of 167,431 Birr and 527,549 Birr was paid out on modern fertilizer 
mainly such as for UREA and DAP in Atsbi and Ada’a, respectively. The average 
amount of fertilizer use per hectare was 217.18kg/ha and 242.9kg/ha in Atsbi and Ada’a, 
respectively, but varied according to the types of crops grown. The highest amount was 
for tomato, 400kg/ha in both woredas. On the other hand, beneficiaries in Atsbi used 
manure /compost in year 2006/07 to supplement the modern fertilizer use. There had 
been no application of herbicide and pesticide in Atsbi. However, in Ada’a from 4 liter/ha 
up to 5liter/ha of herbicide was applied. Average amount of seed used was differed 
according to the crop type they selected. In general, the estimated value of seed used was 
222, 351 Birr and 1,758,957 Birr in Atsbi and Ada’a, respectively. 
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Our evidence is consistent with the argument that irrigation agriculture demands higher 
person days/ha (labor force). For instance, in year 2006/07, the average labor person-days 
used in the irrigation sites of Ada’a was around 86 person-days/ha, and  around 98 
person-days/ha in Atsbi. This figure is well above, as compared to the average 55 person-
days/ha and 53 person-days/ha, labor needed for rain-fed agriculture in Atsbi and in 
Ada’a, respectively. With regard to oxen power used, even if the mean oxen power 
days/ha used in the two woredas was comparable, there was higher variation among the 
value of oxen /day/ha, which was 60 Birr in Ada’a and 120 Birr in Atsbi. This suggests 
that how huge role oxen play in agricultural sector of the country. 
 
The average estimated value of crops yield (total yield) in Atsbi was 4,413,538 Birr and 
13,469,056 Birr in Ada’a. In addition, there was high variation in productivity of 
irrigated land among the two study area, possibly due to magnitude difference in inputs 
use. 
  
The findings imply that, producing crops using irrigation water generally functions well 
in both woredas. The total net revenue from using irrigation water was estimated as 
3,274,889 Birr in Atsbi, with total revenue of around 4,413,540 Birr and total cost of 
around 1,138,051 Birr. Likewise, in Ada’a, being the total cost of around 6,010,985 Birr 
and total revenue of around 13,469,056 Birr, the total net revenue was 7,458,069 Birr.  
 
The result of impact of using irrigation water in different tabias of the two woredas 
indicated that farmers have started to grow crops which were not previously grown in the 
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areas. The farmers themselves witnessed that it has a positive impact on their income as 
well as on the living standard of their families. Effort still should be made on provision of 
technical assistance to farmers in supplying variety of seeds, herbicides, pesticides and 
training provision. The other point to be noted is the level of magnitude of beneficiaries 
mainly depends on market and infrastructure accessibility, since most of the crops grown 
in these areas are perishable. In addition, our findings also revealed that the productivity 
of irrigated land is highly affected by input used. Therefore, intervention is needed on the 
availability of institutional support services such as input supply and credit extension. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN IRRIGATION SITES 
 
6.1. Gender and Irrigation 
Evidence shows that the meaningful involvement of women in water resources 
development and management can help make projects more sustainable. It also ensures 
that infrastructure development yields the maximum social and economic returns and 
advance progress on the Millennium Development Goals. That is why during the past 
four decades critical case studies and successful innovations led to a growing consensus 
among many irrigation policy makers, interventionists, local irrigation leaders, and 
researchers world wide that gender27 is an important variable in irrigation (van Koppen, 
2002). 
 
Women play crucial role in many water and food related issues; however, they still tend 
to be underrepresented in decision–making process. In this chapter, we try to see the 
participation of women at three different levels: farm (field) level, association (forum) 
level and leadership level in WUAs. 
? Equal farm level access to water, which encompasses both water rights, irrigated 
land and associated obligations (van Kopper, 2002). 
? Water users associations are the informal or formal networks to which, in 
principle, all farmers in the command area belong and in which rules for rights to 
water and land and related obligations are set and reinforced from the lowest to 
the highest tiers. Equal participation in forums or networks for collective water 
                                             
27 Gender refers to the socially constructed rather then biologically determined roles of men and women as well as the relationships 
between them in given society at specific time and place. These roles and relationships are not fixed, but can and do change. They are 
usually unequal in terms of power, freedom, agency and status as well as access to and control over entitlements, resource and assets. 
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management arrangements –generally required for strengthening access to water 
at farm level (ibid). 
? Equality at leadership-level in the sense that the gender composition of leaders 
should reflect the gender composition of the farmers in the scheme. Women 
leaders should also be able to function as well as men (ibid). 
The above generic analytical tool is called The Gender Performance Indicator for Irrigation 
(GPII), which helps to diagnose, indicate and analyze gender issues and performance in 
those collectively managed irrigation schemes. 
 
6.2. Women Participation at Farm Level 
Most households in the study woredas consist of one adult man, one adult woman and a 
number of children. The adult man is considered the head of the household, which 
implies that he is responsible for managing all labor and other means of production, with 
the objective of feeding all household members year-round. Most important input in 
terms of food security for the household is the so-called rain-fed collective or family 
field. All household members have the obligation to work on the rain-fed collective field 
on which cereals and legumes are grown.  
 
Like other parts of the country, in both woredas, land allocation policies in command 
areas of old or/and new irrigation systems, plots are normally given to a households as a 
unit which is represented by men (husbands). According to experts at the woredas’ office 
of agriculture, to allocate men as household representative stems from a number of 
implicit and explicit assumptions. The assumptions are related to the intra-household 
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organization of agricultural production and the roles of women in this organizational set-
up in particular. Since it is assumed that women (wives) will benefit from the plots, the 
need for allocating plots to women at the same time will cause inequitable land 
distribution. Moreover, unless plot sizes are varied, allocating more than one plot to a 
single household will lead to a situation where fewer households will have access to 
irrigation water. 
 
Farm level women participation can be looked at in two different ways. The first one is 
access to water –to women farm decision makers (female households heads) and to 
households which women are under their male kin (most of the time their husbands). In 
the study areas, women farm decision makers are those female headed households which 
are single, widowed or divorced.  
 
All women who have access to irrigation water are beneficiaries of irrigation water. As 
can be seen in Table 5.1 below, out of 1855 beneficiary farmers in Atsbi Wemberta, 402 
(21.67%) of them were female headed households, who were either single, divorced or 
widowed at the study period. 
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Table 6.1.Proportion of female headed beneficiary households in Atsbi –Micro Dam and Modern 
River Diversion Users  
 Micro-Dams  Modern River Diversions  
No. of Beneficiaries  No. of Beneficiaries  
Name of 
the 
Micro- 
Dam Total Female Male 
Name of 
the river 
diversion Total Female Male 
 
Golgol 
Nael 542 138
1
(25.5%)2 404(74.5%) Endaminu 507 97
1
(19.1%)
2
 410(80.9% 
Harresaw 305 96(31.5%) 209(68.5%) 
 
     
Barka Adi 
Sebha 0 0 0 
 
Hadnet 68 6(8.8%) 62(91.2%) Kelisha 
Emni 0 0 0      
     Habes 0 0 0 
Ruba 
Felg 0 0 0 
 
     
Adi 
Mesanu 9 0 9(100% 
Era 0 0 0 
 
Kuret 159 29(18.2%) 130(81.8%) 
Sub-total 
847 1  
(((45.7%)))4 
2341 
(27.6%)2 
((58.2%))
3 
(((12.6%)))4 
613   
(72.4%) 
((42.2%)) 
(((33%)))  
743              
(((40%))) 
1321                       
(17.8%) 2              
((32.8%))3 
(((32.9%)))4 
611               
(82.2%) 
((42%)) 
(((52.87%))) 
    
 
    
1The numbers out of the bracket shows number of observations in each category for discrete data. 
(.)2 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in that specific irrigation schemes. 
((.)) 3 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of female /male beneficiaries’ categories. 
(((.)))4 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in the woreda.  
 
 
 
Table 6.2.Proportion of female headed beneficiary households in Atsbi –Shallow Wells and Large 
Communal Ponds 
 
Shallow Well   Large Communal Ponds  
No. of Beneficiaries  
 
No of beneficiaries  
Name  of 
the 
shallow 
well Total Female Male  
Name of 
the pond Total  Female Male 
 
Gereb Gesa 5 0 5(92.9%) 
 
Gereb Gesa 9 1
1
(11.1%)
2
 8(89.9%) 
Sub-total 
5 
1   
(((.27%)))
4 
0 
5
1 
 (92.9%)
2
 
((.34%))
3 
 
(((.27%)))
4
 
 
 
9
1 
(((0.48%)))
4
 
1
1 
               
(11.1%) 
2  
  
((0.2%))
3 
(((0.05%)))
4
 
8    
(89.9%) 
((0.5%)) 
(((0.43%))) 
         
 1The numbers out of the bracket shows number of observations in each category for discrete data. 
(.)2 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in that specific irrigation scheme. 
((.)) 3 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of female /male beneficiaries’ categories. 
(((.)))4 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in the woreda. 
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Table 6.3. Proportion of female headed beneficiary households in Atsbi –Traditional River Diversion 
and Spring Water Users 
Traditional River Diversion  Spring Water Use  
No. of Beneficiaries  No. of Beneficiaries  
Name of the 
diversion Total  Female Male 
Name of 
the the 
spring 
water Total  Female Male 
 
Gera Rebue 62 12
1
(19.4%)
2
 50(80.6%) 
 
Afenjow 42 2
1
(4%)
2
 40(96%) 
 
Tsiquaf 20 5(25%) 15(75%) 
 
Tsigaba 24 1(4.2%) 23(95.8%) 
 
Samera 58 8(13.8%) 50(86.6%) 
 
    
Kimber 
(Tsgaba) 13 0 13(100%) 
    
 
    
Mebrahetom 32 7(21.9%) 25(78.1%)      
 
Era Erere 0 0 0     
Sub-total 
185
1 
(((9.97%)))4
 
 
32
1 
     
(17.3%)
2
 
((7.96%))
3 
(((1.7%)))
4
 
153    
(82.7%) 
((10.5%)) 
(((8.2%)))  
66
1 
 
(((3.56%)) )
4
 
3 
1
               
(4.5%) 
2  
     
((.7))
3 
    
(((.16%)))
4
 
63  
(95.5%)  
((4.3%))  
(((3.4%))) 
    
 
    
        
1The numbers out of the bracket shows number of observations in each category for discrete data 
(.)2 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in that specific irrigation schemes 
((.)) 3 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of female /male beneficiaries categories 
(((.)))4 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in the woreda  
 
 
Table 6.4. Total female headed beneficiary households in Atsbi 
 
Irrigation Beneficiary Female Headed Households in Atsbi 
Total  Female Male 
      
1855 402
1(((21.67%)))4 1453(((78.3%)))   
1The numbers out of the bracket shows number of observations in each category for discrete data 
 (((.)))4 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in the woreda  
 
In terms of micro-dams beneficiary farmers, out of a total of 847 beneficiary farmers, 234 
were female who had access to irrigation water that accounted for 27.6% as compared to 
their male counterparts. Besides, among irrigation beneficiary female household heads 
58.2% of them used micro-dams as a source. Furthermore, there were about 743 
irrigation water users in the modern river diversions in Atsbi that represented 132 
(17.8%) female headed households. Female beneficiaries who had access to modern river 
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diversions constituted 32.8% and 32.9% as compared with other female irrigation water 
beneficiaries and the total irrigation water beneficiary farmers in Atsbi, respectively. 
 
 
With regard to traditional river diversion, 32 female headed households participated in 
the irrigation use that accounted for 1.7% of the total irrigation water beneficiary farmers. 
Besides, there were only 3 women farm decision makers in spring water use, 2 of them 
were from Afenjow (Ruba Felg). Furthermore, in Gereb Gesa (Adi Mesanu) shallow well 
and communal ponds irrigation use, merely there was one female headed household who 
had access to irrigation water.  
 
As indicated in Table 5.2 above, in year 2006/07, there were a total of around 2,381 
farmers who had irrigation water access in Ada’a. Of which 318 (13.4%) them were 
female headed households. Even though it was Mojo river diversion which was accessed 
by many beneficiary farmers, the highest number of women farm decision maker 
beneficiaries were found in Godino scheme (18.2%), followed by Goha Worko scheme 
which had 65 women farm decision farmers, who represented 24.3%. 
 
In addition, the majority of female headed households (90%) who had water right used 
irrigation water from Wedecha-Belbela dam. Moreover, in Mojo diversion and Hora 
Kilole lake, the number of women farm–decision makers is 25 and 7, respectively. 
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Table 6.5.Proportion of female headed beneficiary households in Ada’a  
from Wedecha-Belbela Micro-Dam  
 Wedecha-Belbela Micro-Dam 
Name of the 
irrigation 
scheme No. of Beneficiaries  
 Total Female Male 
 
Godino 495
1
(31.6%)
2
 90(18.2%) 405(81.8%) 
 
Gohaworko 267(17%) 65(24.3%) 202(75.7%) 
 
Harawa 68(4.3%) 24(35.3%) 44(64.7%) 
Belbela-
Fultinao 247(15.8%) 28(111.3%) 219(88.7%) 
 
Dhanama 54(3.4%) 8(14.8%) 46(85.2%) 
 
Kataba-
Gimbi 427(27.2%) 71(16.6%) 356(83.4%) 
    
Sub-total 
1558
1  
                       
(((75.7)))
4
 
286 
1
  
(18.2%)
2 
((90%))
3
 
(((13.8)))
4
 
1272 
(81.6%) 
((61.8%)) 
(((61.78))) 
1The numbers out of the bracket shows number of observations in each category for discrete data 
(.)2 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in that specific irrigation schemes 
((.)) 3 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of female /male beneficiaries categories 
(((.)))4 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in the woreda  
 
Table 6.6. Proportion of female headed beneficiary households in Ada’a 
from Mojo River and Hora Kilole Lake 
iver Diversion  Lake Use  
No. of  beneficiaries  No. of Beneficiaries  
Name of 
the River 
Diversion Total  Female Male 
Name of 
the lake Total Female Male 
Mojo 
River 698  25 
1
(3.6%)
2
 
673 
(96.4%) 
Hora 
Kilole 125       7(5.6%) 118(94.4) 
Sub-total 
698
1 
               
(((33.9%)))
4
 
25 
1 
      
(3.6%)
2 
((7.9%))
3 
(((1.2%)))
4
 
673 
(96.4%) 
((32.7%)) 
(((28.3%))) Sub-total 
125
1 
   
(((5.2%)))
4
 
7 
1 
    
(5.6%)
2 
((2.2%))
3 
(((0.29%)))
4
 
118  
(94.4%) 
((5.7% )) 
(((4.96%))) 
        
1The numbers out of the bracket shows number of observations in each category for discrete data 
(.)2 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in that specific irrigation schemes 
((.)) 3 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of female /male beneficiaries categories 
(((.)))4 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in the woreda  
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Table 6.7. Total female headed beneficiary households in Ada’a 
 
Irrigation Beneficiary Female Headed Households in Ada’a 
Total  Female Male 
      
2381 318
1(((13.4%)))4 2059(((86.6%)))   
1The numbers out of the bracket shows number of observations in each category for discrete data 
(((.)))4 -The percentage distribution of the variable from the total number of beneficiaries in the woreda 
 
Generally, 100% of female household heads in the irrigation sites of the two areas who 
have irrigation water access (who are in the command areas) have the right to use the 
irrigation water in their respective schemes. On the other hand, as can be seen in the 
tables above (Table 6.1 and 6.7), the majority of beneficiaries in the irrigation schemes of 
the two woredas were male headed households in year 2006/07, that accounted for 86.6% 
(2058) and 78.3% (1453) in Ada’a and Atsbi, respectively. 
 
 6.2.1. Labor Requirement for Irrigation in Male Headed Households  
The introduction of irrigation to different parts of Ethiopia holds the promise of increase 
food security as well as marketable surpluses by enabling farm households to cultivate 
two or more rounds of crops per year. However, realizing the income and subsistence 
potential of irrigation depends crucially on the availability of family labor for year–round 
agricultural production. As many parts of the country, as much as land; labor is the most 
critical production input in agriculture. Hence, the main concern of many farm 
households is to maximize the return to labor. Arrangements for access to and control 
over labor and the products of labor (agricultural products) are crucial structuring 
principles in the intra-household organization of agricultural production. This is why 
household labor availability is not a simple function of the absolute number of adult 
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household members; instead it is closely related to the intra-household division of rights 
and responsibilities. Gender is one of the main axes around which this division occurs. 
 
The result of focus group discussion with beneficiary farmers at scheme level depicted 
that women in Atsbi and Ada’a have always done and still do, independent work in 
addition to working for on the family irrigated land (male-controlled irrigated plots). This 
labor contribution in the household is seen as the fulfillment of a woman’s duty as a wife, 
in return for which she enjoys the general welfare and security of the household. Women 
were found significantly involve in each activity of irrigated agriculture, in planting, 
weeding, cultivation, sowing, watering, applying fertilizer, harvesting and marketing. The 
only irrigation activities they have not participated are plowing and threshing.  However, 
the revenue generated from agriculture is controlled by men. 
 
When asked about labor supply decision on family irrigation plot (male-controlled field), 
all women (wives) replied that they continue to provide the same amount of labor to the 
male-controlled fields. One woman explained:  “We help each other in the rain-fed field 
and in the irrigated plot. If you would not have been here to interview me, I would have 
been working in the irrigated plot”. 
 
6.2.2. Labor Requirement for Irrigation Agriculture in Female Headed households 
In both study areas, women have equal opportunity to use water as any other water user, 
provided that they are heading a family. Labor as a factor affecting users practice of 
irrigation is mostly related to gender with respect to household heads. Most of the time 
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female headed households lack male labor, which is culturally decisive for practicing 
irrigation known for its high labor demand. Due to gender-typing of tasks in irrigation 
agriculture in societies, labor bottlenecks cannot be overcome by substituting one for the 
other.28 As female beneficiary farmers explained “lack of male labor renders women 
household heads (those that are divorced or widowed) face a triple burden along side, 
care of children, other household duties, their responsibility as household heads placing 
income generation as additional burden on them.”  
 
Another problem which is faced in day-to-day activities of female headed households is, 
during irrigation water shortage seasons, farmers are allowed to use the irrigation water 
only at evening and night time. But, on the other hand, it is not safe for women to work in 
dark. In such situations, if they have a capacity to do, they prefer to hire daily laborer for 
their irrigation farm activities, 15-16 Birr/day with addition of free lunch and ‘tela’(which 
is a local drink). 
 
In addition, other inputs such as fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides and preparation of 
manure/ compost/ are required in the irrigation agriculture. But, according to discussions 
with key informants in the two woredas, in Atsbi 80%-90% and in Ada’a 70%-75 % 
female household heads are found in lower socio-economic condition in those 
communities, except when ranked with each other. Thus, the crucial problem in this case 
is not only labor shortage but also financial problems. 
 
                                             
28 Irrigation labor requirement is discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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As a result, many women farm decision makers lacking man labor usually were forced to 
quit irrigation practices, and lease-out their plots in a form of contract payment or 
sharecropping. Hence, they were forced to give up some part of benefit from irrigation. 
Table 6.8 also shows that in year 2006/07, 32.2% (128) of female headed households 
leased-out the irrigated land in Atsbi. On the other hand, in Ada’a the figure was even 
higher, 64% of women farm decision makers were forced to lease-out irrigation land. 
Discussion with female headed households in Atsbi indicated that the situation was better 
than earlier. As explained by one of the women beneficiary farmer “For many years, I 
had leased-out the irrigated plot. But now the situation is different, I know how much 
benefit I can get from irrigation. Even if I have labor shortage problem, I beg for labor 
assistance from relatives.”  
                                Table 6.3. Choices made by female household heads 
Choices made by female household heads 
Atsbi -
freq(%) 
Ada'a-
freq(%) 
Lease-out    128(31.8%) 203(64%) 
Practice irrigation   232 (57.8%) 115(36%) 
 
6.3. Women Participation in the Water Users Association  
As we described earlier in this paper, all farmers who have irrigation water access are 
members of their respective water users association, it is not different for women farm 
decision makers either. In Atsbi, all the 402 female farm decision makers were members 
of WUA, (91 (5.84%) were single, 167(10.7%) divorced and 144(9.2%) were widowed 
during 2006/07). The large percentage of women were married (they were part of male 
headed households), who represented 74.18% (1155 in number). Similarly in Ada’a, 
there were 1678 women under male headed households. While, the number of single 
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female who used irrigation water were 54 (2.76%), the rest were those of divorced and 
widowed, who accounted for 176(9%) and 88(4.5%), respectively.  
                         6.4. Female irrigation water users in Atsbi and Ada’a 
Name of the 
woreda Single 
Married( are 
part of male 
headed 
households) Divorced Widowed Total 
Atsbi 91(5.84%) 1155(74.18%) 167(10.7%) 144(9.2%) 1557(100%) 
Ada'a 54(2.76%) 1638(83.74%) 176(9%) 88(4.5%) 1956(100%) 
  
One type of contribution expected of beneficiary farmers is labor. All members of WUA 
should participate in the maintenance, clearance and minor construction of the communal 
managed irrigation schemes. Besides, the financial problem women face, labor shortage 
is another constraint in female farm decision makers to practice irrigation in both farm 
and forum level activities.  
 
At least two times a year .i.e., in the months of September and February, farmers clean 
the canals. ‘Free riding’ is not allowed with regard to cleaning and maintaining their parts 
of the irrigation canal. Women farm decision makers also have an obligation to 
participate; either themselves, their son(s) (relative) or they can hire a daily laborer. 
However, if their economic status and family labor constraint is realized by other 
members of the association, they are excused for not participating in provision activities 
of the irrigation system in the study areas. 
 
Annual average value of farmers’ contribution in WUA also constitutes contribution in 
cash form. The result of discussion with water users committee in many of the irrigation 
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schemes showed that female farm decision makers pay their contribution for the 
committee as much as possible on time as compared to other members of the association.  
 
With the exception of female headed households, men, more than women, control the 
resources, expenditure and income generation within the family. Men’s dominant role in 
economic transactions, representation and legal matters and their contribution to family 
income is extended to the responsibility to participate in decision making bodies, such as 
WUAs and their meetings. As one of the executive committee from Godino PA in Ada’a 
explained, “Even if meetings are a very rare phenomenon in our association, a majority of 
members, especially women (those who are married as well as heads of the households) 
have considered the responsibility of attending meetings as an obligation rather than an 
opportunity, therefore, most of the time the majority of them are absent”.  
 
According to interviews with the executive committee, the overall participation of male 
and female members is low in the association meetings. When the meetings are crucial 
and it is imperative that a household member attend the meetings, it is usually a male 
member who attends (from male headed households). There is no rule that prevents 
women from attending and participating in the association meetings in the study areas. 
Either the husband or the wife or both are able to attend and represent their interests at 
the meetings. However, attending meetings and discussing matters are thought of as male 
activities.  
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Discussion with the woreda experts in both areas revealed the common reasons for the 
low participation of women in association meetings. Some of the major reasons include:- 
women do not have the time as mostly they are engaged in domestic activities; husbands 
do not prefer their wives going out  to attend meetings; women lack experiences (for 
example in managing meetings, talking in front of people) and the wrong perception that 
there is no need for both husband and wife to attend meetings.  
 
Generally, the rationale for female farmers, who attend the meetings but not participating 
actively in the discussions, can be found further in the prevailing gender ideology among 
the population in the case study areas. As articulated frequently by male and female 
respondents, women are considered to be less capable in their understanding of how the 
WUA functions. Thus, the main reason for women not participating in associations is 
lack of awareness towards gender equality that exists among both men and women.  
 
6.4. Women Participation at the Leadership Level 
The assumption that participation will be always in the interest of women and 
subsequently that women will always be eager to become members of WUC, to attend 
and participate actively in the discussion of meetings,…is not confirmed by this study. 
According to the woreda irrigation expert in Ada’a, most women those who can rely on 
their husbands or male relatives for representation of the household are not eager to take 
over the responsibilities, which they perceive to be the responsibility of men within and 
outside the household. 
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All women female household heads have equal chance of being elected as WUC. 
However, participation of women at leadership level is very low. There are a total of 14 
and 8 water users associations in Atsbi and Ada’a, respectively. On average one WUA 
constitutes 5-7 executive committee. The WUC includes chair person, vice chair person, 
a secretary, a cashier, a controller and 1-3 members. Except in Kimber irrigation scheme 
(Zarema tabia), where there are only three elder men who serve as WUC. Surprisingly, 
there were only a total of three women in WUC in Adi Mesanu, Haressaw and Hadnet (in 
Atsbi) in year 2006/07. One of them is cashier (in Adi Mesanu) and the rest are 
secretaries in there respective WUA (Haressaw and Hadnet). The situation becomes 
worse when we come to Ada’a. During 2006/07, the only female who involved in WUC 
was found in Goha Worko. In addition, there was no female water distributor29 at all in 
both study areas. Regarding the block leaders30, there are 94 and 75 block leaders who 
are in charge of controlling the water distribution system at Gujeles and Geres level, 
however, none of them are female.  
 
As we saw earlier in chapter four, there are two kinds of conflict resolution mechanisms 
in the irrigation sites of the two woredas; the formal –tabia level court system and elected 
elders at each scheme level. In both of the cases, there is no participation of women at all.  
The main reasons for absence of women participation in WUC are:- 
o Unable to work at night; 
o A lot of domestic work at home;  
                                             
29 Water distributor is a person in charge of irrigation water distribution at scheme level.  He also controls 
the performance of block leaders (who are operating in his respective irrigation scheme). 
30 Block leaders are group leaders who are in charge of irrigation water distribution at outlet (block) level. 
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o Other perceptions; such as men know more how and what to say in meetings and 
in public gatherings and males also have more ability to convince others in 
conflict resolution cases. 
 
Discussion with beneficiary farmers revealed that even though the participation of 
women in the WUCs is very low, all four of women members of the WUC were doing 
very well in both woredas. 
 
The group discussions with female headed households in Ada’a irrigation schemes 
indicate that there is a combination of factors that prevents women from active 
participation in water user associations. Some of these factors are the prevailing norms of 
modesty and appropriate behavior for women; direct or indirect discouragement by other 
participants or the feeling that it is not their duty to contribute actively. Those women, 
who choose to participate actively, run the risk of being accused of inappropriate 
behavior. 
 
6.5. KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of this chapter was to assess the participation of women at farm, forum and 
leadership level in the two communal managed irrigation schemes. 
 
In the two case study areas, plot allocation policies are based on the assumption that men 
are the main farmers, decision makers and providers. Plots are allocated to a household as 
a unit, with men (husbands) being the representative of the household, with the 
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assumption that women would benefit through their husbands. The underlying estimates 
of labor availability are determined based on the belief that women would be willing and 
available to provide labor for family plots. In addition, discussions with female headed 
households indicate that even though women are found to be significantly involved in 
irrigated agriculture in male headed households, the revenue generated from agriculture is 
controlled by men.  
 
When we consider women as household heads, 100% of female headed households who 
have irrigation water access have the right to use the resource in both case study woredas. 
On the other hand, large proportion of female headed households in the study areas quit 
to practice irrigation due to 3 major reasons. The first one is women farm decision 
makers face a triple burden along side; care of children, other domestic duties and 
responsibilities as household heads. The second is financial problem – most of them are 
categorized in low-income level group of the society, as a result, they cannot use 
complementary inputs like fertilizer, variety of seed etc. The third is during water 
shortage season, they are allowed to use the irrigation water only at night which involves 
security threats /concerns. 
 
All farm decision markers in a WUA have an obligation to participate at association 
level. However, if the economic status and family labor constraint of female headed 
households is realized by other members of WUA, they will be excused for not 
participating in maintenance and clearance of canals. 
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There are a number of reasons which are mentioned by men as well as women farm 
decision makers for lower participation of women at farm, association and leadership 
level. Some of them are unable to work at night, a lot of work at home, husbands do no 
prefer their wives going out attending different economic and social activities (mentioned 
frequently in focus groups discussions with irrigation beneficiaries in Ada’a), women 
lack of experience (for managing meetings, talking in front of people). 
 
However, the real rationale for lower participation of women is that the society they are 
living in, does not give men and women equal opportunities to become independent farm 
decision makers with access to land, skills, inputs, capital and markets. Women are not 
perceived as productive and main contributor as male. They are also considered to be less 
capable to understand how the WUA functions. Direct and indirect discouragement of 
women by other participants or the feeling that it is not their duty to contribute actively is 
the common phenomenon in the societies of the study areas. 
 
Generally, when talking about gender inequality it is important to realize that it might be 
more important to focus on the most disadvantaged group of farmers, i.e., female headed 
households. Women farm decision makers are found in lower economic status of the 
community and have a problem of family labor constraint. Therefore, policy intervention 
is needed to improve the position of women (the most disadvantaged parts of the 
community) at farm, forum and leadership level and effort should be made to change the 
wrong perception of the society towards women (considering them as they are less 
capable of participating in economic activities).  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DETRMINANTS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND ITS EFECTIVENESS FOR 
IRRIGATION WATER MANAGEMENT 
 
7.1. Analysis of the Determinants of Collective Action in Communal Irrigation 
Schemes 
The estimation results of determinants of collective action for indicators- average value 
of a household contribution for the resource management per year, whether there is (are) 
guard(s) for protection of the irrigation site, whether group members contribute for the 
guard’s payment, if there is (a) person(s) in charge of equitable water distribution and 
appropriate usage of the irrigation water, whether group members contribute for the water 
distributor, is presented in Table 7.1. 
 
7.1.1 Annual Average Value of Contribution per Household  
We found that average value of household contribution for the resource management is 
negatively associated with number of households in the group. But it is positively 
associated with total number of households squared. This is because of economies of 
scale and a U-shaped relationship between annual average value of household 
contribution for the resource management and number of households in the group. 
Groups which have smaller number of beneficiaries should contribute more in order to 
cover the operation and maintenance cost of the resource management. But as the number 
of beneficiaries increases the average contribution per household decreases. However, 
after some point (as the number of households increases more), management costs 
increase rapidly, requiring higher per household contribution. The turning point in this 
relationship (where minimum expected number of beneficiaries occurs) was at 154 
households/group, within the range of household number in the group in the two study  
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woredas (from 4 to 297 households/ group)31. The magnitude of the impact of number of 
households is moderate. Average value of contribution per household also negatively 
correlates with proportion of female headed households in the group. It suggests that both 
financial and labor32 constraint appear to be a greater concern for female headed 
households.  
 
With respect to education status, groups which have higher proportion of literate 
household have negative association with average household contribution for the resource 
management. The result is both statistically (significant at 5% level) and qualitatively 
significant. Perhaps household heads with some level of education have better access to 
engage in non-farm activities, which offers higher income, hence undermines collective 
action. 
 
Moreover, average family size is positively correlated with average value of household 
contribution for the resource management at 1% level of significance. This means groups 
with large average family size make higher contribution per household. This is due to 
great availability of family labor to participate in collective action of irrigation water use, 
since labor contribution constitutes 89.5% of the total contribution (cash+ kind+ labor) of 
members of the WUAs (see Table 4.9). 
  
Not surprisingly, having access and using of formal sector credit is positively and 
strongly associated with average value of a group member contribution for the resource 
                                             
31 For more information refer  Table 3.3 
32 Total annual household contribution is in the form of  labor, cash and kind  
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management, indicator of more collective action (at 1% level of significance). This is 
possibly because of credit is used primary to purchase crop inputs such as fertilizer and 
improved seeds, which are complementary inputs to irrigation water use. Surprisingly, 
contact with the extension programme is not strongly (significantly) associated with 
average value of a group member contribution for the resource management.  
 
Unexpectedly, higher proportion of households whom the primary source of livelihood is 
irrigated agriculture has no effect on average value of household contribution. It appears 
that it is not the livelihood strategy (being irrigated agriculture) of beneficiaries per se 
that is leading to higher amount of contribution in these woredas but rather other factors 
such as family size in a group and access of formal credit. 
 
Wealth measurement indicators are also important determinants of collective action. Size 
of agricultural land in a group (non-irrigated land) and total group’s TLU have mixed 
effect on average household contribution per year; negative with total agricultural land in 
the group and positive with TLU. The possible reason can be groups which have larger 
size of agricultural land may give more attention for their rain-fed agriculture, and higher 
TLU as a measure of wealth is an indication of ability to make contribution. 
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Table 7.1. Determinants of indicators of collective action in Atsbi and Ada’a, 2006/07 Coefficient (standard errors in parenthesis) 
Explanatory variables 
 
Average value 
of a group 
member 
contribution 
for the 
resource 
management  
If there is 
(are)guard(s) 
for protection 
of the 
irrigation site 
(dF/dx)‡ 
Whether group 
members 
contribute for 
the guard(s) 
(dF/dx)‡ 
If there is a 
water 
distributor in 
the irrigation 
scheme 
(dF/dx)‡ 
Whether group 
members 
contribute for 
the water 
distributor 
(dF/dx)‡ 
Regional Characteristics 
Woreda, cf.,Ada’a 
 
Group Characteristics 
Total number of households in the group 
 
Total number of households in the group squared 
 
Proportion of female headed households in the group 
 
Proportion of literate headed households in the group 
 
Average family size in the group 
 
Proportion of households who have used formal credit 
in the group 
Proportion of households who have included in the 
agricultural extension programme 
Proportion of households whom the primary source of 
livelihood is irrigated agriculture 
Total irrigated area in the group 
 
Total agricultural land in the group(non-irrigated 
land) 
Tropical livestock unit for the group 
 
Proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-end 
 
Year of experience of irrigation water use, no. 
 
Provision of training, no.  
 
Farm Characteristics 
Proportion of soil coverage considered good by the 
group in the catchment area 
 
Village Characteristics 
Whether rainfall adequacy in the village is considered 
good by the group 
 
 
-97.50147   
(91.39847)    
 
-2.44839***   
(.9388741)    
.0079435**   
(.0032323)     
-54.14266   
(52.90396)    
-191.6583**   
(74.02852)    
24.3402***    
(7.832015)     
1.095235***   
(.2177543)     
221.1597   
(210.5841)     
2.963661   
(52.05627) 
-1.260037   
(2.395867)    
-2.853806*   
(1.465202)    
.4433728*   
(.2589661)     
26.69484   
(75.93723)     
-1.329808   
(1.338798)    
-.180455   
(5.302972)    
 
-18.93334   
(14.81855)    
 
 
109.7401   
(79.33109)     
 
 
-.1004423    
(.144125)     
 
.0125639*** 
(.0145803)     
-.0000372*** 
(.0000452)     
.1279945** 
(.1843523) 
-.0273196  
(.0643707)   
.0048154 
(.0093878)     
.0623452***    
(.0947366)     
-.0355268    
(.2431854)   
 .0072542    
(.0230683)     
.0095655** 
(.0134072)     
.0071554 ***   
(.009483)      
.0003973*  
(.0005813)     
-.0744927 
(.1113372)     
.0008542    
(.0046769)     
.0172791***    
(.0242046)     
 
.012894    
(.0400998)     
 
 
.0190732    
(.0925456)     
  
.0251459   
(.0515297)     
 
.0034242***   
(.0017931) 
-.0000915***   
(.0000525)    
.2524605***   
(.1916403)  
-.1053229   
(.1032882)  
-.0008083    
(.008546) 
 
 
.5541125   
(.3821659)    
.0792391*   
(.0825772) 
.0029209 **   
(.0037978) 
.0030176 *   
(.0023954) 
.0002909 *   
(.0004376) 
.1123086   
(.1185141)   
.0012329   
(.0013417) 
-.015713 **   
(.0164089) 
 
.1925832   
(.1339614) 
 
 
-.1510933*    
(.1498897)    
 
 
.8205165***   
(.2488298)     
 
.0011754***   
(.0017479)    
-7.17e-06   
(6.43e-06)     
.1827336   
(.1663727)     
-.1377547   
(.1023142)    
.0109844   
(.0168198)     
.2919586***   
(.1416184)     
-.509087   
(.5904329)    
.1676395***   
(.0837026)    
.0030024   
(.0043583)     
-.0016165   
(.0028884)    
-.0007405   
(.0004243)    
-.4724717   
(.2524078)    
.0108338**    
(.004208)     
.0234287**   
(.0160673)    
 
.2886481***   
(.0844612)     
 
 
.4405119**   
(.2471971)     
 
 
-.7869334***   
(.1790068)  
 
-2.19e-17***  
(4.63e-16)    
 
 
-3.81e-16   
(8.12e-15)   
8.78e-17   
(1.81e-15) 
1.02e-16   
(2.16e-15)   
 
 
-5.14e-16   
(1.09e-14)    
3.63e-16**   
(7.69e-15) 
2.15e-16   
(4.53e-15) 
-1.91e-17   
(4.05e-16) 
3.68e-18**   
(7.78e-17)   
8.61e-16   
(1.81e-14) 
3.36e-17   
(7.14e-16) 
-6.35e-17   
(1.33e-15)  
 
9.23e-18***   
(1.90e-16) 
 
 
-.9999088    
(.000575) 
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Walking time from that group’s specific irrigated land 
to( in hours) 
Town market 
 
Village market 
 
Development post 
 
Scheme Characteristics 
Whether the irrigation scheme was promoted by the 
external organization 
Number of external  organization(s) which is 
(are)operating currently in that specific irrigation 
site 
Number of local  organization(s) which is (are) 
operating currently in that specific irrigation site 
Whether there was farmers’ participation during 
construction of the whole structure 
Type of irrigation system dummy, cf., communal ponds 
Micro-dams 
 
River diversion 
 
Spring water use 
 
Shallow well 
 
_Cons 
 
mills 
 
Type of regression 
Number of observation 
F(28, 140) 
Prob > F 
R-squared 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.1544492   
(.1448537)    
.235727    
(.6915918)     
.5151172   
(.6777663)     
 
10.09033   
(27.50153)     
25.0423**    
(11.38271)     
 
18.9421    
(13.59268) 
-40.34981    
(52.6411)     
 
-78.77681   
(92.72828)    
165.3306**    
(82.8344) 
-14.36502   
(89.38776)    
-181.9143*   
(95.21018)    
-112.0618   
(318.0857)    
 
 
 
OLS 
169 
29.77 
0.0000 
0.6036 
 
 
 
-.0004761**    
(.0006672)     
-.0004279    
(.0014563)     
-.000692    
(.0019121)     
 
.0425002    
(.0740186)     
-.0207725    
(.0300775)     
 
.0736847***    
(.0919245)     
.9049967 **   
(.2456271)     
 
.0249966**    
(.0964438)     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selection Model-
Probit 
169 
212.65 
0.0000 
0.8650 
 
 
 
 
.0000305     
(.00014) 
-.0032064***   
(.0023282) 
-.0035514***   
(.0024127) 
 
-.0045196   
(.0325335) 
.0007954   
(.0190842) 
 
-.0190024   
(.0249432) 
.0000461** 
(-.0317386)   
 
.0493252 
(-.022026)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.1931062**   
(.1783197)   
Selection Model- 
Probit 
103 
123.67 
0.0000 
0.6668 
 
 
-.0005327*  
(.0003076)    
.0010231   
(.0015798)     
-.0027727   
(.0018438)    
 
-.0808885   
(.0614335)    
.099223***   
(.0327524)     
 
.14125038**   
(.0535214)    
-.1288109   
(.1035174)    
 
-.0839703**   
(.0470526)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selection Model- 
Probit 
169 
100.77 
0.0000 
0.6169 
 
 
 
-3.07e-20   
(6.38e-19) 
-1.02e-18***   
(2.10e-17) 
-3.93e-19***   
(8.07e-18) 
 
-8.18e-12   
(9.69e-11) 
-2.07e-17   
(4.28e-16) 
  
1.26e-17     
(2.61e-16) 
.0000594   
(.0003212) 
 
.1838809   
(.3470024) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.44e-17**   
(9.18e-16) 
Selection Model- 
Probit 
109 
179.47 
0.0000 
0.7583 
 
***statistical significant at 1%; ** statistical significant at 5%; * statistical significant at 10% 
‡Reported coefficients represent effect of a unit change in explanatory variable on probability of the respective dependent variable. 
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From scheme level characteristics, communities with greater presence of external 
organizations make higher contribution per household for the resource management. This 
result is statistically and qualitatively significant. A unit increase in the presence of 
external organization which operates currently in that specific irrigation site, increases 
average value of annual contribution per household by 25 Birr. Perhaps the current 
external organizations in these irrigation schemes may be engaged in provision of 
complementary inputs to local collective action rather than displacing it. 
 
The result of the regression analysis also depicts that in terms of types of irrigation 
system dummies, river diversion is found to be positively and statistically significant 
associated with average value of household contribution (at 5% significance level). That 
is groups that are located in river diversions contribute more per household than groups 
that are found in communal lakes. Perhaps structures of river diversions demand high 
contribution of labor during clearance and maintenance than communal lakes do. Shallow 
well irrigation type dummy is also negatively associated with average household 
contribution, since most of the times farmers who use shallow wells don’t have canals, 
their labor contribution is less as compared with communal lake users. 
 
7.1.2. Presence of and paying for guards in the communal managed irrigation sites, 
2006/07  
 
Table 7.1 also presents the estimated Probit-selection model results of indicators of the 
determinants of having guard and paying for guard for irrigation water management 
during 2006/07. It was found that an inverted U-shaped relationship between number of 
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households and employing guard.  Irrigation water beneficiary farmers are more likely to 
have and pay for guard at intermediate number of households in a group than at low or 
very high total number of households per group. Possibly due to higher fixed costs at 
lower number of households and higher variable costs at larger number of households for 
having and hiring guard. The turning point in these relationships is 169 and 160 
households per group respectively (where maximum probability of communities for 
having and contributing for guards). Higher proportion of female headed households in 
the group increases the likelihood of having and contributing for the guard, perhaps due 
to an attempt` to compensate for labor constraints for protecting the irrigated farm land.  
 
Furthermore, the greater the proportions of households who have used formal credit in 
the group, the higher the probability to have and pay for guard. The statistical 
significance and positive direction of the effect of proportion of households whom the 
primary source of livelihood is irrigated agriculture on contribution of guard is consistent 
with the hypothesis we stated. It gives evidence that obtaining higher benefits from 
irrigation water use encourages beneficiaries to more collective action. Moreover, total 
irrigated area in the group has strong statistical association with the presence of and 
paying for guards. It indicates that as the irrigated land size increases, the importance of 
employing guard becomes very crucial to protect the whole structure of irrigation sites 
with addition to the irrigated farm land.  
 
We also find that groups which have larger size of land for agriculture and with higher 
TLU have positive association with having and contributing for guard. It suggests that 
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contributing for guard relates to affordability issue. Thus, groups with a better physical 
resource are more likely to employ guard than those with few physical resources. Groups 
with more frequent provision of trainings are significantly and more likely to employ 
guard. The expectation is that they can understand the benefit more easily and are more 
open to access of information than groups with less frequent of provision of trainings. 
Thus, more frequent provision of trainings for beneficiaries will have a remarkable 
impact on benefiting from irrigation water use, which in turn leads to more collective 
action.  
 
With regard to village level factors, rainfall adequacy also has negative effect on paying 
for guard, implying that groups with adequate amount of rainfall are also less likely to 
contribute for guard. It suggests that having better agricultural potential may tend to 
undermine individuals’ incentives to cooperate by offering more “exit” options, giving 
more attention for rain-fed agriculture.  Expectedly, groups which are closer to the town 
market are more likely to have guard. In addition, being closer to village market and 
tabia development post have positive correlation with contributing for payment of guard. 
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that having better access to markets 
increases the value of resources and thus the value of managing resources well, which 
may favor collective action. In addition, beneficiary farmers which are closer to tabia 
development post are more open to access of information than irrigation users which are 
very far away from development post.  
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From scheme level factors, communities with greater presence of local organizations 
have higher probability of having for guard. This finding is consistent with the argument 
of experience with local organizations may favor collective action due to possible 
learning effects of how to enhance the ability to enforce collective action. Increasing the 
number of local organizations by one unit increases having guard by 7.4%.  
 
Community participation during construction of the irrigation scheme increases the 
likelihood of having guard than communities who did not participate in any form. This 
implies that beneficiaries who contributed for the construction of the scheme give more 
emphasis for the protection of the scheme. It indicates presence of stronger sense of 
belongingness and ownership towards the irrigation site. Statistically significant and 
positive correlation is depicted between groups which use micro-dam irrigation water and 
having guard. The expectation is that, the structure of modern micro-dams has reservoirs, 
spill way, different outlets, canals (main, lateral and sub-laterals) which needs higher 
protection from external as well as internal damage caused by individuals and cattle.  
 
As we can see from the above table the inverse Mills ratio is statistically significant at 5% 
level. This indicates that there is a sample selection bias. Since we use sample selection 
model, it was tested and controlled. 
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7.1.3. Presence of and paying for water distributors in the communal managed 
irrigation sites, 2006/07  
 
As can be shown from Table 7.1., groups which are found in Atsbi are strongly and  
positively associated with having water distributor in the irrigation scheme, but 
negatively correlated with contributing for the service he gives (1% statistical 
significance for both) than groups which are found in Ada’a. It suggests that the presence 
of Abo-Mai is a common phenomenon in schemes that are found in Atsbi. It also 
indicates that how immense role he plays in the irrigation water distribution system in 
Atsbi. Moreover, it also implies that how social capital helps to reduce the cost of 
attaining and enforcing collective action in the communal irrigation sites of Atsbi. 
   
We also found that irrigation water beneficiaries are more likely to have water distributor 
at intermediate number of households. Perhaps the reason might be at low number of 
households, the cost of having water distributor is large. Therefore the probability of 
having water distributor becomes low. Similarly, at high number of households the 
probability of having water distributor becomes low, because for one person it becomes 
very difficult to monitor very large number of population. Instead it might be wiser 
(effective) to put group leaders in charge for monitoring and controlling irrigation water 
distribution in every block. Besides, as the number of households increases, it is less 
likely to contribute for the water distributor.  
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The result also shows that the greater the proportions of households who have used 
formal credit in the group, the higher the probability to have and pay for water 
distributor. Higher proportion of households whom the primary source of livelihood is 
irrigated agriculture is positively associated with presence of water distributor and on 
their payment (statistically significant at 1% and 5%, respectively). It implies that 
obtaining higher benefits from irrigation water use appreciates collective action. Groups 
with larger TLU (wealth measurement indicator) have positive association with 
contributing for water distributor.  
 
Years of experience of irrigation water use is positively correlated with having water 
distributor in the scheme. It witnesses that through time beneficiaries have understood the 
benefit of having a person who is in charge of the whole water distribution system by 
simply selecting individuals who are influential local leaders who give services. It also 
shows that the importance and viability of social capital in community managed 
resources. Groups with more frequent provision of trainings are significantly and more 
likely to have water distributor. The reason is that they can understand the benefit more 
easily and are more open to access of information than groups with less frequent of 
provision of trainings.  
 
Group members were also asked to categorize, what percentage of the soil coverage was 
considered good by them in their groups’ farm land. Soil type which has the capacity of 
absorbing medium amount of water was considered ‘good’ by beneficiary farmers. 
Higher proportion of land in good soil has positive and statistically significant association 
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with employing for water distributor (at 1% statistical significance level). These findings 
are consistent with the argument that having better agricultural potential increases the 
benefit of using irrigation water and thus the value of managing the resource well, which 
appreciates collective action. Similarly, communities with good adequacy amount of 
rainfall are significantly and more likely to have a person in charge of water distribution. 
 
With regard to access to market and tabia development post, groups which are closer to 
town market are more likely to have water distributor. In addition, being closer to village 
market and tabia development post have positive correlation with contributing for the 
payment of the water distributor. 
 
From scheme level factors, communities with greater presence of local organizations 
have higher probability of having water distributor. Besides, presence of external 
organizations in the community managed irrigation schemes increase the likelihood of 
having water distributor. It indicates that external organizations may increase the benefit 
of collective action management by introducing profitable opportunities and new 
technologies to beneficiary farmers. Statistically significant and negative correlation is 
depicted between groups which use micro-dam irrigation water and having water 
distributor. The expectation is that because of the presence of modern structure that can 
be easily handled by group leaders, the water distribution-related problem is less in 
micro-dams as compared with other types of irrigation schemes. Therefore, the 
importance of having water distributor becomes less. 
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As expected, the inverse Mills ratio revealed that there is correlation between the two 
error terms (for the dependent variables- whether there is water distributor in the scheme 
and whether members contribute for the water distributor), but it is taken care of by the 
coefficient in the second stage –‘the selectivity term’. 
 
7.2. Analysis of the Determinants of Failure of Collective Action  
7.2.1. Determinants of Violation Occurrence of Restricted Rules and Regulations 
 
The estimated regression results of the determinants for frequent violation occurrence of 
rules and regulations is presented in Table 7.2. There is no statistically significant 
association between regional dummies and number of violation occurrence. 
Unexpectedly, occurrence of violation of use rules and regulations is positively 
associated with total number of beneficiaries in a group but negatively associated with 
total number of beneficiaries squared. This implies that an inverted U- shaped 
relationship between number of households in a group and collective action. This finding 
indicates that larger number of beneficiary farmers in a group leads to greater scarcity 
which increases number of violation occurrence. At higher scarcity and ecological stress 
institutional arrangements often breakdown as people scramble for survival and discount 
rates which leads to increasing ‘exit options’ of irrigation users. They keep only the 
membership title in WUA but unable to use the resource due to high number of 
households (since they are unable to use the water, they can’t violate the rules). As a 
result, number of violation occurrence start to decline. The turning point where maximum 
expected number of farmers is almost 225 households /group. It is within the range of 
total number of beneficiaries in a group which ranged from 4 to 280 households in Atsbi 
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and 8 to 297 beneficiaries /group in Ada’a33. However, this is only an ex-post hypothesis 
to explain a result that we did not expect34, and further research would be needed to 
confirm or reject the hypothesis.  
 
Higher proportion of female headed households per group has negative association with 
number of violation occurrence. It confirms the explanation farmers and the executive 
committee gave us during focus group discussion about women’s performance in the 
irrigated agriculture. Women understand the rules and regulations just as equal as male 
irrigation water users and keep it as more than their male counter parts, implying its 
remarkable importance to make policy implication. 
 
One of the most convincing reasons for higher number of violation of rules and 
regulations is larger proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-end (at 1% significant level), 
which causes for irrigation water scarcity (least secure water supplies) and longer hours 
of cleaning of canals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
33 Summary statistics of variables used in the regression is presents in Table 3.3. 
34 We expected that as the number of beneficiary household increases number of violation of rules and 
regulations will be high. 
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Table7.2.1.Determinants of frequent violation occurrence in community managed schemes, 2006/07 
Explanatory Variable    Coefficient t p>/t/ 
Regional Characteristics       
Woreda, cf.,Ada’a    -7.287844 -1.20 0.233 
       
Group Characteristics       
Total number of households in the group   0.6140693*** 6.22 0.000 
Total number of households in the group squared  -0.0013674*** -4.94 0.000 
Proportion of female headed households in the group -11.54029* -1.70 0.091 
Proportion of literate headed households in the group -3.296027 -0.58 0.563 
Average family size in the group   0.0023655 0.00 0.998 
Proportion of households who have used formal credit  -0.035994 -1.17 0.245 
in the group       
Proportion of households who have included in the  -20.53341 -0.78 0.439 
agricultural extension programme      
Proportion of households whom the primary source  0.7578805 0.15 0.879 
of livelihood is irrigated agriculture      
       
       
Total irrigated area in the group   0.2715149 0.9 0.368 
Total agricultural land in the group   0.2185159 -1.88 0.159 
(non-irrigated land)      
Tropical livestock unit for the group   0.0048166 1.42 0.822 
Proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-end  35.70082*** 3.9 0.000 
Year of experience of irrigation water use, no.  0.0941158 1.01 0.315 
Provision of training, no.     -2.064542** -2.48 0.014 
       
Farm Characteristics       
Proportion of soil coverage considered good by the  -4.436368* -1.88 0.063 
group in the catchment area       
       
Village Characteristics       
Whether rainfall adequacy in the village is considered  -8.307804 -1.45 0.148 
good by the group       
       
Walking time from that group’s specific irrigated     
land to( in hours)       
Town market    0.0212133* 1.94 0.054 
Village market    -0.1590093* -1.92 0.057 
Development post    0.0928955 0.99 0.325 
       
Scheme Characteristics       
Whether the irrigation scheme was promoted by the  3.679401 1.58 0.116 
external organization       
Number of external  organization(s) which are(is) 0.0934963 0.06 0.949 
operating currently in that specific irrigation 
site     
Number of local  organization(s) which are(is) operating 1.265134 0.87 0.386 
currently in that specific irrigation site     
Whether there was farmers’ participation during   6.163928 1.26 0.209 
construction of the whole structure      
       
Type of irrigation system dummy, cf., communal ponds    
Micro-dams    -7.707983 -0.87 0.384 
River diversion    -11.74274 -1.44 0.152 
Spring water use    -6.625995 -0.64 0.524 
Shallow well    -16.53446 -1.33 0.185 
_Cons    26.78845 0.82 0.414 
       
Type of regression    OLS   
Number of observation    169   
F(28, 140)    29.69   
Prob > F    0.000   
R-squared    0.6271   
***statistical significant at 1%; ** statistical significant at 5%; * statistical significant at 10% 
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The result of regression analysis also shows that groups with more frequent provision of 
training experienced lower number of violation occurrence at 5% level of significance. It 
suggests that human capital and access to information favor for collective action. One 
more provision of training for beneficiary farmers, decreases number of violation 
occurrence by 9% per group. Thus, provision of training expansion by both governmental 
and non-governmental organizations will have a remarkable impact on enforcing of use 
rules of collective action in both study woredas.  
 
Expectedly, farm characteristics are also important determinants for the frequent 
occurrence of violation of by-laws. Higher proportion of land in good soil is associated 
with lower number of violation occurrence in year 2006/07. A unit increase in proportion 
of soil coverage considered ‘good’ by the group in the catchment’s area decreases the 
number of violation of restrictions occurrence by 4 number of times per group.  
 
Access to markets has a mixed effect. There is more frequent violation occurrence in 
groups closer to village market. Being further by an hour (walking time) from the village 
market implies 15% less violation occurrence. The possible reason might be groups 
closer to village markets most likely scramble for maximizing their benefit from 
irrigation water use without considering the rules. As a result, there might occur higher 
number of violation of rules. Groups closer to the woreda town market also experienced 
less frequent violation of rules and regulations. Being closer to the woreda town market 
by an hour (walking time) implies 2.1% less occurrence of violation. 
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Table 7.2.2.Tobit /Tobit Decomposition Results – Determinants of the Failure of Collective Action in Community Irrigation Water Management, 2006/07 
Number of conflict occurred in 2006/07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 
7.2.2. 
continued 
 Marginal Effects
Explanatory Variables 1Latent 
Variables 
3Conditional 
on being 
Uncensored 
4Probability 
Uncensored 
Regional Characteristics 
 
Woreda, cf.,Ada’a 
 
Group Characteristics 
 
Total number of households in the group 
 
Total number of households in the group squared 
 
Proportion of female headed households in the group 
  
Proportion of literate headed households in the group 
 
Average family size in the group 
 
Proportion of households who have used formal credit in the group 
 
Proportion of households who have included in the agricultural 
extension programme 
 
Proportion of households whom the primary source of livelihood is 
irrigated agriculture 
 
Total irrigated area in the group 
 
Total agricultural land in the group(non-irrigated land) 
 
Tropical livestock unit for the group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5.035339   
(8.409348)     
 
 
.4870427***   
(.1090967) 
-.0013044***   
(.0003321)     
-18.72516**   
(7.842905)  
9.39432   
(6.189696) 
-1.77056*   
(.9559716)     
.1657701   
(3.866335)      
10.97963   
(28.80865) 
 
1.305513   
(3.728566)      
 
.505004*   
(.2982261) 
.2330373   
(.1652178) 
0055565   
(.0243579)      
 
   
  
 
 
-3.666065     
(6.17193)    
 
 
.3513605***     
(.07973)   
 -.000941***    
(.00024)    
-13.50863**     
(5.696920    
6.777215     
(4.46446)     
-1.27731*      
(.68953)    
.1195892     
(2.78918)     
7.92088      
(20.782)     
 
.9418182     
(2.68928)  
 
.3643181*      
(.21557)     
.1681169      
(.11927)     
.0040085      
(.01758)   
  
 
 
-.0672957      
(.11023)    
 
 
.0066967***    
(.00172)     
-.0000179***   
(.00001)    
-.2574672**    
(.11172) 
.12917      
(.08701)     
-.0243448*     
(.01357)    
.0022793      
(.05316)     
.1509677      
(.39667)     
 
.0179505      
(.05135)     
 
.0069437*      
(.00419)    
.0032042      
(.00231) 
.0000764      
(.00033)     
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Table 7.2.2. continued 
 Marginal Effects
Explanatory Variables 1Latent 
Variables 
3Conditional on 
being Uncensored 
4Probability 
Uncensored 
 
Proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-end 
 
Years of experience of irrigation water use, no. 
 
Provision of training, no.  
 
Farm Characteristics 
 
Proportion of soil coverage considered good by the group in the 
catchment area 
 
Village Characteristics 
 
Whether rainfall adequacy in the village is considered good by the 
group 
Walking time from that group’s specific irrigated land to( in minutes) 
Town market 
 
Village market 
 
Development post 
 
Scheme Characteristics 
 
Whether the irrigation scheme was promoted by the external 
organization 
Number of external  organization(s) which are(is) operating currently 
in that specific irrigation site 
Number of local  organization(s) which are(is) operating currently in 
that specific irrigation site 
Whether there was farmers’ participation during construction of the 
whole structure 
 
31.66201***   
(9.451805)  
.1082202   
(.1317924)      
-2.822012***   
(.7500963) 
 
 
-3.81969   
(4.405514)     
 
 
 
-5.561101    
(8.30507)     
 
.0124345   
(.0131478)      
-.2379589***   
(.0912393)     
.1992439**    
(.097155)      
 
 
.28171   
(2.835483)      
2.597125*   
(1.427277) 
.9038073    
(1.71336)      
-17.29776***   
(5.847238 
 
 
   
 
 
22.84148***     
(6.85976)     
.0780718      
(.09509)  
-2.035845***      
(.54685)  
 
 
-2.755586      
(3.18131)    
 
 
 
-3.980742     
(5.89241)    
 
.0089704      
(.00949)     
-.1716674***      
(.06613)    
.1437377**       
(.0703)     
 
 
.2033986     
(2.04927)     
1.873608*     
(1.02923)     
.6520212      
(1.2363)     
-10.72948***     
(3.07866)    
  
 
.4353463***       
(.1413)     
.001488      
(.00182)  
-.0388021***      
(.01136)  
 
 
-.05252      
(.06084)    
 
 
 
-.0786816      
(.12191)    
 
.000171      
(.00018)     
-.0032719***      
(.00132)    
.0027396**      
(.00138)     
 
 
.0038628      
(.03876)     
.03571*      
(.02023)     
.0124272      
(.02361)     
-.3503727**      
(.15195)     
 
 
 Marginal Effects
  171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***statistical significant at 1%; ** statistical significant at 5%; * statistical significant at 10% 
1Latent variables give ordinary Tobit results,   3Conditional on being uncensored value shows the effect of the independent variable for cases with a non-limit values on the dependent 
variable and 4Probability on uncensored indicates the effect on the probability  of having a non-limit value for cases with the limit value of the dependent variable. 
Explanatory Variables 1Latent 
Variables 
3Conditional 
on being 
Uncensored 
4Probability 
Uncensored 
Type of irrigation system dummy, cf., communal ponds 
Micro-dams 
 
River diversion 
 
Spring water use 
 
Shallow well 
 
_Cons 
 
/sigma 
 
Type of regression 
left-censored observations at nconf<=0 
uncensored observations 
right-censored observations 
Number of observation 
LR chi2(28)                                                        
Prob > chi2      
Pseudo R2  
 
Fraction of sample above the limit and adjustment factor for 
unconditional expected value: (Ф(z)) 
Fraction of mean total response above limit and adjustment factor for 
cases above limit: 
(1-zφ(z)/ Ф(z)- φ2(z)/ Ф2(z) 
Adjustment factor for cases at the limit(φ(z)/σ)    
 
 
 
 
 
4.387408   
(12.85366)      
1.585662   
(12.64176)      
2.254329   
(14.65023)      
-20.37767   
(13.44198)     
-25.44499   
(37.22276) 
12.23234   
(.7399531) 
Tobit 
25 
144 
0 
169 
127.78 
0.0000 
0.0984 
 
.852 
 
.63152 
 
 
 
.0192928          
   
  
 
3.063705     
(8.67663)     
1.159462     
(9.36703)     
1.680774      
(11.271)     
-10.10033**     
(4.088060    
  
 
.0669518      
(.21636)     
.0208243      
(.15841)     
.0275922      
(.15809)     
-.5389041      
(.41277)      
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7.2.2. Determinants for Conflict Occurrence in Community Managed Irrigation 
Schemes, 2006/07 
 
The estimated result of the Tobit model and the decomposed Tobit coefficients of the 
determinants for conflict occurrence are presented in Table 7.2.2.  From the total of 169 
observations,  only 144 groups had experienced conflict related to water distribution 
issues in 2006/07, so the proportion of cases above the limit (i.e., zero in our case) (Ф(z)) 
is 0.85.  
 
As shown in the table, there is no strong correlation between the regional dummies and 
number of conflict occurrence in 2006/07. Related to household factors, we found that 
conflict occurrence is positively associated with total number of households per group, 
but negatively associated with total number of households squared. This finding suggests 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between total number of households in a group and 
number of conflict occurrence. The turning point in this relationship is nearly 196 
households per group; within the range of number of households observed (the range in 
our case is from 4 to 297 households per group). Possibly it indicates that, as the number 
of households increases, the resource becomes scarcer and unable to be shared as the 
members want. As a result number of conflicts increases but after some point it begins to 
go down. This witnesses that as number of households grows to very high levels, the 
gains from collective action may be outweighed by the incentive problems associated 
with it. As rising scarcity increases, the benefit from attempting to ‘free-ride’ on the 
efforts of others also increases. Consequently, ‘exit options’ increases, users start to 
frustrate and leave to co-operate but keep only the membership title which has a negative 
impact on number of conflict occurrence. Similar to the previous section (determinants of 
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number of violation occurrence), we did not expect this relation35. Further research is 
needed to accept or reject the ex-post hypothesis. 
 
With regard to, proportion of female headed households, we found that groups which 
have larger proportion of female headed households experienced less number of conflicts. 
This witnesses in stead of arising conflicts frequently, women contribute to solve their 
irrigation-related problems through informal discussions. This result is both statistically 
and qualitatively significant. This suggests that policy intervention is needed to 
encourage women’s participation in farm, forum and leadership level (in both WUC and 
conflict resolution committee) in all irrigation schemes.  
 
Average family size in a group is also negatively correlated with conflict occurrence at 
10% level of statistical significant. This means that groups which have larger average 
family size have experienced less number of conflicts in water distribution use. Perhaps, 
it is because of great availability of family labor to contribute as much as collective 
action demands which decreases the probability of conflict occurrence and ‘free-riding’ 
problem in the irrigation sites. Increase in average family size of a group by a unit, results 
in an expected decrease of 1.2 units of conflict in groups that have already experienced a 
conflict and also 2.4 % lower probability of experiencing a conflict in groups with no 
conflicts. 
 
                                             
35 Our hypothesis was as the number of beneficiaries in a group increases number of conflicts also 
increases.  
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Furthermore, another group characteristic which has statistically significant association 
with conflict occurrence is total irrigated area in a group. That is larger area of irrigated 
land in a group is more likely to have higher number of conflicts, since it becomes more 
difficult to monitor the water distribution sequence for group leaders. Therefore, 
beneficiaries begin to shirk or collude against the use rules which leads to more conflict 
occurrence. However, it should be noted that even if it is significant statistically the 
variable has insignificant effect in magnitude implying its less importance to make policy 
implication. 
 
One of the most important group level factors which the result is both statistically and 
quantitatively significant is the proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-end in a group. A 
unit increase in the proportion of beneficiaries at the tail leads to an expected increase of 
number of conflicts by nearly 23 units in groups that have experienced a conflict. It also 
increases the probability of experiencing a conflict by 43.5% in groups with no conflict 
experience. The possible reasons could be the resource becomes scarcer at the tail; as a 
result beneficiaries scramble to get a share which leads to conflict occurrence. There is 
also a great of possibility for intervening by other farmers as the water flows from head-
end to tail-end fields. The greater cumulative effect of seepage and evaporation losses in 
delivery canals as fields are more distant from the water source is also another reason for 
the scarcity of irrigation water at the tail. It also suggests that intervention is needed in 
those irrigation schemes that have higher proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-end.  
 
  175 
Pa
ge
17
5 
With regard to provision of training, there is a negative association with number of 
conflict occurrence. One more time of training provision by beneficiaries in a group 
implies an expected decrease change of conflict experience by 2 units and decreases the 
probability of experiencing a conflict by 3.9% in groups with no conflict occurrence. This 
might be because of the training helps them to use the water efficiently in wet as well as 
in dry seasons. The training also enables them to respond more easily for the problem 
they face through informal ways. 
 
Access to markets also affects the number of conflict occurrence, though the effects are 
mixed. Groups closer to the village market have experienced higher number of conflicts. 
Possibly it is because of high demand of irrigation water.  Being 1 hour further from the 
village market implies an expected decrease in the conflict occurrence by 0.17 unit in 
groups that have experienced a conflict and also 0.33% decline in the probability of 
experiencing a conflict in groups with no conflict experience. On the other hand, conflict 
has been occurred less frequently in groups closer to tabia development post.  
 
Concerning scheme level characteristics, groups with greater number of external 
organizations are positively and statistically significant associated with higher number of 
conflict (10% significant level). This evidence supports the hypothesis that the presence 
of external organizations may undermine collective action if they are providing 
substitutes for collective action. We also found that as the number of external 
organizations increases by one unit, increased expected conflict occurrence by almost 2 
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units in groups that have experienced a conflict and increase in the probability of 
experiencing conflict by 3.6% in groups with no conflict experience.  
 
As expected, farmers’ participation during construction of the whole structure of the 
irrigation scheme and number of conflict experienced in 2006/07 have negative 
correlation. It is statistically (at 1% significant level) as well as quantitatively significant. 
Each additional unit participation of farmers implies 10.7 units expected decline of 
number of conflict occurrence in groups that have already experienced a conflict. 35% 
less probability of experiencing a conflict occurs per farmers participation, in groups with 
no conflict experience. The most interesting implication of this result is that, it may serve 
as one type of policy instrument to increase effectiveness of collective (community) 
managed natural resource. In terms of irrigation system type shallow well dummy found 
to be negatively associated with frequent number of conflict occurrence as compared with 
beneficiaries who use communal lake water for irrigation purpose. 
 
Note that the expression in Table 7.3 (1-zφ(z)/ Ф(z)- φ2(z)/ Ф2(z) a numerical value of 
less than 1.00, i.e., 0 .63152 is the fraction of the total effect of an independent variable 
that is attributable to the effect of being above the limit(McDonald and Moffit 1980). Put 
simply, in our case, only about 63% of the total change in number of conflict occurrence, 
resulting from a change in the independent variables, in groups that had conflict. 
Whereas, about 37% of the total effect of the independent variables is generated by 
changes in the probability of experiencing a conflict in groups with no conflicts.  
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7.3. Analysis of the Determinants of Enforcement of Penalty System  
Following all these results, one thing we should consider is devolving rights to local 
communities to manage resources, i.e., establish use rules and regulations is only a 
necessary condition for successful community resource management. Sustainable 
resource management also requires that the community rules are enforced.  
 
As shown in Table 3.2, almost 95% of the groups in the study area have their own formal 
written restricted rules. It includes the penalty system (punishment if some one from the 
WUA is found out not to abide by the rules). In addition, on average nearly 23 number of 
times per group in year 2006/07 violation of rules and regulation had occurred (with 2 a 
minimum value and 72 a maximum value). However, the number of times the penalty 
system applied has a mean value of 4 times per group (with 0 as a minimum and 28 as 
maximum value). This leads to the question of what are the determinant factors of 
enforcement of penalty system. We will discuss it in the following section. 
  178 
Table 7.3.Tobit/Tobit Decomposition Results – Determinants of Effectiveness of Collective Action on Community Irrigation Water Management, 2006/07. 
Number of Penalty exercised in 2006/07 cropping season 
 
   Marginal Effects 
Explanatory Variables 1Latent 
Variables 
3Conditional 
on being 
Uncensored 
4Probability 
Uncensored 
Regional Characteristics 
 
Woreda, cf.,Ada’a 
 
Group Characteristics 
 
Total number of households in the group 
 
Proportion of female headed households in the group 
  
Proportion of literate headed households in the group 
 
Average family size in the group 
 
Proportion of households who have used formal credit in the group 
 
Proportion of households who have included in the agricultural 
extension programme 
 
Proportion of households whom the primary source of livelihood is 
irrigated agriculture 
 
 
Total irrigated area in the group 
 
Total agricultural land in the group(non-irrigated land) 
 
 
Tropical livestock unit for the group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.89077***   
(3.129638)    
 
 
.0105169   
(.0214443)      
.9746128   
(2.724429)      
.1497064   
(1.950338)      
.0264495   
(.3127141) 
.0402548   
(.0338929)      
4.595077   
(9.652505)      
 
.9326368   
(1.222324) 
 
 
.0586374   
(.0780284)      
-.0625308   
(.0529208)     
 
.0051532   
(.0081646) 
                 
 
 
6.556517***     
(1.65821)     
 
 
.0062018      
(.01266)     
.5747295     
(1.60746)     
.0882819     
(1.15007)     
.0155973      
(.18441)     
.0237383      
(.02001)     
2.709719     
(5.68971)     
 
.5499762      
(.72051)     
 
 
.0345785      
(.04603)     
-.0368744      
(.03129)    
 
.0030389      
(.00482)     
 
 
         
 
 
.7737188***    
(.14347)     
 
 
.0007203      
(.00147)     
.0667499      
(.18661)     
.0102532      
(.13358)     
.0018115      
(.02142)     
.002757      
(.00233)  
.3147108      
(.66205)     
 
.0638751      
(.08394)     
 
 
.004016      
(.00535)     
-.0042827      
(.00364)    
 
.0003529      
(.00056)     
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Table 
7.3. 
 Marginal Effects
Explanatory Variables 1Latent 
Variables 
3Conditional on 
being Uncensored 
4Probability 
Uncensored 
 
Proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-end 
 
Year of experience of irrigation water use, no. 
 
Provision of training, no.  
 
 
Farm Characteristics 
 
Proportion of soil coverage considered good by the group in the 
catchment area 
 
Village Characteristics 
 
Whether rainfall adequacy in the village is considered good by the 
group 
Walking time from that group’s specific irrigated land to( in hours) 
Town market 
 
Village market 
 
Development post 
 
Scheme Characteristics 
  
Whether the irrigation scheme was promoted by the external 
organization 
Number of external  organization(s) which are(is) operating currently 
in that specific irrigation site 
Number of local  organization(s) which are(is) operating currently in 
that specific irrigation site 
Whether there was farmers’ participation during construction of the 
whole structure 
  
 
5.009939   
(3.058099) 
-.0006786   
(.0420731) 
.5419897**   
(.2430756)  
 
 
 
.0474522   
(.9905721)      
 
 
 
16.9014***   
(3.268852)      
 
-.0079778*    
(.004421)     
-.0549612*   
(.0290206)     
-.1059926***  
(.0320375)      
 
 
-1.512739*  
(.8855637)     
1.657044***   
(.4960262)      
-.4523449   
.5786978         
1.690883   
(1.773824)      
 
          
 
 
                 
 
2.954363     
(1.80447)     
-.0004002      
(.02481)    
.3196115**      
(.14359)    
 
 
 
.0279826      
(.58415)     
 
 
 
10.53624***     
(2.03316)     
 
-.0047045*       
(.0026)    
-.03241078*     
(.01707)    
-.0625039***     
(.01885) 
 
 
-.8770504*      
(.50704) 
.9771596***      
(.29505)     
-.266748      
(.34164)    
.9466532      
(.94064)     
 
     
         
 
 .3431241      
(.21126)     
-.0000465      
(.00288) 
.0371202**      
(.01694) 
 
 
 
.0032499      
(.06784)     
 
 
 
.8593785***      
(.08878)     
 
-.0005464*      
(.00031)    
-.0037642*      
(.00202)    
-.0072593***      
(.00229)     
 
 
-.1064902*      
(.06417)    
.1134888***      
(.03513)     
-.0309805      
(.03972)    
.1255824      
(.14151)     
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***statistical 
significant at 
1%; ** 
statistical 
significant at 
5%; * statistical significant at 10% 
1Latent variables give ordinary Tobit results,  3Conditional on being uncensored value shows the effect of the independent variable for cases with a non-limit values on the dependent 
variable and 4Probability on uncensored indicates the effect on the probability  of having a non-limit value for cases with the limit value of the dependent variable. 
 Marginal Effects
Explanatory Variables 1Latent 
Variables 
3Conditional 
on being 
Uncensored 
4Probability 
Uncensored 
 
Type of irrigation system dummy, cf., communal ponds 
Micro-dams 
 
River diversion 
 
Spring water use 
 
Shallow well 
 
_Cons 
 
/sigma 
 
Type of regression 
left-censored observations at nconf<=0 
uncensored observations 
right-censored observations 
Number of observation 
LR chi2(28)                                                        
Prob > chi2      
Pseudo R2  
 
Fraction of sample above the limit and adjustment factor for 
unconditional expected value: (Ф(z)) 
Fraction of mean total response above limit and adjustment factor for 
cases above limit: 
(1-zφ(z)/ Ф(z)- φ2(z)/ Ф2(z) 
Adjustment factor for cases at the limit(φ(z)/σ)    
 
 
 
  
8.376642*   
(4.383649)     
11.78554***   
(4.297464)        
3.141721    
(5.30952)         
-8.654913   
(4.444963) 
-28.80875**   
(13.09756)     
4.008876     
(.25278) 
Tobit 
35 
134 
0 
169 
89.23 
0.0000 
0.0996 
 
.792899 
 
.5731 
 
 
.07696299 
 
                 
 
 
3.981087**     
(1.70444)     
9.058153**     
(3.67628)     
2.188808     
(4.24391)     
-2.984805      
(.79237)        
 
 
.6660501**     
(.30028)     
.4253279**     
(.10626) 
.1480139      
(.14802)     
-.7110354     
(.20176)       
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The estimated results of the Tobit model and the decomposed Tobit coefficients for 
determinants of effectiveness of penalty system in community managed irrigation 
schemes, 2006/07 is presented in Table 7.4. Among the total of 169 observations, only 
134 groups had exercised penalty for the violation of rules and regulations occurred  
during 2006/07, so the proportion of cases above the limit(that is, zero in our case)(Ф(z)) 
is 0.79.  
 
We found that there is a positive and very significant association between regional 
dummies and number of penalty applied (at 1% statistical significant level).  That is 
groups which are located in Atsbi had applied the penalty system more often than groups 
which are found in Ada’a. Perhaps, there has been strong informal code of conduct for 
long period of time in Atsbi. Groups which are found in Ada’a have 77.8% lower 
probability of applying penalty system.  
 
Not surprisingly, provision of trainings and enforcement of penalty system in year 
2006/07 are highly and positively correlated (at 5% level of significant). This result is 
consistent with the previous findings in this study, provision of training on collective 
action. One more time provision of training implies 3.7% higher probability of exercising 
a penalty system, in groups with no penalty had exercised. This indicates that groups 
which have received more frequent training better understand the whole purpose of 
imposing and enforcing use rules and regulations. They may be more aware of the 
benefits of applying penalty system on effective utilization and sustainable use of the 
resource. This gives support for recommendation that more frequent provision of 
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trainings to beneficiary farmers will have a remarkable and positive impact on increasing 
the benefit of collective action. 
 
In areas where there is adequate amount of rainfall, less use of the penalty system is 
observed. This finding is consistent with the argument that higher agricultural potential 
may lead to higher labor opportunities and wages, hence higher costs of collective action. 
Access to market also affects the number of penalty system enforced. Groups closer to 
town market, village market and tabia development post had exercised more penalty 
system. Probably, beneficiaries have more access to information and also understand the 
benefit of imposing rules and regulations on irrigation water use to produce more market 
oriented crops, which they can sell it in those markets.   
 
In relation to scheme characteristics, the study shows that the initial involvement of 
external organization (whether the scheme was promoted by external organization or not) 
has negative association with penalty enforcement. Perhaps, it is due to the fact that 
external organizations might displace local collective action. On the other hand, number 
of external organizations which are operating currently in the irrigation sites has a 
positive correlation with the number of penalty system applied. The most interesting 
implication of these results is that over time external organizations seem to understand 
their role in communal natural resource management. In stead of displacing local 
organizations, they are seeking to provide trainings and technical assistance to 
beneficiary farmers which are complementary to local collective action. Every unit 
change in number of external organizations in that specific site implies an expected 
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change of a unit in application of penalty systems in groups that have already applied the 
penalty systems. It also results in 11% less probability of exercising the penalty system in 
groups with no penalty enforcement. With respect to irrigation system type, micro dam 
and river diversion dummies are positively associated with number of penalty system 
enforcement.  
 
Note that the number in Table 7.4, 0.5731 is the fraction of the total effect of an 
independent variable that is attributable to the effect of being above the limit. Therefore, 
nearly, 57% of the total change in number of penalty system had been enforced, resulting 
from a change in the independent variables. It is generated by marginal changes of the 
positive penalty system exercised. While about 43% of the total effect of the independent 
variables is associated with changing the probability of enforcing penalty system in 
groups with no conflicts. 
 
7.5. KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Here we summarized key findings with regard to our hypothesis, the previous chapters 
and their implications. 
 
Regional Characteristics 
Our findings revealed that, collective action is more prevalent and more effective in 
irrigation water users of Atsbi than Ada’a. Irrigation water users in Atsbi have enforced 
the penalty system in more number of times than beneficiaries who live in Ada’a, even if 
the number of violation of restricted rules occurred less frequently than Ada’a. Moreover, 
groups which are found in Atsbi are strongly associated with having water distributor 
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without payment. Instead voluntary labor compensation from beneficiary farmers during 
harvesting is common (an activity which demands higher labor use). This implies that 
how social capital reduce the cost of enforcing collective action in communal managed 
natural resources.  
 
Group Characteristics 
Our result is consistent with the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
number of beneficiary farmers in the group and dependent variables- having and paying 
for guard and water distributor. It has also U-shaped relationship between beneficiary 
farmers in a group and average annual contribution per household.  These findings give 
us evidence that at low levels of number of beneficiaries, the demand for collection 
action to manage resource will be low and average annual contribution per household is 
high. However, as number of beneficiaries’ increases, increasing the resource scarcity 
will increase the benefits of improved resource management, for example by hiring 
guards and water distributor. Average annual contribution per household also declines. 
While, as number of irrigation water users grows to very high levels, beneficiaries begin 
to compete to use the resource, conflicts may arise frequently. Transaction costs for 
attending and enforcing rules also increases and becomes difficult. Violation of rules and 
regulations can be intensified and the ‘free-rider’ problem increases. In this case the gains 
from collective action may be outweighed by the incentive problems associated with it. 
Finally, beneficiaries start to give up and leave to co-operate. They only keep the title of 
water user, without getting the benefit. 
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Higher proportion of female headed households in a group is associated with less average 
value of household contribution. This suggests that both financial and labor constraint 
appears to be a greater concern for female headed households. On the other hand, in 
groups where there is high proportion of female headed households, number of violation 
and conflict occurrence decreases. In addition to this, higher proportion of women farm 
decision makers in the group increases the likelihood of having and contributing for 
guard. This is an indication of their attempt to compensate labor constraints by hiring 
guards. This suggests policy intervention is needed to encourage the participation of 
women in farm, forum (in WUA) and leadership level of WUA and conflict resolution 
committee. 
 
Our evidence also shows that better education status and collective action have strong 
negative association, in both statistically and qualitatively. This finding is consistent with 
the hypothesis that better education status tend to undermine individuals incentives to co-
operate by increasing the opportunity cost of labor or by offering more ‘exit options’. 
Expectedly, we found that larger family size favors collective action. It is positively 
correlated with household contribution and negatively associated with conflict 
occurrence, since groups with larger family sizes can provide labor as much as the 
irrigation agriculture demands.  
 
Previously, we hypothesized that agriculture extension and formal credit programme 
would encourage collective action. However the evidence presented that, it is access and 
using of formal credit that has positive and strong association with collective actions. 
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Probably because of credit is primarily used to purchase inputs like variety of seeds, 
fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides…, which are complementary inputs for irrigation water. 
 
Of the various group level factors, total irrigated area is one of the variables, which were 
hypothesized to affect collective action. It has strong positive association with hiring of 
guard. In addition, it is positively associated with frequent occurrence of conflict. This 
indicates that as the irrigated land size increases the importance of hiring guard to protect 
the sites will be more crucial. However, as the same time monitoring and enforcing of 
transaction cost may rise, beneficiary farmers begin to shirk or to collude against the use 
of rules which leads to frequent conflict occurrence.  
 
We also find that groups which have larger size of land for agriculture (rain-fed) and with 
higher TLU have positive association with having and contributing for both guard and 
water distributor. This suggests that contributing for guard and water distributor relates to 
affordability issue. Thus, groups with a better physical resource are more likely to 
employ guard and water distributor than those with few physical resources. 
 
Our evidence shows that one of the most convincing reasons for collective action failure 
is large proportion of beneficiaries at tail-end. Perhaps the reason might be the increasing 
scarcity of the irrigation water at tail-end due to greater possibility of intervention of 
other irrigation users at the head and middle. In addition, there could be greater 
cumulative effect of seepage and evaporation losses of more distant plots from the water 
source.  It suggests that intervention is needed in those irrigation schemes that have 
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higher proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-end.  Years of experience of irrigation water 
use increases the likelihood of having water distributor. This implies that through time 
beneficiaries have realized the importance of having water distributor. 
 
The regression result also shows that provision of training is positively associated with 
employing both guard and water distributor. One more time training provision for 
farmers implies an expected decrease change of conflict experience by 2 units in a group. 
It also decreases the probability of experiencing a conflict by 3.9% in groups with no 
conflict occurrence. In addition, it is positively correlated with penalty system 
application. These findings are consistent with the argument that more frequent provision 
of training favors collective action. It helps beneficiaries to understand easily the whole 
purpose of imposing and enforcing rules and regulations. It also enables them to be aware 
of how to use the water more efficiently which has a positive effect on sustainable 
utilization of the resource. An important point that should be noted is, it is not being 
literate or not, that is leading to more collective action, rather it is provision of training 
that favors collective action. Thus, more frequent provision of trainings by governmental 
and non-governmental organizations for farmers will have a remarkable and positive 
impact in increasing the benefit of collective action. 
 
Farm Characteristics 
Higher proportion of land in good soil also contributes to lower frequent violation 
occurrence. The number of violation will be lower by 4 units per unit additional in 
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proportion of land in good soil. It also increases the likelihood of employing water 
distributor, implying higher agricultural potential favors collective action. 
 
Village Characteristics 
The study found statistically significant evidence, in areas where there is adequate 
amount of rainfall, less use of the penalty system is observed. Probably because of 
divergence of interests in rain-fed agriculture, hence higher costs of collective action, 
This finding supports the hypothesis that higher agricultural potential may also lead to 
higher labor opportunities. 
 
Mixed effect is observed, with respect to market access on collective action. Groups 
which are closer to village markets are correlated with higher number of conflict 
experience and violation occurrence. Possibly it is because of high demand of irrigation 
water. Being further by an hour from village market implies 15% less violation 
occurrence, 17% decrease in conflict occurrence in groups that have experienced a 
conflict. Moreover, groups which are closer to the town market are more likely to have 
guard and water distributor. In addition, being closer to village market and tabia 
development post have positive correlation with contributing for the payment of the 
guard and water distributor. Besides, groups closer to town market, village markets and 
tabia development post have higher tendency of applying the penalty system. 
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Scheme Level Characteristics 
The study showed that initial involvement of external organization in the promotion of 
the irrigation scheme has negative association with number of penalty system exercised. 
Perhaps initially the external organizations in the irrigation sites might displace local 
collective action. Communities with greater number of external organizations make 
higher annual contribution per households. Average value of annual household 
contribution increases by 25 Birr per additional number of presence of external 
organization which is operating currently in that specific irrigation site. It also increases 
the likelihood of having water distributor. It suggests that the presence of external 
organization increases the benefit of collective action by increasing awareness of profit 
opportunities and new technologies in the irrigation scheme. Greater number of the 
presence of local organizations has high probability of having and contributing for both 
guard and water distributor. This finding supports the hypothesis that local organizations 
may favor collective action due to possible learning effects of how to enhance benefit 
from collective action. 
 
As hypothesized previously, community participation during the construction of the 
irrigation scheme has a positive impact on collective action. It increases the likelihood of 
hiring and contributing for guard than communities who did not participate at all. That is 
an indication of the existence of stronger sense of ownership and belongingness. It is also 
negatively associated with frequent conflict occurrence. This suggests that it may serve as 
one type of policy instrument to increase effectiveness of community managed resources. 
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In terms of types of irrigation system dummies, groups that are located in river diversions 
contribute more than groups that are found in communal lakes. In addition, statistically 
significant positive correlation is depicted between groups which use micro-dam 
irrigation water and having guard and negative correlation with having water distributor. 
The expectation is that the structure of modern micro-dam needs higher protection of 
external as well as internal damage caused by individual and cattle, but less water 
distribution related problems exist because of the presence of modern structures that can 
be easily handled by group leaders. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
8.1. Conclusions 
Improved access to agricultural water supply plays critical role in the sustainable 
livelihoods of rural people. Irrigation is one of the options which increases yield and 
output, facilitates diversification, reduces vulnerability and creates employment 
opportunities. Community natural resource management (for instance in the case of 
communal irrigation water) is increasingly recognized as a viable alternative to 
privatization or state ownership of the resource. As a result, local level resource 
management institutions and organizations to enforce them are receiving greater 
attention.  Irrigation water development in Ethiopia during the imperial and military 
regimes focused on the development of large scale irrigation schemes. This trend was 
reversed by the current government, which emphasized the development of small-scale 
schemes. Since then many new small-scale communal irrigation schemes have been 
constructed. In addition, the old ones also have cleaned up and rehabilitated and handed 
over to the community. However, the history of irrigation development in Ethiopia has 
been characterized by emphasis on technical and engineering aspects, with inadequate 
attention accorded to policy, institutional and socio-economic factors.  
 
In this study, methodologies including descriptive, qualitative and econometric analysis 
are used to analyze the institutional arrangement for water distribution mechanisms and 
to identify factors that determine collective action for provision and appropriation of 
irrigation water.  Besides, group discussion has been undertaken at different levels to 
grasp more detailed information from beneficiaries. Interview has been done with experts 
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on irrigation issues from different governmental and non-governmental organizations. In 
addition, woman participation at farm, association and leadership level was assessed. 
 
In Atsbi, under 221.1 ha of land, there are 14 irrigation schemes which constitute 1855 
beneficiary households. On the other hand, in Ada’a there are a total of 2059 irrigation 
water beneficiaries in 8 communal managed schemes, which covers on 960.5 ha of land. 
Each irrigation scheme is a common property resource that is owned and managed by the 
community. Each scheme has its water users association (WUA), which is administered 
by water users committee (WUC). In addition, there are water courses representatives at 
the outlet (block) level, which are called group leaders. They are 94 in Atsbi and 75 in 
Ada’a. 
 
Collective action in managing irrigation water generally functions well in both study 
areas, which supports the role of community resource management as effective water 
distribution mechanisms. Our evidence revealed that farmers have started to grow crops 
which were not previously grown in the areas.  It was also found that it has also a positive 
impact on their income as well as on the living standard of their families. In addition, 
through time beneficiary farm households depend more on the production from their 
irrigated fields, which enabled them to harvest more than once a year round.  
 
Our finding is also consistent with the argument that irrigation agriculture demands more 
labor person-days than rain-fed agriculture. In year 2006/07, the average labor person-
days used for households in the irrigation sites in Atsbi was around 98 person-days/ha 
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and around 86 person days/ha in Ada’a. This figure is well above as compared to the 
average 55 person–days/ha and 53 person-days /ha labor needed for rain-fed agriculture 
in Atsbi and Ada’a, respectively. 
  
Our findings revealed that, collective action is more effective in irrigation water users of 
Atsbi than Ada’a. They have enforced the penalty system in more number of times, even 
if the number of violations of restricted rules has occurred less frequently than among 
irrigation water users of Ada’a. Moreover, groups which are found in Atsbi are strongly 
associated with having water distributor without payment. Instead voluntary labor 
compensation from beneficiary farmers during times of harvesting is common (an 
activity which demands higher labor use). This implies that how social capital reduce the 
cost of attending and enforcing collective action in communal managed natural resources.  
 
Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between number of households in a group and collective action, for dependent variables-
hiring of guard and water distributor. Moreover, we also found U-shaped correlation 
between household number in a group and annual average value of contribution per 
household. 
 
Expectedly, collective action is more prevalent and more effective in groups with larger 
family size. The expected reason is that farm households with larger family size can 
supply more labor as much as the irrigation agriculture demands both individually (in 
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farm activities) and collectively (in clearance and maintenance of canals and the whole 
infrastructure).  
 
We also found that access to market is associated with higher probability of having guard 
and exercising the penalty system more frequently, which favors collective action and its 
effectiveness. However, on the other hand, higher number of conflicts and violation of 
rules are observed. The reason might be excess demand for irrigated land and water in 
those places, where they can enable to sell what they produce very easily.  
 
Though women (wives) are found to be significantly involved in irrigated agriculture in 
male headed households, the revenue generated from irrigation agriculture is entirely 
controlled by men. On the other hand, large proportion of female headed households in 
the study areas quit to practice irrigation due to excess burden in the household, financial 
problem and unsafe timing of irrigation water use. This result also supports the 
econometric result. There is negative association between higher proportion of female 
headed households and annual average value of a household contribution for the resource 
management. It implies that financial and labor constraints appear to be a greater concern 
for women farm decision makers.  Moreover, higher proportion of female household 
heads has significantly positive relationship with hiring guard and water distributor, 
indicating their attempt to compensate labor constraints they have by hiring labor. The 
participation of women in association and leadership level is very low, because of the 
prevailing gender ideology among the community, which women are considered to be 
less capable in their understanding. However, the estimation result reveals that higher 
  195 
Pa
ge
19
5 
proportion of female household heads has negative relationship with occurrence of 
conflict and violation of rules and regulations. This implies that women’s higher 
capability to solve irrigated related problems through informal discussions. 
 
In addition, the findings of the study imply that collective action for irrigation water 
management may be more beneficial and more effective in areas with intermediate 
number of beneficiaries, in areas that are close to market and credit access, in groups that 
have longer years of experience in irrigation water use, in groups with larger family size, 
in communities with larger number of local organizations, and in schemes where there 
was participation of beneficiaries during construction of the scheme. 
  
8.2. Recommendations 
At the aggregate level, we found that producing crops using communal irrigation water 
has positive impact on the net revenue of the community. Therefore, to mitigate the 
erratic nature of rainfall and to cope up with the ever-increasing food demand of the 
population of the country, development and implementation of small-scale communal 
irrigation schemes will be helpful to promote productivity and production of farm 
households. 
 
In addition, both qualitative and quantitative results of the study show that collective 
action in managing irrigation water generally functions well in both areas. This indicates 
that it can be one option to combat the risk of “tragedy of commons” in managing the 
common pool resource- irrigation water.  Therefore, effort should be done to increase 
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effectiveness of collective action in both areas to use the resource in more sustainable 
way. 
 
From cost-benefit analysis, we still observe that productivity of irrigated land is also 
affected by input use such as variety of seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides and other 
important inputs. Hence, institutional interventions should be made on the availability of 
support services such as credit extension, input supply and marketing, especially in areas 
such as Atsbi which are remote from most infrastructures. The benefit found from the 
marketable crop started to be grown, depends on market and infrastructure accessibility. 
Thus, efforts should be made in improvement of infrastructure as well as in creating a 
market linkage.  
 
In both study areas local routes such as associations and conflict resolution committees 
are preferred by local communities from formal ones. This is because of the existence of 
a stronger sense of identity and belongingness than in the formal set-ups. Therefore, 
attention should be given to such informal institutions to strengthen their capacity and in 
creating strong linkage with the formal institution arrangements.  Through time the 
demand for irrigation water increases among beneficiary farmers. Therefore, assigning of 
water rights and strengthening organization and operation of WUAs will be very essential 
for further efficient use of the common pool resource.  
   
Our evidence shows that number of provision of trainings favors collective action. Thus, 
more effort should be exerted by both governmental and non-governmental organizations to 
provide training more frequently to enhance the understanding of beneficiary farmers on how 
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to use the irrigation water efficiently and to raise awareness towards the purpose of enforcing 
the rules and regulations. 
 
The major factor for failure of collective action is high proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-
end. It is highly correlated with frequent occurrence of conflict and violation of restrictions.  
Therefore, intervention should be needed in order to expand the capacity of the scheme, in 
those sites that have higher proportion of beneficiaries at the tail-end. Our findings also 
suggest that, in communities that are remote from markets or high group size, private –
oriented approaches to resource management may be more effective.  
 
In addition to active involvement of beneficiaries in the design and implementation stage, 
pre-feasibility and feasibility study is needed before the construction of a long-term 
infrastructure such as communal irrigation scheme. This helps to avoid frequent destruction 
and conflict occurrence among different interest groups and enables rapid cost recovery of 
the resource.    
 
The most disadvantaged group of farmers are female headed households who are found in 
lower economic status of the community and have a problem of family labor constraints. 
Moreover, the participation of women in WUA and leadership levels is limited due to the 
wrong perception existed in the society. Thus, government support will be essential to 
improve the livelihood of women farm decision makers and effort should be made to raise 
awareness towards gender equality in the community. In addition, policy intervention is 
needed to encourage the participation of women at farm, forum (WUA) and leadership level 
of WUA and conflict resolution committee.   
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ANNEX 1.The Written By-Laws in Atsbi  
In Atsbi, in all the irrigation schemes the components of the by-law are the same, except 
the penalty system part. It varies scheme to scheme. The formulated written by-law 
constitutes three parts.   
(i) Rules and Regulations- in this section the whole obligations of farmers are stated in 
the following manner:  
1. All irrigation water beneficiary farmers should abide by the stated rules and 
regulations; 
2. All members should cultivate vegetables, fruits, pulses and spices using irrigation 
water; 
3. All farmers have to use fertilizer in order to enhance the fertility of the soil; 
4. Every beneficiary must leave half a meter of land as boarder. In this piece of land 
each farmer must cultivate fruits and forage; 
5.  Planting eucalyptus and cactus trees is strictly forbidden because it consumes 
high amount of water; 
6.  Nobody can walk across the irrigated farm land with his/her cattle along side;  
7.  It is every farmer’s responsibility to protect the whole structure of the irrigation, 
to clean and maintain the canal  and use the water efficiently;  
8. For every water distributor and irrigation water guard the payment should be done 
on the agreed time; 
9. Each of the executive committee must handle his/her responsibility/duty 
efficiently.  
(ii) The second section explains the rights beneficiary farmers have; 
1. All farmers have the right to use every crop type they harvest; 
2. Every beneficiary can sell his/ her products everywhere(market) he / she wants 
3. Every water user has the right to vote and to be elected as an executive committee 
4. In the general assembly, each beneficiary farmer can raise any irrigation-related 
issues and can comment on the rules and regulations.  
(iii) The third part and the more detailed section is the penalty system for not abiding by 
the rules and regulations. 
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1) Each beneficiary farmer is not allowed to cultivate any new types of crops in the 
irrigated fields36, without permission from the WUC and/or DA. If so, she/he shall 
be dismissed from membership immediately; 
2) If a farmer is not willing to use inputs on his/her irrigated farm, for the first time 
he/she shall receive advice. If he/she refuses to accept the advice, complete 
dismissal of membership shall be followed ;  
3) If a water user violates a half meter common border. For the first time she/ he 
shall be penalized a cash fine. If he/ she refuses, the case shall be discussed in 
local court; 
4) Fruits and forages should be planted on the border’s of once plot; otherwise, for 
the first time he/she shall receive advice. If he/she refuses, he /she shall be 
penalized in cash. For the third time, the case shall be discussed in front of the 
general assembly of WUA and decided accordingly; 
5) If a beneficiary plants eucalyptus and cactus trees, the case shall be seen in front 
of the tabia court; 
6) Walking across the irrigated land with cattle is strictly forbidden. Otherwise, for 
each kind of cattle or animal there are different levels of penalty systems in cash. 
If he/she did it consciously the case would be discussed in the general assembly 
and decide accordingly;  
7) Every beneficiary in the scheme has to participate in the clearance as well as 
maintenance of canals. If not, for the first time he/she shall be penalized in cash 
and clean the same length of canal as other farmers do. If she/he refuses and do it 
again, he/ she shall be penalized more amount of money and clean double length 
of canal. Finally, complete dismissal from membership shall be followed; 
8) Beneficiaries must use the irrigation water appropriately. If not, for the first time 
she/he shall be penalized in cash. For the second time, the case will be seen in 
local court. 
9) All members of WUA should contribute for the salary of water distributor and 
guards. If not, for the first time he/she will receive advice. If he/she refuses, 
                                             
36 The permission is needed due to farmers can plant new kinds of crops without much knowledge of it. The 
new type of crop might have a capacity of consuming more amount of water. As a result, the nearby 
cultivated crops can wither. 
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he/she will be forced to pay the double amount and the case will be discussed in 
front of the general assembly; 
10) If the guard fails to protect the irrigation site and similarly if water distributor fails 
to administer the operation of the water distribution, for the first time the penalty 
shall be in cash (which varies from scheme to scheme). But afterwards, he shall 
be fired for good; 
11) The executive committee has the responsibility to meet and discuss the operation 
of the irrigation scheme once a month. If a member of the committee is absent, 
the penalty shall be in cash. If he/she does it again, complete dismissal from WUC 
shall be followed; 
12) Each beneficiary must attend every meeting. Otherwise, he/she shall be penalized 
in cash for being late as well as for being absent. 
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ANNEX-2- The Written By-Laws in Ada’a  
In Ada’a the presentation of the written rules and regulations is a bit different from Atsbi. 
It was also observed that in all schemes the by-laws are the same. The by-laws are 
divided into seven articles:-  
Article 1- states the name of the Water Users Association (WUA), 
Article 2- identifies the address of the association, 
 Article 3–states when it was established and the aims, objectives and vision of the 
association, 
 Article 4- duties, responsibilities and obligations of member beneficiaries  
This article includes issues such as:  
• The beneficiaries have right and obligation to comment, give suggestions and 
finally decide on the issues forwarded by the executive committee and the 
performance of the committee.  
• Above half of the members should be present to decide on the forwarded issues. If 
they refuse to do so, the decision shall be done by members who are present. 
Article 5- Explains about the rights members have as a beneficiary of irrigation water 
user. Any beneficiary can-  
• vote or can be elected as a executive committee and 
• Among members of the executive committee, if a member misuse the available   
resource of the association for his/her individual need, she/he shall be judged in 
front of the general assembly and local court. 
Article 6- (1) obligations of beneficiaries as the water user  
All members- 
• should abide by the rules and regulations; 
• have to contribute (money) annually within agreed time;  
• If a farmer refuses to participate in any provision of collective action (cleaning, 
maintenance and construction of canals), he/she shall be penalized a cash fine set 
by the WUA. 
• If any beneficiary refuses to abide by the rules and regulation, she/he shall be 
dismissed from membership for good. 
    (2) Duties and responsibilities of the executive committee.  
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The WUC has 5-7 committee members with their own duties and responsibilities. These 
are: 
1. Chairperson    4. Secretary 
2. Treasurer    5. Cashier  
3. Auditor    6. Members. 
 
And finally, article 7 states that -  
a) Every beneficiary farmer should contribute 12 Birr/year.  If she/he fails to do so, 
he /she shall be forced to pay with penalty.  
b) Every 15 days, the committee members have a meeting and the general meeting 
will be held quarterly. The penalty system in cash exists in absence or being late 
from meetings. 
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